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JOHN P. WHEMN, P.C. 
2 I 3 N. 4rh Street 
Coeur dxlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax; (208) 664-2240 i I 
IS&# 6083 1 
1 
/ IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JqDlClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE CipUNV OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. IAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
SASE NO, CV-03-04621 
3RDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
JtOTlON TO STRIKE 
Defendants. 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Bre a J. Lawrence, Motion for 
t Enlargement came regularly before the Court on August 7, 2007. John P. 
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Wee s appeared for Pla4nti.Ff. 
, 
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court denied Defendants' motion to strike in' 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE - 1 
Dated: 7 
doh? fl Mitchell 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STRIKE - 2 
0 9 , / 1 0 1 2 0 0 7  1 4  22 F?,% C C 4 2 2 4 0  John P W h e l a n ,  P C 
i 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 4~ SERVICE 
I 
i 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day f September, 2007, 1 caused to e be served a true and correct copy of the forego!-ng by the method indicated 
below, and addressed as indicated below: I 
John P. Whelan 
21 3 N. 4eh Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid $ Fax to (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
1/_ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
OY,'lU/Z00 7 1 4 . 2 2  FA::; 6 6 4 2 2 4 0  John  P 'Vhe l an ,  P C 
J%pPz 
*, :- 'W,. s<g+g*;. p&;gg;2 
$<?.* .' * 
f@Q&i;$ 
\ 9 + z z  c&?$ > qggjy 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8361 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
iSB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEMAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff", 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 I 
VS. / ORDER ON DEFENDANTS7 
DOUGW P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. M R E N C E ,  Husband and Wife, 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTfCE 
Defendants. 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenida j. Lawrence, Motion for 
Enlargement came regularly before the Court on August 7, 2007. John P. 
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. wee& appeared for Plaintiff. 
Having heard the argument of counsel andi having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court granted Defendanr's request regarding, taking notice o f  the Court files. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE- 1 
Having heard rhe argument of counsel anb having reviewed rhe evidence, 
the Court took notice that Metsker maps have been relied upo p 
for many decades. d /3 "\ 
Dated: ~ ~ 7 7  
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE- 2 
0 9 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 ;  14 2 2  F A X  6642240 John P %Ihe lan,  P C 
i*g&b+ [*zkg I 
+g& I 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of September, 2007, 1 caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated 
below, and addressed as indicated below: 
john P. Whelan 
21 3 N. 4'h Street I I 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid I $i Fax to (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at  Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d'  Alene, ID 83814 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
V Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
I 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
JOHN P. WHEUN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N, 4ch Street 
G s e u r  d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
lSB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUE INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
Defendants. 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion for 
Enlargement came regularly before the Court on August 7, 2007. John P. 
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P, Weeks appeared for Plaintiff. 
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court granted Defendants' Motion for Enlargement, and Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment was continued to the date of September 24, 2007. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT- 1 & A  /Cp B 
Dated: ( 2.2?0j7 
r 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT- 2 
CLERK'S SCERTlFfCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of September, 2007, 1 caused to 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated 
below, and addressed as indicated below: 
John P. Whelan 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
$- Fax to (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
% Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
JOHN P, WHEMN, P,C. 
2 1 3 N. 4'h Street 
Coeur diAlene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
vs. / ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J, LAWRENCE, I-iusband and Wife, 
Defendants, 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda f ,  Lawrence, Motion for 
Enlargement came regularly before the Court on August 7, 2007, John P. 
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for Plaintifl. 
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court: denied Defendants' motion for reconsideration. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 1 
Dated: l'/ &337 
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION- 2 
OY:10]2001 1 4  27 F A X  6 6 4 2 2 4 0  J O h n  P W h e l a n ,  P C 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ! day of September, 2007, 1 caused ro 
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated 
below, and addressed as indicated below: 
John P. Whelan 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
y i  Fax to  (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at: Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
)!, Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. Lake~~ood  Dr. Ste. 200 
Goeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 663- 1683 
1SB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
MOTION TO CORRECT 
JUDGMENT 
Defendants. I 
Plaintiff hereby stipulates to the enlargement of time requested by Defendants in this 
matter. Due to a family tragedy, counsel's normal contact with plaintiff has been out of the 
office for an extended period of time. Thus, it is fair that Defendants' motion for enlargement be 
granted. 
DATED this 1 7t" day of September, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
4.- @ ' - - % P A  
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
MOTION TO CORIUZCT JUDGMENT: 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 17"' daj of September, 2007, 1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail C1 
d Wand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Wbelan 
2 13 4"' Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
MOTION TO C O W C T  JUDGMENT: 2 
SUSAN I?. WGEKS 
JAMES, VERNON cY: WEEKS, P.i?c 
1875 M. Lakcwood Dr. Ste. 200 
Coeur d' Alene. ID 83 8 1 4 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1684 
ISB #4255 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COU?l?"J 0;- K?GTENA! ) ss 
;:i!-c:i. 
- - 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IX THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Case No. CV 03-462 1 
STIPULATION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT 
Defendants. 1 
Plaintiff hereby stipulates to the enlargement of time requested by Defendants in this 
matter. Due to a family tragedy, counsel's normal contact with plaintiff has been out of the 
office for an extended period of time. Thus, it is fair that Defendants7 motion for enlargement be 
granted. 
DATED this 17'" day of September, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
465 
STIPULATION FOR ENLARGMENT OF TIME: 1 
CERTIFICATE: OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that oon the 17"' day of September. 2007.1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelan 
21 3 4t" Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
STIPULATION FOR ENLARGMENT OF TIME: 2 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS. P.A. 
1875 N. Lakewood Dr. Stc. 200 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
'I'elepl-tone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (308) 664- 1684 
1SB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiff, 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
VS. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
MOTION TO STRIKJ3 PORTIONS 
OF AFFIDAVIT AND 
SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUG LAWRENCE FILED 
SEPTEMBER 10,2007 
Defendants. 1 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and pursuant to Rule 56 (e), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
hereby moves to strike portions of the affidavit of Douglas Lawrence for the reasons enumerated 
herein. 
Regarding affidavits submitted in support of summary judgment, Posey v. Ford Motor 
Credit Co., 1 1 1 P.3d 162 (Idaho Ct.App. 2005) discussed the requirement that evidence 
submitted by affidavit must be admissible to be considered by the court. Therein the court noted: 
Posey argues that nearly the entire affidavit is inadmissible because it does not 
show that the matters averred to are based on personal knowledge, contains 
conclusory assertions, contains inadmissible hearsay and provides no foundation 
for introduction of attached exhibits. Posey's position is well taken. 
Affidavits supporting or opposing a summary judgment motion must be made on 
personal knowledge, must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, 
and must show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters 
stated. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e). These requirements "are not satisfied )A , 0 
LL : 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT "
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER If), 2007: 1 
by an aftidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay, and not supported by 
personal Imowledge." (Cites omitted.) 
The P O S L . ~  v FOI*LI ;Z/l>for C ' I - L ' L ~ ~ ~  C'O. court further noted: 
Eight documents are attaclied to the affidavit. No foundation is provided 
concerning who prepared the documents. several of which, on their face, indicate 
that they were not prepared by Ford but by the Caldtvell dealership. The affidavit 
purports to identify the documents without demonstration of the requisite personal 
lu~owledge for authentication of the documents pursuant to I.R.E. 90 1 and 
includes arguments as to the documei~ts' legal effect, none of which is admissible. 
(Cite omitted.) To the extent that the documents are offered to show the truth of 
assertiosis contained within them, the documents are hearsay for which no hearsay 
rule exception has been established by the Griffith affidavit. In State v Hill, 140 
Idaho 625, 97 P.3d 1014 (Ct.App. 2004), we described the foundational 
requirements for application of I.R.E. 803(6), the exception to the hearsay rule for 
business records: 
Rule 803(6), the business record exception to the hearsay 
rule, allows admission of a record or report if it was made 
and kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity and if it was the regular practice of that business to 
make the report or record. See Henderson v. Smith, 128 
Idaho 444, 450, 91 5 P.2d 6, 12 (1996); In the Interest qf 
S. K, 127 Idaho 5 13,520,903 P.2d 102, 109 (Ct.App. 
1995). These foundational requirements must be shown 
through "the testimony of the custodian or other qualified 
witness." I.R.E. 803(6). That is, the record must be 
authenticated by someone "who has custody of the record 
as a regular part of his or her work or who has supervision 
of its creation." Henderson, 128 Idaho at 450, 915 P.2d at 
12. A document is not admissible under I.R.E. 803(6) 
unless the person testifying has a personal knowledge of 
the record-keeping system used by the business which 
created the document. Id. ; Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 
293,297,900 P.2d 201,205 (Ct.App. 1995). 
Hill, 140 Idaho at 628, 97 P.3d at 101 7. The mere receipt and 
retention by a business entity of a document that was created 
elsewhere does not transform the document into a business record 
of the receiving entity for purposes of I.R.E. 803(6). Id.; In 
the Interest of S. W ,  127 Idaho 5 13, 520, 903 P.2d 102, 109 
(Ct.App. 1995). Griffith's affidavit does not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 803(6) with respect to any of the records 
attached to his affidavit. 
Posey at 483-484. 
The following portions of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit should be stricken: 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER 10,2007: 2 
1.  I%ragraapl~ 5, sentences 3 and 3 are hearsay and not admissible. 
2. Paragraph 6, sentences 3 and 4 are l-rearsay and not admissible. 
'7 
3.  Paragraph 7, sentences 2, 3 and 4 are hearsay and not ad~~~iss ib le .  
4. Paragraph 8 is hearsay and not admissible. 
5. Paragraph 9, sentences 3.4. 5, 6 and 7 are hearsay and not admissible. 
6. Paragraph 10, 1 1 and 12 contain argument. not testimony and references a 
document that is not attached to the affidavit. 
7. Paragraph 20, sentences 2 is not based on personal knowledge and lacks 
foundation. 
8. Paragraph 22, sentence 2 is hearsay and not admissible. 
9. Paragraph 23, setences 2, 3 , 4  and 5 are hearsay and not admissible. 
10. Paragraph 28, sentences 2,4, 5, 6, and 7 is argument, and not admissible 
evidence. 
11. Paragraph 29 is argument and not admissible evidence. 
12. Paragraph 3 1, sentence2 is argument and not admissible evidence. 
13. Paragraph 32, sentence 2 is argument and not admissible evidence. 
14. Paragraph 33 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
15. Paragraph 34 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
16. Paragraph 35 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
17. Paragraph 36 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
18. Paragraph 37 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
19. Paragraph 38 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
20. Paragraph 39 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
21. Paragraph 41 is argument and opinion, and not admissible evidence. 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER 10,2007: 3 
23. Paragrap/i32 is argtimeiit and iiot admissible evidei~ce. 
23. Paragraph 43 is argument, and iiot admissible evidence. 
24. Paragraph 44, sentence 3 is hearsay and is not based upon personal knowledge 
and co~itradicts the affidavit of John Mack filed in this matter. 
25. Paragraph 45 is argument, and not admissible evidence. 
26. Paragraph 46 is not based on personal kliowledge. The exhibit, previously 
submitted, is admissible. 
27. Paragraph 47 is argument based upon a previously submitted exhibit and not 
admissible evidence. 
28. Paragraph 48 is argument not based upon personal knowledge but rather a 
previously submitted judgment in the record and does not constitute admissible 
evidence. 
29. Paragraphs 50 and 5 1 are argument. not based upon personal knowledge but 
rather documents previously submitted in the record and does not constitute 
admissible evidence. 
30. Paragraphs 52 and 53 lacks foundation. Mr. Lawrence lays no foundation that he 
is a surveyor capable of interpreting the 191 0 viewer's report, ort he 1959 
Metsker map or relating them to the satellite imagery that lie pulled from Google 
Earth and therefore such evidence is inadmissible. 
3 1. Paragraph 56 lacks foundation or any personal knowledge that the road depicted 
is within the 19 10 viewer's report for Mellick Road. 
32. Paragraph 60 lacks foundation. Mr. Lawrence has no personal knowledge 
regarding who constructed the gate depicted in Image 14. 
33. Paragraph 61, sentences 2 and 3 are impermissible hearsay. 
34. Paragraph 64 is argument, not admissible evidence. 
35. Paragraph 65 is argument not based upon personal knowledge. Some is based 
upon documents previously submitted herein. 
36. Paragraph 66 is argument not based upon personal knowledge as it occurred prior 
to Lawrences' ownership. 
37. Paragraph 67 is argument not based upon personal knowledge. 
38. Paragraph 68 is argument not based upon personal knowledge. 
39. Paragraph 69 and Exhibit "T" are not admissible evidence. Mr. Wilbur's affidavit 
is not p;operly authenticated or prepared. 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER 10,2007: 4 
40, f'aragraph 70 is argumc11t not based upon persorlal knoivledge of facts adniissibe 
as evidence. 
4 1.  Paragraph 7 1 is arg~rrrte~lt not based upon personal ktlocvledge of facts. 
42. Paragraph 72 is z~rgument not bascct upon personal knowledge. 
43. Paragraph 74. sentence 4 is hearsay. 
44. Paragraph75 is hearsay. 
45. Paragraph 77 is argument, not admissible facts. 
46. Paragraph 78 and 79 are argument, not admissible facts. 
47. Paragraph 80, sentences 4, 5, 6 and 7 are argument. not admissible facts. 
48. Paragraph 8 1 is argument, not admissible facts. 
49. Paragraph 83 is argument, not admissible facts of which Mr. Lawrence has 
personal knowledge. 
50. Paragraphs 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, and 90 are argument, not admissible facts of 
which Mr. Lawrence has personal knowledge. 
Turning to the supplemental affidavit of Doug Lawrence filed September 10,2007, 
plaintiff moves to strike on the following grounds: 
1. Paragraph 4 is a legal conclusion with argument referenced to other individuals' 
affidavits and depositions. 
2. Paragraph 5 is argument, and not based on defendant's personal knowledge. 
3. Paragraph 6 is argument and not based on defendant's personal knowledge. 
4. Paragraph 7 is argument based upon the deposition of Harold Funk, not 
defendant's personal knowledge. 
5. Paragraph 8 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's 
personal knowlege. 
6. Paragraph 9 is argument from the deposition of Harold Funk, not defendant's 
personal knowledge. 
7. Paragraph 10 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 471 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER 10,2007: 5 
8. I'aragrapli 1 1 is argument. and not based upon defendant's personal knotvledge. 
9. Paragraph 12 is argument, and not based upon dcfcndant's personal knowledge. 
10. Paragrap11 13 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
I I .  Paragraph 14 is argument, asid not based upoil defendant's personal knowledge. 
12. Paragraph15isargurnent. 
13. Paragraph 16, sentences 2,3,  5 and 7 are argument, and not based upon personal 
knowledge. Further, there is no foundation for tlie summary contained on Exhibit 1 regarding 
intersections. 
14. Paragraph 18 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
15. Paragraph 19 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
16. Paragraph 20 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
17. Paragraph 21 is argument, and not based upon defendant's personal knowledge. 
DATED this 17"' day of September, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & W E K S ,  P.A. 
BY: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MOTION TO STRIJCE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER 10,2007: 6 
CERTIFICATE OF SEIIVICE 
-e r- I hereby certify that on the !3 - day of , I caused to be served a tr~te 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by tl-te method indicated below. and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail 
d Wand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Telecopy (FAX) 
John P. Whelm 
2 13 4"' Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 1 6 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT AND SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT 
OF DOUG LAWRENCE FILED SEPTEMBER 10,2007: 7 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VEIII'U'ON & WEEKS. P.A. 
1875 N. Lali-ewood Dr, Ste. 200 
Coeur d'Aletle, ID 838 14 
Telephone: (308) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
ISB 154255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-462 1 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS 
OF AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24, 
2007 
Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence came before 
the Court for hearing on August 7,2007. The court heard argument of counsel, reviewed the 
affidavits, and made its findings of record at the hearing, Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is granted in 
part and denied in part. 
1. The last sentence of paragraph 3 of Mr. Lawrence's affidavit is stricken. The 
objection is overruled with respect to the remainder of paragraph 3. 
2. Paragraphs 4, 5 ,  and 6 are stricken. 
3. Paragraph 8 is sustained on foundation grounds, but overruled as to the 
identification of Exhibit E, Metsker's map. 
4. The motion to strike the first sentence of Paragraph 9 is overruled and granted on 
the second sentence and the third sentence. The Exhibit remains as evidence. 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,2007: 1 
Paragraph 1 8. 
'The motion to strike Paragraph I0 is denied. 
T11e motion is granted with respect to tlie second sentence of Paragraph I 1. 
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 14. 
The motion is denied with respect to Paragrap11 15. 
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 17. 
The motion is granted with respect to the third, fourth and fifth sentences only of 
The motion is granted with respect to the second and third sentences of Paragraph 
The motion is granted as to the second sentence of Paragraphs 20. 
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 22. 
Paragraph 23 is stricken. 
Paragraph 24 is stricken. 
The motion is denied with respect to Paragraph 40. 
The motion is granted as to the second, fourth and fifth sentences of Paragraph 44. 
Paragraph 47 is stricken. 
The motion is granted as to the last sentence of Paragraph 48. 
Paragraph 49 is stricken. 
Paragraph 5 1 is stricken. 
Paragraph 52 is stricken. 
Paragraph 54 is stricken. 
The motion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of Paragraph 57. 
The motion is granted to all sentences except the first sentence of Paragraph 58. 
The fifth, seventh, eight and tenth sentence are stricken of Paragraph 59 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,2007: 2 
77. 'The ob-jection is overruled as to t)aragrapl~ 60. 
28. Paragraph 61 is striclten. 
29. Paragraph 67 is stricken. 
30. Paragraph 68 is striken. 
33. Paragraph 69 is stricken. 
DATED this / r k d a y  of September, 2007. 
&strid Judge 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,2007: 3 
CERTIFICATE, OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that on the day of September, 2007. I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail k Overi~ight Mail Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
Susan P. Weeks 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200 
Coe~tr d' Alene, ID 83 8 14 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684~' 
John P. Whelan 
2 13 4t" Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 / 
477 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE FILED JULY 24,2007: 4 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.11. 
1875 N.  Laliewood Dr. Ste. 200 
Coeur d'ixlene, ID 8381 4 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (205) 664- 1684 
ISB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
Plaintiff, 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
VS. 
Case No. CV 03-462 1 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
Defendants. 1 
Plaintiffs moved to strike: ( I )  Defendants' Motion to Strike portions of certain affidavit 
filed by Plaintiff in support of its summary judgment, ( 2 )  Defendants' opposition response to 
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and supporting affidavits, (3) Defendants' Motion for 
Enlargement of Time, and (4) Request for Judicial Notice because they were not timely. In the 
alternative, Plaintiffs moved for an enlargement of time to respond to the above pleadings. The 
Court having heard argument of counsel on August 7,2007, and enunciated its findings of 
record, 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court grants the motion for enlargement of time to respond and 
$78 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME: 1 
denies the motion to strike as being moot 
'-"+ 
DATED this 1 b ';lay of September. 2007. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1g day of September. 200'7,I caused to be served a true I hereby certify that on the 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
Susan P. Weeks 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive, Ste. 200 
Goeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 14 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 v" 
John P. Whelan 
2 1 3 4t'' Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83 8 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 / 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DEFENDANTS' PLEADINGS OR IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME: 2 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
J S, VERPjON & VE,EICIS, P.A. 
I875 N. Lakewood Dr. Ste. 200 
Coeur dtAlene. ID 83 8 1 4 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
ISB #4255 
Attorneys for PlaintiR 
IN TEE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDJCIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF LDAMO, TN ArCD FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Dclaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff; 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE md BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
AMENDED MOTION TO 
CORRECT JUDGh4ENT 
COMES NOW Plaintiff and hereby files this Amended Motion to replace tlte motion 
filed September 17,2007. Pursuant to Rule 60(a), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Plaintiff 
moves the Court to enter the judgment entered September 11,2007 regarding judicial notice of 
the b fe~ker  map. The Court did not nrle that the Mctsker map was accurate. It ruled that it 
would take notice that it was a Merskr map. 
DA'JXD this 2 1 st day of September, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
BY 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
R :"l 
" t , j  1J 
AMENDED MOTIOH TO COFZRl2CT JUDGMENT: 1 
PAGE E33ii37 
I hcrcby certify that on the 21"' day of September, 2007,T caused to be senred a true and 
concct copy of the foregoing document by d ~ e  method indicated below, and addressed to the 
U.S. Mail Oveni&t hkil 
Hand Delivered d Telccopy (FA4X) 
John P. me1m 
2 1 3 4th Street 
Coeur d7Alene, ID 838 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
AMENDED MOTION TO CORRECT JUDGhENT: 2 
SUSAN P. W E K S  
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
1875 N. Lakernrood Dr. Stc. 200 
Cocur d'Alene, JD 838 14 
"Telephone: (268) 667-0655 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
TSB M255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE FRST J m I C L C  DISTRICT OF THE 
STA4E OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT 
TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS.LAWRENCE md BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, Itusband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME 
COMES NOW the above named PlaintiE, and herein moves the Court for an order 
shortening the time for Notice of Hearing on Plaintiffs Amended Motion to Correct Judgment. 
T h i s  Motion is based on the fact that Plaintiff filcd the motion 0x1 September 17,2007, but d u ~  to 
an oversight, t11e Notice of Hearing was not served or filed at that time. Further, the notion 
language was subsequently replaced by the amended motion due to a clericaI error, 
DATED this 21% day of September, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEKS, P.A. 
BY l"GAd 
SUSAN P. 
MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME: 1 
PAGE 951 87 
CERTImGATE: OF SERVICE 
I hcreby cedi@ that on the 21 St day of September, 2007, I ca~tsed to be served a tme and 
correct copy of the foregoing docment by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following. 
U.S. Mail Overnight MaiI 
Hand Delivered 
John P. Wlelan 
2 13 4" street 
Coeur d' Alene, TI> 838 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
03,'2512001 14 26 F x Y  6642240 John P W h e i a n ,  P C &A t$;! 
W&Y 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4'h Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Teie.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
IS&# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TW E COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND ANSWER 
Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion for 
Leave to Amend Answer came regularly before the Court on September 24, 
2007. John P. Whetan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for 
Plaintiff. 
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court hereby grants the request of Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence 
for leave to file an amended answer raising the additional defense of laches. 
The Lawrences shall not be required to physically file an amended answer as this 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER - 1 
09/25/2007 14.27 FA X  6S42240 John P W h e l a n ,  P C 
#$$$@% &f-z$;** 
--$@4 *-,dir'iY tk3@$fl 
\.#." A I&* %&gy 
order shall serve to authorize the amendment of the Lawrences' answer ta raise 
the defense of laches. 
Dated: c==7 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ANSWER - 2 
0 9 1 2 5 1 2 0 0 7  1 4  27 F?,X 6 S 4 2 2 4 0  John  P Whelan, P C 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the , $b' day of , 2007, 1 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method 
indicated below, and addressed as ind icared below: 
John P. Whelan 
21 3 N. 4rh Street 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Nail, postage prepaid 
Fax to (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
0 3 / 2 5 / 2 0 0 7  1 4 . 2 6  F A X  6 6 4 2 2 4 0  *-$g;a J o h n  P .  I"lhelari, P C .  cr3xs ~ 
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JOHN P. WHECAN, P.C. 
27 3 N, 4'h Street 
Coeur d'Alene, It3 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
IS&# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
ORDER ON MOTION TO 
COMPEL 
Defendants. I 
Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion to 
Compel came regularly before the Court on September 24, 2007. John P. 
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for Plaintifi. 
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court hereby orders Plaintiff, Tower Asset Sub Inc., in accordance with 
I.R.C.P. Rule 30(b)(6), to produce a person or persons having knowledge of the 
case at hand for a deposition to occur within fourteen (1 4) days, to be noticed 
by Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence. The Plaintiff shall pay 
to Defendants the cost of the Court Reporter non-appearance fee of $85.00, 
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL - 1 
487 
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Dated: I 
ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL - 2 
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CLERK" CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY xhat on the day of , 2007,i  
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method 
indicated below, and addressed as indicated below: 
John P. Whelan 
21 3 PI. 4'h street 
Coeur dl Alene, 10 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
% Fax to (208) 664-2240 
- 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
39!25/2007 1 4  2C F A X  6 E 4 2 2 4 0  ,+%% John P 'Whelan, P C &7*$&>s ,*#".*** r%g?Qz 
t~$*,~<$p t@@&# t@g@$ 1 --4& .-*w 
JOHN 8. WHELAN, P.C. 
21 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
Ise# 6063 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 1 
Defendants', Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, Motion for 
Enlargement came regularly before the Coun on September 24, 2007. John P. 
Whelan appeared for Defendants. Susan P. Weeks appeared for Plaintiff. 
Having heard the argument of counsel and having reviewed the evidence, 
the Court hereby grants the Lawrences' Motion for Enlargement of time in which 
to f i le their opposition to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The 
summary judgment hearing is continued to the date of November 28, 2007 at 
3:00 p.m. 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 1 r , [ ln  - e 
Dated: d;! w 
Dis 'q ic Judge MixcheH 
ORDER ON MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT - 2 
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C L E R K 3  CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3~ day of  , 2007, l  
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method 
indicated below, and addressed as indicated below: 
John P. Whelan 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur dl Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid $ Fax to  (208) 664-2240 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Goeur dl  Alene, ID 83814 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
'$ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By: 
dOl-tN P. WHELAN, P,&. 
2 1 3 N. 4" Street 
Coeur dxafenp, 1D $387 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (2538) 664-2240 
lSB# 6083 
IN THE D15TRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TW E COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB fNC. ,  a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS . 
CASE NO. CV-03-462 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN 
IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED 
MOTION FOR 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
DOUGLAS P, LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
HEARING DATE: 
TIME: 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
County of Kootenai 1 
I, John P. Whelan, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OFJQHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 1 
1 ,  1 am the attorney for Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda 
Lawrence in the above-entitled rase and the case of Capstar Radio Operating 
Company v, Lawrence (CV-02-7671)' I have personal knowledge of the 
following facts and could competently testify. 
2 .  I have previously filed the Affidavit of John P. Whelan filed on June 5 ,  
2007 in support of the Defendant's initial Notion for Disqualification for Cause 
and I incorporate herein by reference the factual allegations recited therein. 
3.  1 also filed the Amended Supplemenral Affidavit of John P. Whelan 
(with Exhibit Attached) in support of the Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration 
on July 24, 2007 and I incorporate herein the factual allegations contained 
therein by reference. 
4. 1 submit this affidavitin support of Defendants' Renewed Motion to 
Disqualify the Honorable John T. Mitchell for Cause pursuant' to 1-R-C.P. Rule 
40(d)(2). 
5 .  Since the filing of Defendant's motion for reconsideration of 
Defendants' initial motion for disqualification for cause, the following additional 
events have occurred in the herein case: 
6. 1 have filed a complaint with the Idaho Judicial Council alleging rhar 
Judge John T. Mitchell has engaged in conduct in the herein action that violates 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 2 
the ldahaii Code of$udiciat Conduct, specifically Canan 1,  Canon 2A, Canon 28, 
Canon 3E(I )(a), Cannon 318(1), Canan 38(2), 3B(4), 38(5), and Canan 5C(2), 
7. During a public hearing in his couaroom on October 31, 2007, in 
the Capstar case, Judge Mitchell accused me of lying to the Court. He made this 
allegation while my son, Kellen Whelan, was the sole spectator in the courtroom, 
The Judge was on the bench when I walked into the csunroorn with my son and 
the fudge had a clear view of the persans walking in to the courtroom. The 
fudge accused me of' lying to the court in response to a statement t had made in 
the course of argumentthat the Idaho Supreme Court had vacated the injunction 
that Judge Mitchell had issued in this case when he entered summary judgment 
in the case against my ciient (See Tower Asset Sub /nc. v. Lawrence, 143 ldaho 
71 0,  152  P.3d 581 (2007)).' 1 correctly and truthfully represented the facts to 
Judge Mitchell: the injunction was, in fact, vacated when the Supreme Court 
vacated the order that created the permanent injunction, Judge Mirchelt's 
accusation (in front of my son) that I was a liar was a gross breach of decorum 
and clearly inappropriate. The accusation i s  evidence of the Judge's bias and 
prejudice against me and, therefore, my clients. 
Judge Mitchell granted summary judgment to Plaintiff in this action by an order dated 
Nay 27, 2007. The same order quieted title in favor of Plaintiff and created a permanent 
injunction restraining Defendant from inrefiering with Plainriff's use of Defendants' land. 
Additionally, the order specifically recited that "any bond posted in conjunction with the 
temporary restraining order entered herein is hereby released." This order was appealed to the 
ldaho Supreme Court, The ldaho Supreme Coun vacated the order granring summary 
judgment. By vacating the order granting summary Judgment, the ldaho Supreme Court 
vacated the permanent injunction recited therein. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUAUFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 3 
8. Three days prior to the October 31,  2007 hearing where Judge 
Mitchell called me a tiar, counsel for Ptaintiff, Susan Weeks, filed an application 
for an order shortening time and a Motion for Sixth Access [sic]. Neither motion 
was supparted by an affidavit and nei ther motion referenced a rule basis for the  
motion as required by 1.R.C.P Rule 7(b)(l). At the hearing, I objected to the 
"application" and the "motion" on the grounds tha t  no supporting affidavit was 
filed and no rule basis was cited. I argued that Plaintiff had failed to 
demonstrate grounds for a order shortening rime. My objections were 
summarily overruled. I further argued that the bond that had been ordered and 
posred for the temporary restraining order issued early on in this case had been 
exonerated by the Court's June 7, 2005 order granting summary judgment, 
therefore no bond was in place (as Plaintiff had recovered the bond on May 3, 
2006). 1 funher argued that, at a minimum, a bond should be ordered posted 
by Plaintiff to replace the bond exonerated. The argument was summarily 
dismissed by Judge Mitchell even though I.R.C.P. 65(c) mandates that "no 
restraining order or preliminary injunction shall issue except upon the giving of 
security by the applicant. Judge Mitchell has seemingly refused to follow the 
law.' 
The findings requlred by I.R.C.P. Rule 65(d) also were not in the order granting sixth 
access, which was essentially a mandatory injunction. The Rule 65(d) findings were nor in the 
original preliminary injunction order either. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WHELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 4 
9, 1"h.s abundanely clear rkar  Judge Mitchell applies a rdjfllFerenit: standard 
of conduct to Plaintiff's scclunsei than he applies to your affiant,3 as bath the 
Application For Order Shortening Time and the Motion for Sixth Access [sic) was 
granted without citing any rule basis. 
10. On October 31, 2007, Plaintiff's counsel submitted an order to 
Judge Mitchell entitled "Order Granting Requesr For Sixth Access." The order 
referenced that "the Court having reviewed t h e  application of Plaintiff and the 
affidavit in sutclnort: thereof ..." (emphasis added). In fact, no affidavit had been 
filed in support of Plaintiff's application, a point argued by your affiant. When 
your affiant received the signed order, an "Objection to Form of Order Granting 
Sixth Access" was filed on November 2 ,  2007, the very day that your affiant first 
saw rhe signed order. Apparently, no action has been taken to correct the false 
reference in the Court order, Again, it would appear that Judge Mitchell applies 
a double standard when it comes to misrepresentations to the Caurt made by 
Plaintiff's counsel. A true and correct copy of the order i s  attached as Exhibit A . ~  
' S e e  Affidavit of John P. Whelan filed June 5 ,  2007, In the case of Srraub v. Smith. 
(CV-04-5437), Judge Mitchell denied John  P. Whelan's prevailing client attorney Pees pursuant 
to a standard real esrare purchase conrract conraining an arrorney fee clause because John P. 
Whelan had allegedly failed to reference a rule (1.R.C.P) basis for his motion. In fact, a rule basis 
was sited and Judge Mitchell apparenrly did not read the motlon before denying it. 
The Court is requested to take naclce of the Judicial records referred to herein as well 
as the Court Clerk records regarding the exoneration of rhe bond posted by Plaintiff, 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WMELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 5 
'I 1 Lastly, Judge Mitchell scheduaed bath the Capstar case (CV-02- 
7671) and the Tower Asset case (GV-03-4621) for trial w i t h ~ ~ t  issuing a 
scheduling asder. It is my understanding that & of the Judges in the First 
District roi~tinely issue scheduling orders in every civil case. The absence of 
scheduling orders in the cases at hand seemingly benefits the Plaintiffs, and 
Plaintiff's counsel, in each case in that Plaintiff doeti not have to disclose the 
witness and evidence disclosures required in all other civil cases in the First 
District, thus the Defendants in this case are placed at a distinct disadvantage. 
None ofthe time deadlines established by the routine scheduling order utilized 
by Judge Mitchell apply to the Plaintiff in this case, 
12. I believe that Judge Mitchell is  biased and prejudiced against 
Defendanrs's counsel, your affiant, and that disqualification for cause i s  
warranted by I.R.C.P. Rule 40(d)(2). I also believe that the Judge's impartiality is 
reasonably questioned in this case and that the Judge has failed to follow 
accepted rules of decorum. I also believe that the following Judicial Canons have 
been violated by Judge Mitchell: Canon 1, Canon 2A, Canon ZB, Canon 3€(1)(a), 
Cannon 3B(1), Canon 3B(2), 3B/4), 3B(S), and Canon 5C(2). 
DATED this day of November, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
y for Defendanrs 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. W H E U N  IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 6 
Subscribed and sworn before me this day of November, 2007 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN P. WWELAN IN SUPPORT OF RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE - 7 
I HEREBY CERTIFY rhaf on the T7'day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be 
served a t r u e  and correcr COPPOI: the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N, Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
U,S. Maif, postage prepaid 
7 Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
Judge John T. Mitchell 
324 W. Garden Ave. 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
J Facsimile: (208) 446-1 132 
- Personally served 
SUSAN P, m E K S  
JAMES, =WON & WEEKS, f .A. 
Cmur d'Alae, ID 83 X X 4 
TeIe$ane: (288) 667-W83 
Fa~simda: (20g) 664-1684 
TSB W4Z5 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE RTST.RICT COURT OF E I E  FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE: 
STATE3 OF IDAHO, IN A1?TT) FOR l7.E G O W Y  OF K O Q m A I  
Plaintiff', 
VS, 
CAPSTAR. EkDIO OFERAnNG COMPANY, 
a Delaware corporation, 
ORDER G m r j l  EQ'UEST 
FOR SIXTI3 ACCESS 
Case No. CV 02-767 1 
DOUC3LAS LAW'RENCE and BRENDA 3. 
LAWRENCE, hu~band and sift, 
The Courk having mi-d the appiicaiidn of PlaimEF and thr Afidaqr filed in support 
tl-e and it apparhg that Plaintiff has utilizrd the four (4) accesses granted by &e Corut, and a 
sixth access being ~quizsted: 
IT IS W.WBY ORDERED bt Plaintiff may mak n sixth access to tbc: prop- p m ~ t  
to th8 uxiginal IEI.cm frljunctian. Order atered[ .hcreh PIainW is r q u h d  to fdc a Notice o f  
Acc&s of the date of the sjxth access. 
DATZD this ,? I $'day of b &I k- 2007. 
day o f  G L ' ~ ~ /  2007, I cauxd lo bc imd i 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indkared below, and addressed 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Deli9erc;d 7 
S~~ P. W&s 
James, V m o n  gE. We&, P A .  
1874 N, Lakewoad Dr., Suite 200 
Coeur dFA1ene, ID 838 14 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 1 
0ve.mjght Mail 
J8HN P, WMEldfN, P,C. 
2 1.3 N. 4rh street 
Coeor dxlene, iD 8381 4 
Tele.: (2081 664-5893 
Fax: (288) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KQOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO, CV-03-0462 1 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
DfSQUALlFlCATlClN FOR CAUSE 
DATE: 
TINE: 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
COMES NOW the Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record. john P. Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court for an Order for Disqualification for Cause against rhe Honorable John T. 
Mitchell, presiding judge in the above-entitled action, This motion i s  made on 
the ground that Defendants believe the Honorable John T. Mitchell is biased or 
RENEWED MOTION FOR DiSQUALlFlCATlON FOR CAUSE - 1 
prejudiced againsf them or their case in this action. This rnotisar Is made on the 
ground of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule %O(d)(2). 
Defendants request oral argument. 
DATED f his ay of November, 2007. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ey for Defendants 
RENEWED MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the YHday of November, 2007, 1 caused ro be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 208 
Coeur dAlene,  ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
i/ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
Judge John T, Mitchell 
324 W, Garden Ave. 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile; (208) 446- 1 1 32 
- Personally served 
JOHN P, WHELAN, P.C. 
2 a 3 N. 4''' Srreer 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8385 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5897 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
STATE '2: lC$m 
CQUNTi Ci: vC<FEbJj 
FiEC 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL D I S T R I C T  OF THE 
STATE QF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF KQQTEMAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 1 
Plaintiff, 
Corporation, 
DOUGLAS P- LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J, LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
CASE NO. CV-83-04621 
Defendants 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT HALL 
DATE: November 28, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: JOHN T. MITCHELL 
Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by and through their 
anorney of record, John P, Whelan, hereby move the court further object to the 
Affidavit of Robert Hall, identified herein, which affidavit was offered in support 
to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as follows: 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT HALL - 1 
1 .  Paragraph 7, pg. 3 ,  Second back of foundation for Hall's 
Sentence claimed knowledge of the access 
allegedly used by Switzer. 
2 ,  Paragraph7,pg,3,lastSentence LackofFoundationregarding 
Hall's claim that. the road was 
clearly in view and being used at 
the rime of Terms Corp's purchase 
of the property from Switzer. 
DATED this 1 day of November, 2007. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
By: 1. 
{oh4 P. Whelan 
wney for Defendants 
ADDITIONAL OBJECTIONS TO AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT HALL - 2 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 13&day of November, 2007, I caused to be 
served a r rue  and correct copy of rhe foregoing by rhe  mexhod indicated below, 
and addressed to the folfawing: 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1875 N. Lakcwood Drive 
Suite 200 
Coeur d '  Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: lJ.5. Mail, postage prepaid 
/ Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
JOHN P. WMELAN, P.C. 
2 f 3 N. 4" hTreer 
Caeur dxlene,  !D 8381 4 
le le , :  (208) 664-5891 
fax: {SOB) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
ON THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAi 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-03-8462 1 
RENEWED NOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM 
AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER 
DATE; November 27, 2007 
TIME: 3130 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
COMES NOW rhe  Defendants, Douglas Lawrence and Brenda Lawrence, by 
and through their attorney of record, John P, Whelan, and hereby motions this 
court, pursuant to Rules 1 Z(a) and 12(b) of the Idaho Appellate Rules for an 
Order for Permission to Appeal from an Interlocutory Order. Defendants request 
an Order granting them permission to appeal if Defendants' Renewed Motion for 
Disqualification for Cause is denied, 
RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 1 
This motion is  made on the grounds that. gaod cause was shown for the 
renewed ma"cion for disqualification, and Defendants1 believe t ha t  they cannot 
obtain a fair tr ial f r om Judge fohn 7". Mitchell, The matter is  scheduled for  trial 
on December 10, 2007, therefore Defendants request is an urgent request. 
Defendants request oral argument. 
DATED this day of November, 2007. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ttorn y for Defendants u 
RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPlEAt FROM AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SlERrdlCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1 ~ '  day of November, 2007, 1 caused to be 
sewed a true and correct copy of the faregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to t h e  following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon Bi Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 875 N. Lakewood Drive 
Suite 200 
Goeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: U.S, Mail, postage prepaid 
d Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
- Personally sewed 
JOHN P. WHEWN, P,C, 
2 1 3 N. 4t"~reer 
Coeur d%Alene, 19 8381 4 
Tele,: (288) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants, I 
CASE NO. CV-03-4627 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS 
LAWRENCE IN OPPOSITION TO 
PLAINTIFF'S RENEWED MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DATE: November 28, 2007 
TIME: 3;00 p.m, 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss,  
County of Kootenai 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RENEWED MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
I, Douglas Lawrence, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1 ,  I am a Defendant named in the above entitled action. I have 
personal knowledge of the following facts and could competently testify. 
2. My wife and I own 80 acres of land on the top of Blossom Mountain 
in Post Falls, Idaho. The land is  legally described as follows: The Northeast 
Quarter of the Southeast Quarter; the East half of the Northwest Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter; and the East half of the Southeast Quarter of the Southeast 
Quarter of Section 21, Township 50 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian, 
Kootenai County, Idaho. We purchased the land in 1996. 
3.  Over the years, I have become familiar with the identities of other 
landowners in the vicinity of our 80 acres, I have also performed extensive 
research on the titles of the properties that surround my 80 acres by reviewing 
records at the County Recorder's Office and by reviewing my own chain of title. 
4, 1 am familiar with the parcel of land in which the Plaintiff in this 
action claims an interest. The parcel is roughly a one-acre parcel that i s  
landlocked by a much larger parcel. There is a tower on the location. The land 
surrounding the parcel is presently owned by John Mack. 
5 ,  Over the years, 1 have walked my 80 acre parcel many, many times, 
I have also walked and driven over many of the parcels of' land that surround my 
parcel, including the Mack parcel and the parcel in which the Plaintiff claims an 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2 "'3 31. 
interest, which I will hereafter refer ta as the lower parcel. I am familiar, 
therefart;, with the access to rhe Tower parcel, 
6 ,  There are two ways to access the Tower parcel. There is a gated, 
private access raad that crosses a portion of my property that was initially 
created by GTC (General Teiephone Company), CTC has an easement to cross 
my parcel that was created in 1966. GTE also has an easement ta cross all of 
the other parcels of land over which the access road crosses. My wife and I also 
have an easement to use the private road. I tao have the right to legally cross 
the parcels of land surrounding the private access road. To my knowledge, no 
one else has a deeded right to use the private access road. However, I have 
granted some entities the right to cross my parcel pursuant to various access 
agreements, 
7, The other access to the Tower parcel is  by way of Mellick Road, a 
public road. The road is paved up to a point where it becomes a gravel road. 
Over the years, Mellick Road has not been maintained as well as rhe GTC private 
access road. Portions of Mellick Road in the vicinity of John Mack's property 
were in rough condition and in need of repair. Mr. Mack recently refurnished the 
road. 
8, For many years, the property to the immediate south of my parcel 
(Section 28) was owned by ldaho Forest Industries ("fFI"). IF1 granted one of my 
predecessors in t i t l e  (john McWugh), an easement to cross Section 28 via the 
private access road described herein (See Exhibit A attached hereto). GTC had 
obtained a similar easement (See Affidavit of Weeks-Exhibits "V", "W", and "X" ) ,  
Harold Funk never obtained the right to cross Section 28 (See Affidavit of John P. 
Whelan and deposition transcript of Harold Funk-pg. 54-56, pg 59:9; pg. 
66;l 5) .  
9. Tower has no express easement to cross my land (See Supreme 
Court decision in this case). Nevertheless, Tower seeks to establish a right to 
cross my land after many years of permissive use, 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUCIAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PIAINTIFF'SF; &: 4 
RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3 *J  i 
10. On as about November 3, 1997, 1 enrered into an Access License 
Agreement wldh Nextel West Carp (a copy of which is artached as Exhiltpit B), The 
Agreement permitted Nextel  ta cross my land in exchange far a monthly 
payment: of $7,000.00, The agreement could not: be assigned withour my 
express written permission. However, assignment was permixred to a company 
acquiring a fifty-one percent (51% or more interest in Nextel. Accordingly, 
Nexrel assigned ro Specrracire (see and Spectracite assigned to 
American Tower (see Exhibit 9). 1 received both Exhibit 6: and Exhibit C) in the 
regular course sf business and the exhibits are part of my business records, 
The monthly payments were made regularly until June of 200'7, when the 
payments ceased altogether. Plaintiff, or i ts  parent company, had made the 
monrhty lease payments to me far many years before rhe payments stapped. I 
permitted Plaintiff to use the private access road across my land so  long as it 
made the $1,000.00 a month payments. This has been the arrangement since I 
war notified that American Tower merged with Spectracite. 
1 1 .  Gares have limited access ta the private access road ar all rimes 
since I purchased my 80 acre parcel. A gate exists at the spot where the private 
access road enters my property and one exists where the private access road 
leaves my property. 
1 2 ,  Harold Funk did not reserve an easement to access my land when he 
sold the land to my predecessor in title, Human Synergistics, Inc. in 1975 (See 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks-Exhibits € / I ) .  Human Synergistics sold the land to 
John McHugh and Don Johnston in 1977. (See Affidavit af Weeks-Exhibits F/H). 
That same year, John McWugh obtained an easement: from IF1 to cross Section 28  
via the private access road described herein (See Exhibit A). The Tower parcel 
did not exist until 1977, as it was merely a part of a much larger parcel owned 
by Funk (See Affidavit of Weeks-Exhibit Q-U), My parcel was sold to Human 
Synergistics two (2) years before the Tower parcel was conveyed to Hall's 
predecessor in title, Harold Funk did not use my land for access to his larger 
parcel of land, a portion of which eventually became the Tower parcel. (See 
Affidavit of John P. Whelan and deposition transcript of Funk). 
AFFIDAVIT OF DOUGLAS LAWRENCE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
RENEWED MOTiON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 4 
13,  1 did not create the Tower parcel. The Tower parcel was never a part 
of my SO acre parcel. The Tower parcel was created long after my 80 acres had 
been conveyed to my predecessor Human Synergistics, 16: Tower has problems 
with i t s  access, those problems are. between Harold Funk, Robert Mall and 
Tower. I had no hand in the dealings which created the Tower parcel. As such, 1 
was not privy to any of the warranties, i f  any, made by Funk regarding access to 
the Tower parcel, However, Tawer has sought fit to include me in the instant 
action, and i am forced to defend against a claim that Tower should be pursuing 
against others, A claim that goes back to 7977-30 years ago. I was a bona 
fide purchaser for value when I bought my parcel, and there was no indication 
that Tower, Hall or anyone other than GTC had the right to use the private, 
gated access that crosses my parcel. I have been prejudiced and placed at a 
huge disadvantage in having to defend against Tower's claim due to the fact 
that the claim was first raised in 2003-twenty-six (26) years after the Tower 
parcel was initially created, 
-... 
-. 
---. . 
DATED this L3 day of November, 2007. '. 
Subscribed and sworn before me this PT4 day of November, 2007. 
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RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 
FOR VALUABLE CCOSSDERAT'LOP. t h a  r e c e i p t  vtraraof is  hereby noknouladyad, I 
TD:DbW WREST XMIUSTRTES.  con, harein cho Grnrrtor ,  doom ha reby  
g r ~ t ~ ~ ,  bargain, transfer DON E. JOHNSTON and FEW A.  JOWSMN, 
heirs, successor*, s d r n i n i a t r e t o r s  and a s s i g n s ,  h e r e i n  t h e  Gran tees ,  an 
aaeaBent  o r  r ight  of wry f o r  t h e  l u l l  and free r i g h t  and l i b e r c y  t o r  them, 
t h e i r  teuanco, se rvnnca .  v i s i t o r e ,  end 1Lcansess ,  i n  common wr!l 611 orharm 
hpving t h e  likc r ighc ,  Ear e l l  purpose6 connec.cecl u1~i1 t h e  u s e  End e n j o p s n t  
!fG\$:,,',' ' 4, (: , . 
, , . . .oh the fo l lowing  d e s c r i b e d  p r o p e r t y ,  t o -wi t :  , 
 errm ma hip 50 North, Rang= f f l . B . H .  , all Koetcnei Couuty,  Idaho. 
TO pas* and repass e b n y  rhe e x l e c l n g  roadrey approxlrneceiy 40 feet In 
v i d c h  l o c a t e d  i n  tho Noreh h a l f  of  che HE-I/& o f  S a c t i o n  28 .  Tovnship  50 
Nor th ,  Range 5 W.B.H., Xo?t*nal Councy, S t a t o  of Idaho.  S a i d  $ondvny 
aaaement jaina the SE-1/4 oe Secc ion  21,  Tovnship 50 Worth, Renga 5 U.B .M. .  
in che SW c o r n e r  snd  t h e  SE-1IL t h e r e o f .  
DATED t h l s  1 1 t h  day of JUIV , 1377.  
5,WW FOREST INDUBTRIOS , INC , . 
a Xdal~o corporation 
Government Lor 3 i n  S e c t i o n  1 5 ,  Township 50 North.  Reage 5 U.B-M.. 
C ~ F  ~ ~ - 1 / 4  of  Seccion 21, Tcnmahip 50 North.  Ranga 5 W . E . M . ,  
Gavarnrnont Lot h and t h e  SW-114  of che W-1 4 of Sac r ion  22 .  
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m a s m n , C a r m n W ~  
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
8.3,  
Cuunry a£  Koot~nad ) 
O n  tho 1 9 t h  day o f  Saptamhgr1977, before me, o Nocery p t j b l k  
in and lor said Stat%. person81B eppe*rad - Mike C. Wailing 
, know to me co be tha R e ~ ~ 0 - m  W n a a a r  
W E  th0 ~ o c ~ o ~ a ~ i o n  that  m e c u u a  m e  foragolng Irutrumenr, and a c k n a l e d g e d  
t o  me t h a t  such corporat ion executed the  same. 
.WITPIE39 tty hand arld oKflcleL meal. 
. ' 4 - P ;  5 ,,,. ' ,Q, i  
ip:, .! 
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4,. P u b l i c  L, Y - L M '  for ~ d a h o  
Raeidfng ec  coaur d ' ~ 1 a n a  
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) 5s. 
C O U N T  OF ROOENAi  1 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PREf EiulS: 
That the undersigned, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda 3. Lawrence, husband and wife (he~inafter 
called "Licensor"), for and in conslderat~on as specified herem. by thee presents do bargain. convey, rleIiver, transfer, 
warrant and grant unto Nextel West Carp., a Delaware corporation, d.b.a. Nextel Commudcations, its successor 
and assigns (herc~nafkr called '21censce"), a non-exclusive license (the 'Y.,iccnsc"), over lhaf portion of Llcet~sor's 
Property (descr~bed herein) generally described as an access road apptoximateiy fifteen (15) feet wlde ("Licensed 
Aroi~") over Ltcensar's Properly, upon whzch Licensee. 1r.s omployces, ergetlts or inv i~es ,  who we reasonably engaged 
in the construction, maintenance or operation of Licensee's communicat~ons facilittes located on the lands nE Roben: 
A. Hall and Brenda M Ha11 and Mark E! Hall and Anne C. Half (collectively, "Hall") on Blossom Mounta~n, may 
egress and ingress and maintain said access road lo tts requlrernenxs 'The leased area ("'Leased Area") and access and 
parking easement ("Access and Parking: Easement") located on the lands of Hall on Blossom Mountain are more 
specifically described and depicted in Exhlb~l B to this Lrcense. 
Consideration. Licensee shall pay to Licensor as consideration for use of the Licensed Area, Lhe sum of Twelve 
Thousand Dollars ($12,000) per annum, payable to Lessor as Escrow Account No. 14426, in equal monthly 
instullments of One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) ench, due and payable in advance on the first day of each monrl~ 
and continuing during the Term of the License. The first monthly payment will commence effective the first day of 
November. 1997. Licensor's address for paylrtent purposes i s  in care of Gridley's Escrow Service. Escrow Account 
Number: 14426, 'I919 North mird  Street. PO Box G, Coeur dlAlene, Idaho 83816-03 18. 
Notice. Any notice or demand recluirecl to be given herein shall be made by certified or regisrcrcd mail, return 
receipt requested, or reliable overnighr courier co the address of the respective parties set forth below: 
Licensee; Licensor: 
Nex&l West Corp. Douglas or Brenda Lawrence 
dba Nextel Cornmica t ions  PO BOX 1027 
1750 112& Avenue NE, Skre  C-100 Coeur dVAlene, Idatlo 83816-1027 
Bellevue, WA 98004 
Am.: ProperQ Manager 
With a copy to: Nextel Comm~nications, Znc. 
1505 Farm Credit Drive 
McLem, VA 221 02 
At&: Legal Dept.. Contracts Manager 
A description of Licensed Area (the access road) is shown on a trketch attached ax Exhibit A to chi$ License. 
Licensor and Licensee hereby agree that the Licensed Area may bc surveyed, at Licensee's sole option and cost. by a 
licensed surveyor, and such survey shall then supplement Exhibit A and become a pay hereof and shall control to 
describe the Licensed Area in the event of any discrepancy between such survey and the description of the boundary 
of the Licensed Area conwined herein. 
n ~ s  Lcense is granted specificdly far the purpose of ingress, egress, msintanrng, altering, repairing and/or 
raylacing an exisling and_paasuublc uccess road approximattfy S~flecn (151 feet w d e  to provade unrestricted access 
(Lrcensec acknawlerigcs that pasage &rough a lucked .date on Licensor's property may be required) from Signal 
Pornt Road m Llccnsee's Leased Area and Access and Parking Essement located on the lands of Hall on Hiusom 
Mounta~n In thxs context "hltertnrr, repalring andlor re~lacing,'"shaIl kc: Yirnrted to those actions r~~tsnnably reqtlired 
to maincailn the existing fi%ir?r,n (15) foot wine dirrClgravel access r o d  3n a safe md passable condit~on. 
Term of Llcense. This License shall be irrevocable unless tetmlnared as provlded herein, for an lnilaal term of five (5) 
years commsnctng an November 1, 1997 (the "'Xnirial Term"). Licenser?. sttali have the riphr to extend the rrrevocable 
L~cense beyond the Initial Term for five (5 )  successive five (5) year per~ods (each a "Rencwal Term") pursuant to the 
same terms and condlrions contained herein, except that the mounl of ~ o n ~ i d e r a t i ~ n  shall be increased at the 
beginning of each Renewal Tern  by an amount equal to fifteen percent (15%) of thc consideration of thc prevlnus 
Term (or Renewal Term) Thts License shall automatically be extended for each successwe Renewal Term unless 
Licensee n~hf ies  Licensor of its intentjon not to renew prlor to the commencement of the succesd~ng Renewal Term. 
Warranties and Covcnimts of Licensee. Liccnsce warrants and covenants that througha~~r Ehc term of this ticcnse, 
Licensee shall maintain comprehensive tiability insurance, naming Licensor as an additional insured, protecting and 
indemnifying Lice~lsor and Licensee against. claims and liabilities for injury, damage to persons or properry, Or fctr the 
loss of life or of property occurring upon the. Licensed Area resulting from any act or arnission of Licensee. Such 
insurance shall afford minimum protection of not less than One Million Dollars (%1.000.000.00) per occurrence and 
Two Million Dollars f%2,000,000.00) aggregate. Licensee shall prcvide to Licensor u certificate indicating t h ~  
applicable coverage, upon request. 
Licensee further warrants and covenants that Licensee, its employees, agenrs or invitees will (i) not cut or rernave any 
trees except as provided hcrcin: (ii) promptly repair and restore any damilge to Licensor's P~.opcrty cuuved by ia 
w~llful or negligent acts; (iii) use Licensed Area only for travel lo and from its Leased Area; (iv) nor discharge 
firearms or ocher weapons bxcept to protect life or property; (v) not w~llfully in~ure or destroy animals or wildlife on 
Licensor's Property; (vi) not discharge hazardous materials, toxic substances or dump any forcign material onto 
L~censor's Property in violation of any law or regulation; (vii) not sublet, assign, or grant ingress and egress across 
Licensed Area to any person or entity not reasonstbly involved with the operation, maintennnce, or ropiiir of Licensee's 
comunication facility. 
Liability and Indemnification, Licensee shald at all times comply with all laws and ordinances and all rules and 
regulations of municipal, state and federal governmental aurhoriries rclacing to the installation, maintenance, use. 
operation, and removal of improvements authorized herein, and shall fully indemnify Licensor against any loss, cost 
or expense which may be susmined or incurred by Licensor as a result of Licensee's failure to comply with such laws, 
ordinances, rules or regulations while traveling across or performing maintenance in Licensed Area. 
This License may be llerrninnted without panalty on thirty (30) days prior written notice by either party up011 defnult of 
any covenant or term hereof by the other party, which default is not cured within (60) days of receipt of written notice 
of default. Licensee may terminacs: this License wirhour further liabi1il.y for any reason, or no reason upon the giving 
of thirty (30) days written notice to Licensor, provided Licensee is not then in material breach of its warrantics or 
cuvenmts. 
Licensee shall also have the right from time to time to cul: and remove irees that have fallen or are at risk to fall, which 
may injure, endangor or interfere with the access over rhe Licensed Arcu. Licensee shall also have she right from rime 
to rime to C ~ E  andfor remove undergrowth and other obsttuccions. whether on said Licensed Area or that are 
reasonably adjacent thereto not to extend beyond twenty feet from the ccnncr of the road, which may injure, cndangm 
or interfere with the access over the Licenmd Area. In any case a11 wood remains the property of rhe Licensor and 
shall be left at side of road where cur. 
Norwithstanding the foregoing. this License shall not restrict or consuain the Licensor from constructing any gate, 
cap-gate, entrance pillars, or other construction or ins~rurnent capable of limiting or prevent in^ road access to any 
person not covered by this License. Additionally, this License shall nor resuicr the Licensor from changing any lock 
Slrc Numc Bins!ifliv, Wo~nWnlUull 
St* Nn: lfZ~H?ib'-3 
or lockrng device st any ilme as the L~~c;e;n%or sees fit. Licensor agrees lo prevade Licensee with any keys, 
cnmbinucrons, or other gale-openmg devices as requlrcd t'or 24 hour, scven (7) day a week access and passage across 
said raad. Licensee agrees to des~gnate 3 person or other single palnt sf cantact w i ~ h  whr~nl the Licensor wrll m:lke 
such devices avavuiiublc. Licensor shall not use or occupy the Licensed Area In any manner. which 1~filreasonakly 
tn~ederes with Licensee" fxd1 ~nlrsyncnt: nf the r~ghrs h.-,z~by grantell 
~ss ignment  L~censdc may not assign or otherwise transfer 811 or &try p u t  of its Interest In this 1,tcense 01- In the 
Llcensed Area without the prior written consent of Licensor; provided, however, chat L~censee may assrgn rts Inrerest 
to 11s parent company, any strbsidiwy or dfi l ia~e ar to any successor-ln-interest or entity acqulrlng fifty-one percent 
(51%) or more of its stock ot assets, subject to any financ~ng entity's Interest, if any. rn thts License and Licens~c may 
assign, mortgage, pledge, hypothecate or orherwise transfer without consent its ~ ~ E ~ S ~ S K  ~ r l  this License to ally 
financing endty, or agent on behalf of any financing enuty to whom I,icensee (i) has obligations for borrowed moncy 
or in respect of guaranties &ereof, (11) bas obligations evidenced by hunds, debncures, notes or sim~lar instruments, or 
(lit) has oblrgations under or with respect to lettcrs af med~t, bankers acceptances and sinllar facilities or in respect of 
guaranties thereof. Licensar may assign this License upon wntten notice to Licensee subject to the asslgnee assurnlng 
all af Licensor's ohl~gations herein 
This License is nor to be considered an easeltlttnr appurtenant to Licensee's interest in Licensee's Leiwed Area and 
Access and Parking Easement on th:: lands of Hall on BIossam Mountain and creates no easement or other interest in  
Licensed Area upon termination. 
U\T TESTIMONY WHEREOF. Chis insrrument is executed an this the day of 
J ~ W  LC .. 2997. 
Licensee: Licensor: 
Nexrel West Corp., 
a Delaware corporation. 
WITNES 
Douglas P. Lawrence 
Brenda J. Lawrence 
Federal Tax ID N O ~ ~ C .  5 3 fS ' 
WITNESS : sLkgb.-bb -
ALL SIGNATURES MUST BE ACWOWEDOED 
On this day of , la before me. personally appeared Perry Sntterlee. known ra 
me to be the president, of the corporabon that executed the insrmmenr or rhe pwson who executed the Instrument on 
behaif al' s a d  coporation and acknowleriged to me that such covorstxon executed the s m e .  
W I m S S  my hrrnd and 
STAIE OF IDAHO 
County of Kootenai 
) ss. 
1 
d On this 3 day of , l 9 n b e f o r e  me, /M jJk' m& 
the undersigned Nordry Public, personalty appemd Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, husband and wife 
known to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within ins~ument, and acknowledged to me they 
executed the same. 
Commission expiras: &&-& 
EXHIBIT A 
B 
to the Access License Agreement dated 1997, by and beween Douglas P. Lawrcncc and Brenda 
I. Lawrence, husband and wife West Corp.. a Delaware corporation, d.b.a. Nextel 
Communications (Licensee). 
The Licensed Area (Access Road) is described and/or depicted as follows: 
UQtK 
I .  This Exhibir may be replaced by a land survey upon the receipt and approval of survey by Licensor and Licensee. 
The Leased Area m d  Access and Pak~ng  Easement locared on the lands of Ha11 on Bl 
spec~ticaily described and depicted in Exhibit B to the Access License Agreement dated 
and between Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, husband and wife (Licens 
Delaware corporation, d.b.n. Nexrel Comunt;cahons (Licensee). 
The Leased Area and Access and Parking Eascrncnt is described andfor depicted as follows: 
- 
A pacsl OI land Ilealad h the buth*.tt m$-qusrirr at S.aCbn 
22, Taunghb ?i8 Narth, R~rrgn ! *at, 0ot11s Mddlen, kaotsscat 
Csonty. Iddo, brhq a prrtlm ef that tact daacxlbea en Wlc 
&it &oIm Qd Rfed In KwtgnakGwmly NdttoruRecardw Flfe. 
Na. l ~ S O S ,  end behg furthar dmrlbnf or faRows: 
Comrnrncin at lha Sulrthvat cunar al  rsrd Ckrlt U h  Deed Fll* 
Ha. I ~ ( 1 3 f l 3 .  ~ d d  gekL bekp mehad by o 5/8 kch reher -Ilk 
plcnrtlc l s r t ~ y  tap; bats M h  $O*Q~'5Sm W ~ a l  danp ths Waet 
Ikra el wid Oult CIah Dad, a awlanar aC 2aOO fael CQ aha 
tffU& PBaNT CIF BECMNWIII; thnm Herb 813W36' Whd among 
auld W m t  h, a dlrtbnea sf 50.BC) Imt; thmm N d h  \ 
8955'04" Eosl, e datmca e.1 43 QO leak thanen SwC)I 
09U4'SNa Ceat. a dlmfma* af SO.OO frrst, thence Ewkh I 
89"JJa!34" Wmt, a dlstma~l of 45.00 Irret lo  the RUh: PQINT OF 
BgIIINU1MO. I 
Said pared at land contahhg 2250 Sq. It, (U.09 Ac.) 
Llxul" - A  AM3 P m  
A pareef ef land locotad rn the ISaolhrarl ma-quatbr al  Ssctkn 
22, r~rr)l*i@ SU Mar&, Range 3 Warrt Baler M r M l a n .  Kecflannl 
County, Ideho, bahg a p&lm BT &a\ tuct Qllawibtd on bsr 
guIr CIofm 0 4  8t.d in Kectmol-Csunty Cblldt-Rnaadsr We. 
No, 1488S5, and bdnq further $mabed er frdlorr 
Cornmerccln at Ih* Sarthrrpt; mmcr at meld Quit aalm Deed FRa 
No 146549. d d  peht b h g  m d s d  by tz 546 hEh rebar wIlh 
plcatlt s ~ m y  cw; tharsr Nwth ODWZ*aCIC Wowl den ths %st 
line af add OuiI aafm wed, a &a\ar\oa or 2Q.m fee, r( W~li6ht8 
Nmth CIOJS'O4" fast, fa &tanga a# 45.00 !art 4a the 'lRUE 
W I H r  W S Q N M N S :  thence North 0094 38" West d dlderncll 
at 25 OQ faat; kkarar M a t h  8 ~ ~ 5 ' 0 ~ '  Earl, a dlmlonca of (OeWI 
feel: thmcr South O5Ta4'56' East a QIBLanrtc at 25.W feet, 
&BRS'I Seabh B!#J~'Q** W r n t  a d l a t ~ ~ a  a! 1D.W frat b \trs 
TRUE PBINT tlF RGIMNINC. 
&Rs e*qgg FQX NO, :208 962 9787 
,., ,.-.,, -..- ,..- . . . - &&au- - - ,.. .,,#-,, 13 ...-. 2@@7 -... -.,,- .,.139:41RM ., ,.,,, P1 
11.'. --.-.-.1 . )  / "  I.._(',. ..,, 
Mt' and Mrs t)ori~lat.l.., I,awrcncr: 
p.r;j, L ) ~ X  1027 
Coeur d%Aiene. tdattu 838 16- I027 
Rc; Access ticcrlsc Agrccmcr~l ritlted November. 3, 1 997, (rhe "Agraament") 
cxccuted by k id berween Do~tglns P. I,ow~.c~ice ~ ind  Brenda J ,  L&wrc~rcc. 
Iicisbitnsl and w i k ,  i t .  "l.,iccr~sor", and Nextel West C:orp., w Dolawa~~e 
cor'parnti~n, d.13.~. Ncxtel Co~nmunications "Licens~a"{-'N~x~x~~l''); 
Spnctl-~r.S;ire Tnwcr ln Nnlnbsl. IU-t 008, tjlossolr~ Mctilnrair~ 
r>asrl* Mr. and Mrs. L~rwrci!cc: end Mr. Muck: 
I'lease find ~ h c  rrclnsr,d letter dated Ja~~uary 9, 2003 Fraln Ncxrcl crrnfiruvring SpttctraSirr: 
C o i n m t ~ n i ~ n t i ~ ~ i ~ ,  ~ I I C . ' ~  (s'Sp~~tr~Site'') rights it1 and to the Licenuw Ad;rs&vcnr rcfcrcr.rced above. 
'I'he assignment oftha Agrc~rrrcrrr to SpkctenSitc and the co~.raspo~~ding pityntant of tt\c 1.iceosc 
fcc give SpccbroSite I:l?c right tn sccoss across the Lawrence pmperly inlo i ts  conl~nrrn icatinns site 
iocated OII B I O S S O ~ ~  MOUI? talri, Tlicrcfk-ire, Specti'aSite requests thi~t yot~ 51 l /ow ;I. rieuatis 10 tllc 
facility EICCOI'C~~ ng it:) thci ler'ms of' rhc I,icanscr Agraaliisnt, 
A:; prcviausly disc.usscd, please: be adviuet,t 1Flt41 N ~:~i.oI-llcru~ wit11 thc top i.cd t o \ r a ~ ~  bar~w>~\ 
light has been reported 10 Specrr~Sisc. F A A  ~.egulations require that SpectraSire ccln-ect tltis issue 
ifl~mediarely. As H ~ u s ~ I F ,  Spem*nSitc 13eeds imna~cliatr; ncccss to ~ h c  sia for the: limited pul-pasc c ) f  
rcpaiting the tsencon liglrt. SpectraSiti: hcrcby a.%sl.lla.s you it will not perform arly ac1:iviTies other 
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I 
do ir and just ask you if I'm doing it right. ' 1 one gate' 
? I've marked the Sigal  Point Road m j 2 A. Urn- 
. Wil, bere was only one gate. 
3 yellow -- : 3 That's right herc on this corner (indicating). 
1 A. U r n - b .  4 Q- W s  that the gare &at was on she  ad 
) Q,  -- okay? And J sroppcd marking; it I 5 propeq l  Do you remember -- 
5 where the road forked in the vicinity of Blossom 6 A.Yes. 
Mowmain. This orher iogglng road I'd like to I 7 Q. -- Wilbur Mead? 
1 mark and identifjr i t as being in blue: okay? i 8 A. yes, urn-hmm 
1 '4- l h n - b .  9 Q- Okay. And that was the anly gate you 
I Q marking) Now. did I properly mark the 1 la encountered in drivmp to Blossom Mom-in? 
logging toad in blue ink? 11 A. Yes. 
A Xt looks to be, 1 12 Q* I take it, was lhat gate opened 
Q. Okay. When you bought the property, ' 13 with he key that the realtor had? 
how many rlmes were you at the propem before 14 A. Yes, 
you closed a deal on it? ! 15 Q. And then you continued driving on -- 
A. Maybe 1 0. As f s  as Synergsics' 16 A, Yes. 
Imd? I17 Q -- to the property? 
Q. Na,  no. I'm raIking about when you md 1 18 A. Yes.  
Mrs. Funk bought the land in the first place in ' 19 Q, Okay. And did you park and walk around 
1 1969, did you go up and look at the land before 
you bought it? 
A. Yes. X djd, yes. 
Q. How many times did you go up and take a 
look ar it? 
20 the property? 
21 A. WeI1, we paxked on top and looked over 
22 the property. It was -- you know, it's steep 
23 and ... 
24 Q. Okay. Were you able to get a pretty 
2 2 1 P t  -~lr;,tr~dtnr -- - 
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Q. And the realtor took you up there? 
A. Urn-hmm. 
Q. Is rhar yes? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did the realtor dnve up there? 
A. Yes 
Q. And the realtor was this young guy, who 
1 A. Ycs. 
2 Q. So you parked pretty high up, then? 
3 A. U r n - h .  
4 Q. Is that yes? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q- Was that close to the CTE -- 
7 A. Yes. 
brought you this investment opportunity? j 8 Q. -- facility? 
A. Ycs. / 9 A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall, as you dmve up the Q. You parked right there. 
rnounain, what route did you take; do you recd? 1 A. Urn-hmm. Yes. 
Was iz: the GTE route? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, Naw, as I understand it, there 
were gates on that route. 
A. Yes. 
12 Q. Okay. A;nd that GTE facility is still 
13 up there, as I understand? 
14 A, Yes, 
15 Q. And it's still in the same location? 
16 A. It was the last time X kncw about it, 
Q, Were there gates here rhc firsr lime , 17 yes. 
you drove up to the mountain? / 18 Q. Okay. So they didn't build anything 
A. Yes, but it seems like he had a key. / 19 new or anythrng. X haven't been up &ere lately. 
Q. The realtor? A. Not to my knowledge. 
A. Yeah. 21 Q. Okay. How long did you walk around the I 20 Q. Okay. So you remember coming to some , 2  property when you drove up before you b o d t  the 
gates as you're driving up towards the mowtajn. 
A. Yes. 
23 property? 
24 A. 15 minutes. 
Q. And the realtor had a key to at least 25 Q. Okay. So after you looked at the 
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1 regarding the transaction, sa 1'11 ga though 
2 t h i s  and you can tell me if this is your 
3 recoiiection 
4 The first payment was received from 
5 Human Synergistics July 1 st, 1976; does rhiat 
6 sound absut right? 
7 : It does to me, yes. 
a SS; f he would h o w ,  
3 b4R. %WLAN. Okay. So E can take that 
10 up wkh her. Okay. 
a 1 Q. (BY b4R. W L A h 3  Now, betwem the time 
12 you bought the property and Lhe time you sold it 
13 to Human Synergist~cs, how many tlmes did you go 
14 up to the property? 
15 A. Well, we'd always go up and pick 
16 hucklebenics and stuff, and 'rarget practice 
17 and -- X don't know. 1 woutd have to guess 
18 maybe. I don't know, 29,30 times. 
19 Q. In the two-year period? Well, three 
20 years since 1969. I'm sorry. Six-year period, 
21 from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on 
22 top of the mountain? 
23 A. I would suppose, yeah. 
24 Q. Okay. And how did you get up there 
24 p a w ?  Wac: it T ~ P  
- 
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1 ,Mountain access road? Is that the letter you're 
2 rer"efing to? 
3 A. Well, could we hold a minute? 
4 Q. Sure. 
5 (A discussion was held oR the record 
6 between the wjtness and Mrs. Funk.) 
7 MR. LAN: Let's go back on the 
8 record, then. 
9 Q. (BY MI?., M L A h y  Okay. Do you think 
10 you initidly obtained a key from GTE to access 
11 that gate? 
12 A. Yes, very definitely. 
23 Q. Okay. And was that right when you 
14 bought the property? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And then at some point, someone changed 
17 the lock. 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. And was that GTE? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So GTE sent you a new key? 
22 A.Yes. 
23 Q. And that new key was sent to you with 
24 h s  July 13tb, 1992 letter? 
25 A Y p c  
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1 initially? 1 Q. And you used that key to open the gate 
2 A. Yes. 2 to arrsrr your property. 
3 Q. You took the GTE road? 
4 A. Yes. 
3 A , Y e s .  
4 Q. Okay. Now, after you sold the property 
5 Q. Did you have a key? I 5 to Human Synergistics in 1975, did you continue 6: A. Ycs.Ith~nk1hadmyownlockwithmy 6 to go up to the propercy? 7 own key And yet they did send me a key. 7 A. Yes. 8 MRS. FUNK. There's a letter here a Q. And how many times did you go up to the 
9 float~ng around on the table. 
10 IMR. WHET;&': Okay. 
11 THE WITNE3S: Maybe I did use thas key. 
12 But however ~t was, I've had other properties, 
13 and we cut the chams and put on a padlock, see. 
9 properjl between 1975 and, say, 19807 
10 A. Well, not many, because we moved back 
11 here in the: fall of -- you &Mt, but 1 came 
12 downaad -- 
13 MRS. FUNK: '75, wasn't it? 
14 Q.(BYMR.WHELAN)Okay. Soyouthink THE WITNESS: i was going to build a 
15 you had a key to the gate? 15 house here for the famiIy; we were moving back. 
16 A. We must have used that one, because I 
/ l4 Q. (BY MR. WHELAN) Here in American 
17 got it (indicating). 17 Falls? 
10 Q. Okay. You're refemng to the key 18 A. L'm-&. 
19 that's taped to the letter that's an .the table 
I l6 
' 19 Q. Yes? 
20 from GTE? 20 M R S .  FUNK: Aberdeen, you mean. 
21 A Yes. 21 THE WETNESS: Well, we ended up in 
22 Q. Now, I'm going to pull out that letter 22 Aberdeen first, yeah, because my dad's business 5 5 3 23 and just refer to that. Xow, is what you're 23 was over there. 
24 referring to is there's a key taped to a July 24 Q. (BY MR. W L A N )  So you moved fiom 
25 13th. 1992 letter from GTE regarding the Blossom 25 Spokane to Aberdeen in 1977? 
(208) 345-96 1 1 M & M COURT WORTD4G SERVICE, M C  (205) 345-8800 ( f a )  
- 
edY$* 
-A^ *% d# 239 &$ 
W d  g&j$ 
Page 29 ' Page 31 
I 
i. e daw. I 1 moved down here. you wcre able to get up to the 2 Ye&. After the girls 2. top o f  the nomtain t w ~  or thee  times in the 
3 gaduated -- I 3 next five years'? 
4 THE WTTN-ESS: Yeah, you came down. I I , 4 A. Yeah. Urn-hmm, that rounds about nght. 
5 moved you down in '75, yeah. I bought Bad out, / 5 Q. And that would put us to, Like, 198 1 or 
6 yeah. in the fall of '75. j 6 so? 
7 Q.(BY;Mft. d you moved 7 MRS. FUNK: U r n - h .  
8 to American Fail ' 8 Q. (BY MR. W L A N )  Okay. Kow. afier 
9 A. Yes. I 9 1981, did you visit the property very much? 
10 Q. Thefaliof1976? ' 10 bfRS. FmK: No. That's when he got 
11 A. Well, the spring, after school was aut. / 11 cancer, in '82. 
12 Q. Okay. Sprlng 19'76 you moved to THE W I N S S :  Yeah, I was pretty sick. 
13 Aberdeen. I I didn't know whether I would make it or not. 
14 MRS. FUNK: Aberdeen, 
15 Q. (BY MR. M L A N )  Okay. And how long 
16 after did Mrs. Funk move down here as well, 
17 assuming that she -- 
18 A. Well, that's when I moved her down, 
19 after school let out. 
20 Q. So you had come down -- 
2 1 A. I came down in the fall of '75. 
22 Q. Fall of '75. Okay. And then you moved 
23 IW. Funk to the property in the spring of 1976. 
24 A. Yeah. 
14 bfRS. FlJNK: So he never made it back. 
15 Q. @Y MR. !MEIEw Okay. So after 1981, 
16 you didn't go back to the top of the mountain? 
17 A. No. 
10 Q. Okay, What business did you IUII here 
19 in Aberdeen? 
20 A. Irrigation. 
21 Q. Irrigation. So -- 
22 A. Yeah, pumps and irrigation, machine and 
i 23 fabrication. I had three businesses. 1990 1 was 
24 the man o f  the year for the Idaho hga t ion  
n 
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1 MR. W L A N ;  June. Okay. 
2 Q. (BY MR, WI-EEL,4iN) Now, after you moved 
3 down to Aberdeen, did you continue to visit the 
4 top of the mountain frequently? 
5 A. Oh, God, I was so busy -- 
6 MRS. FUNK; No, you didn't. 
7 THE WI'TNESS: -- I knew X shouldn't. 
0 But we went our two or three times, and we went 
9 out on the property. But in the business I had, 
10 I couldn't do much traveling or -- I r ~ a s  tuck 
11 liere. 
1 Q. Congratulations. 
2 A, So 1 cvas busy. 
3 Q, Okay. And I've never been down to 
4 this -- well, the last time I was down in this 
5 part of f W o  was 30 yeas ago, and I notice it's 
6 a lot of agricultural use down here. 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. So you supplled the local fanners with 
I 9 irrigation equipment and the like? 
10 A.Yes.  
11 Q. Okay. 
12 Q. (BY MR. W L A N )  Okay. So you stated 1 12 A. And if you've ever noticed these pivots 
13 that you visited the property two or three times I 13 with the drop nozzles? We started that. 14 after you moved down here? 14 Q. Oh, really? -7 
15 A. Yes, A. Yeah. We had Bart Nelson irom Wdla :a a 1 :56 Walla come down and I told him what I wanted. 16 Q. Now, over what period of time, though? I I 
17 The next 10 years or so7 
18 A. I remember I sold the Spokane house to 
19 Mall, and I went up there for that reason on part 
20 of the trips. 
21 TEE \;L?.TNESS: But five years, within 
22 five years? 
23 MRS. FUNK: Withn. 
17 And we picked up 7 percent efficiency by holding 
18 the water down when it was up on top, because a 8 yd 
19 Lot of it -- 
I 20 MR. LAWRENCE: Would blow away. ,$ 
21 THE W1;NESS: Yes. J 
22 MR. LAWRENCE: h4akes sense. 
23 Q. (BY MR. WHELAN) So you got a patent an 
24 TKE WITN5SS: Yeah. ' 24 t h ?  
25 Q. (BY MR. WLm Okay. So after you 1 25 A. 1 didn't, no. 551 
(208) 345-961 1 M & M COURT RBPORTING SERVICE, NC. (208) 345-8800 ( f ~ )  
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1 Was  hat a dawn payment on the Imd7 j 1 Q. Okay. And that's bow you did the 
2 A. Tnat must have bcen just a iittlc, so j 2 trmsactions? 
3 mmy feel by so many k e t  or -- does ~r sav how 3 AYeah 
4 much? 4 0. NOW, does the name John Rook rlng a 
5 Q Ir says an acre bell? D o  you ranember m w n g  a b ~ u t  Rook? 
6 A. Acre. Yeah, that must have been just : He w with Idaho 
1 one paymcnt. I don't h o w .  
8 Q,  Now, Rasmussen was the doc~ar? TNESS: She says I&o 
9 A. KO. No. 
10 m. LANe M a t  was the doctor's LAN) Okay, that was 
11 n m e ?  11 Mr. Rook. And then I think Idaho Broadcutins 
12 a CE: Someland. 12 became Kootenai Braiadcasting? 
13 MR. : Sonnelmd. 13 IvIRS, FUNK: Yeah, they changed the name 1 14 TME W m S S :  Right. i 14 so many rimes, ir's hard to keep mck. 
15 Q. (BY MR. YvWELAV Is ~ a r  rhe doctor you 15 MR. WHELAN: Okay. But it started as 
16 were referring fa? / 16 Idaho Broadcasting, and then wcnt to Koolenai 
17 A. Right. And he's right next to the / 17 Broadcasting, and then I think to something else. 
18 tower. 18 & R S .  FLaW: Yes 
19 Q. Right next to the tower. Okay. 119 Q. (BY MR. WEELAN) Okay. And that party 
20 A. On the east side. 
' 20 bought rhe five-acre parcel, as 1 understand it. 
A. I bclicvc that's conect. 
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I 
Electric paid you at least a $500 deposit - 
A. U r n - h .  
Q. -- on the sale of a one-acre parcel, it 
looks like from this. 
A. That might have been full price on rhar 
one. Bur rhere was a parcel that atas about five 
acres. 
Q. Yeah, that was tlze one, I think, you 
said was sold to Kootenai Broadcasting. 
M R S .  F W :  Here, this is where that 
Mr. Rook comes from (handing document). 
MR. WHELAN; Okay. T l a d  you, ma'am, 
And Mrs. Funk has been kind enough ro 
hand me a copy of a warranty deed to Idaho 
Broadcasting. And that is a deed dated September 
22, 1989. 
Q. (BY MR. WITELAN) Mr. Funk, when you 
sold off these smaller parcels, did you take any 
of those people out to the top of the mouatain? 
A. Well, when I got busy, no, I didn't, 
after -- bur I scc a Notary Public in Aberdeen 
that signed this. 
Q. Okay. 
A. And so the paperwork was sent back and 
forth. 
1 Wj tbur Mead; da you remember that7 
2 A, Yes. 
3 Q, W a t  do you rcmcmbcr about that? 
4 A. The realtor got him to -- t h s  was a 
5 check ro Wilbur. 
6 Q. T h s  was a check lo Wilbur. Okay. 
7 A. And there was some description of what 
8 it covered, but that was to pay far the ingress 
9 and egress. 
10 Q. You purchased 3x1 easement from Mr. Mead 
11. to cross his land? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay. And why did you do that? 
14 A. Because I wanted to make sure that 1 
15 had ingress and egress to the land, so I wasn't 
16 landlocked. 
17 Q. Okay. Now, before 1972, did Mr. Mead 
18 just let you drive across h s  property; is that 
19 how it went? And then hc stoppcd you at some 
20 point, or what happened? 
21 A. NO, he never stopped us, no. No. 
22 Q. .But you decided to purchase an easement 
23 from h m .  There was nothng that caused that to 
24 happen; you just decided to do it? 
25 A. Yes. IwantedtobesureIhadan 
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1 on kii; propeq,  too? 
2 A No, there was  no gate here. The a d y  
3 gate there .was i s  right here (go in~a) .  
4 0. hdyou'repoint ingtori&there~ 
5 A. It was p i n g  up to the telephone 
6 company. 
7 Q. Up to the -- okay. So it was around 
8 here someplace? Someplace around here was a 
9 gate. 
10 A. Well, right there, as I remember 
il (indicating). 
!2 Q Oh, T see. So this road here -- okay, 
3 here, we've got a clean copy, so we'll be able to 
.4 mark this for t!ne rccord. 
5 (Exhibit 2 was marked.) 
,6 *MR. W L A N :  Qkay. HopefiIly this wll 
7 be a linXe easier. 
8 Q. (BY MR. W L & 7  Mr. Funk, I'd like to 
9 show you a copy of the -- a clean copy of the 
?O document we were just referring to. I've marked 
?1 this as Exhibit 2. This is a blowup of a portion 
!2 of Exktbit X that -- a p~rtion showing Blossom 
!3 Mountain, okay? 
!4 A Urn-hmm. 
j n ,% t h ! ~  -v? 
Page 50 
Page 51 
1 A. I: believe that's correct. 
2 Q. Okay. And X'm going to mark that in 
3 blue h d  I'd like to stop where the gate is. so 
4 if you could -- 
5 A. Rjght whcrc the M is on.,* 
6 Q Right where the I( -- right here 
7 (indicatung)? 
8 A. Yeah. 
9 Q. So the gate stops right where the -- 
10 A. Whenever it meets the -- 
11 Q. Right at the point, Now, what I'm 
12 going to do i s  I'm going to put a stat thcrc; 
13 okay? (Makng) There's a star. 
14 A. U ~ - ~ T I D I .  
15 Q. And that's where the gate wa.s? 
16 A. Urn-hmm. 
17 Q. Is that yes? 
18 A. YES. 
19 Q. O b y .  So I've marked in blue the  route 
20 that you took up to the mountain. 
21 A. U r n - h .  
22 Q. And I placed a srar next to the gate 
23 that was on -- was that on Wilbur Mead's 
24 property? 
25 A YE?r: 
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1 A. Urn-hmm. 
2 Q. And these are the roads that go wound 
1 Q. Okay Well, that clarifies things s 
2 little bit. 
3 Blossom Mountain, apparent1 y. Now, do you rcmember any othcr gates? 
4 A. Urn-h. I :  A.No .No .  
5 Q. You've idtntificd h i s  road to rhe east 
6 as being the logging road rhat you remember; is 
7 that true? 
A, Yeah. It was in pretty poor shape, but 
9 it was a road. yes. 
0 Q. And then we have Signal Point Road 
1 corning in, and rhcn it forks; okay? 
2 A. Urn-hmm. 
3 Q. Now, what I'd like to try to do is, if 
4 you could, could you mark on blue the road that 
5 Q. And &.is gate w located right where 
6 the blue stops on this Exhibit 2;  is that 
7 true? 
8 A. Yes. that's true. 
9 Q. Okay. Now, you see down here how the 
10 road dips into this other section? 
' 11 A. Urn-hrun. 
12 Q. And this is Section 28; okay? 
13 A. Urn-hmm. 
14 Q. Did you ever dnve across Section 28? 
5 you used to use to get to the mountain, just so X i 15 A. I'm sure X did, yes. 
6 could know which way you went? Or I can mark it Q. Okay. Now, 28 I don't think was owned 
7 if you just tell me haw to do it. ,,Mead. 
a A. It had to be t h s  one (indicating). 
9 Q. This lictlc part right here? 
'0 A. Yc&, 
'1 Q. Okay. So what I'm going to do, for rhe 
'2 record. is I'm going to draw in blue ink, and you 
3 tell me if I'm tmng the right road that you 
10 A. No, 
19 Q. Does the name Ulrieh sound fkmiliar; 
20 XFX, Idaho Forest Industries? Any of that sotnld 
21 familiar? 
22 TEE3 WITNESS: Does it to you? 
23 M R S .  FUNK: I don't recall that. 
4 would take to get to the mauntain, AJX I doing it Q. (BY MR. WkELAN) Okay. Well, let me 
5 right? 1 :: ask you ths now. When you drive up to the top 
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1 Section 28, who owned the property in Section 28, 
2 abour an easement to cross their property as 
3 well? 
4 A. His name was what again? 
5 Q. I think it w a s  -- oh, there it is right 
5 thcrc. Ulrich. It's on this old Metsker map. 
7 ,+ad I think that's U-L-R-I-C-H. William maybe, 
0 Willlam, Bill Ulrich7 
9 A. 1 don't think so. 
aci MRS. FIIMK: Doesn't sound familiar. 
11 Q. (BY MR. WEELAN") Okay. So you never 
12 approached Mr. Wlrich to obtain an  easement? 
13 A. No I figured that while I hsd the 
14 easement here (indicating) -- 
15 Q. From Mead? 
16 A. -- I could cut over. 
17 Q. Because you had the Mead easement? 
18 A, Yeah. 
19 Q And you thought that gave you the right 
20 to drive as fw as you wanted on that road? 
21 A. Sure. Absolutely. 
22 Q. And you thought that that wsu s grant 
23 Porn Mr. Mead, that gavc you the righr to do 
24 hat? 
25 A ,  Yeah. 
1 of rhe mounrain, you drive up ard you pass 1 Q. h d  3au paid the thousand dollass. 
2 though the gate. 2 A But ir was my Imd then. 
-, 
.Y A, Yes. 3 Q Yes Bur you didn't o w  Section 26; 
4 Q And thar's the gate that had the key 4 right? You didn't own any land in Secuon 28? 
5 thar yoti recerved from GTE. 5 A. KO. 
6 A. Yen I 6 0. And you see how this road goes into 
7 Q. Okay. Now, when you passed through / 7 Section 7.8'7 
8 rhar. gate, would you ~ontinue to drive, or would ' 8 A. Yes.  
9 you jusr park? 9 Q. Okay. So you were passing through 
10 '4. Continued to drive. / 10 Section 28 whcn you would use this road and you 
11 Q Okay. Now, where would you dnve to? 1 ii would park ai ihe top of the mountain? 
12 A, l ip  to the -- where their tower was. 12 A. Yes. Well, now 1 didn't cone in ths  
13 Q 0ka.y h d  you were following the CTE 13 way. I[ came in this way (pointing). 
14 road? 14 Q. Let me see if X c m  explain that. 
15 .A Gm-hnm. ! 15 A Because there was no road going from 
16 Q Is that yes? I 16 here up, 
17 A. It was even gravel. 17 Q. Okay. 
1 A. So it would just go from there. Ir was 
2 a little squiggly, as I remember, but it wasn't 
3 just a straight line, as 1 remember. It comes 
4 kind of straight and then up, lund of up. 
5 Q. Can you draw it in for me, or do you 
6 \van7 me to do it? 
7 A, fMarking)Thatwillwork. 
6 Q. 0%. So for thc record, on Exhibit 2 
9 you've drawn in a blue line going ro rhe rop of 
10 the mountain. 
11 A. U r n - b .  
12 Q. Is that yes? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And that blue line represents the road 
15 that you would take to the  tog o f  the mountain? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. 'Okay. So you passed rhrough rhe gate, 
18 and thm you'd take %he road to the top of the 
19 mountain. 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So you weren't passing across Section 
22 28? 
23 A. Not then. I continued on here m d  went 
24 around there a numbcr of times, but like 1 say, 1 
25 assumed rhar we could build a road through there 
18 Q. It was even gravel. 
19 A. I think, Rock and everything. 
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16 A. I cornc in and park~d thcrc. 
39 Q. Okay. I'd like to mark xhar: in blue 
20 Q Okay. And then you parked at the top, 20 where you would come up. And if you can jusr 
21 typically 1 23. tell me haw to mark it, where do I start? Or you 
22 A . U m - h .  22 canmark it. 
23 Q ,  Is that yes? 23 A. Well, the telephone company must be 
24 A,  Yes. 
23 n nkav nid.yipr war 
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1 if we had to, rftfus turned out to be 
2 itnavailable (indicating). 
3 Q.  You're r e f e ~ n g  to the road on Section 
4 2X? 
5 A, Yeah, 
6 Q, Okay. But there must have been some 
7 kind o f  a road here &at you drove to the top of 
8 the momtain on. That's the road you rode in? 
9 A. Yeah. 
10 Q. And that was there when you drove up to 
11 the properties? 
12 A. Yeah. 
13 Q. Okay. And just to be clear, this other 
14 road, which is -- get my bearings. This other 
15 road, which would be to the west -- wait a 
16 minute, I'm messed up, too, here. I've got to 
17 get my bearings. 
18 A. Which one now7 
19 Q. Okay. Yeah, now I've got it. I've got 
20 to flip ir -- no, you've got it, 
21 This road to the east, that would be 
22 the -- 
23 A. That's to the east, JXs  is to the 
24 south. 
25 n Riohf%ntit clkpv 
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1. A. I'm thinking that somebody down here 
2 kind of told me I couldn't do that, but ... 
3 Q. Okay. Now, just to refresh your 
"iemory, tlGs. X ?kink, i s  Govemenr  Lot 3, right 
5 here, 
6 A. Yeah. 
7 g, So this road went over ecross your 
8 Govement Lat 3; is that true? 
9 A. Yeah. 
10 Q. And it was just in rough shape, though. 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 Q. h d  historically, somebody had logged 
13 the top of that mountain, right? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q, They were cutting trees up there? 
16 A. Yeah. 
17 Q. And they were hauling on that road, 
18 that logging road? 
19 A. Yes. But this was a number of years 
20 before I bought it. 
21 Q. Okay. So somebody had cut it over 
22 f i s t  and then sold it to you? 
23 A. (Witness nodding head.) 
24 Q. Okay. 
AhT. fnr 
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1 So this road to the east, this was the 
2 logging road; right? THE WTNESS: That would be great. 
a A.Yes, I seG0*7 3 MR. W L A N :  Fair enough. 
4 Q. Now, I'm going to write that on this 4 (A brief recess was taken.) 
5 Exhibit 2; okay? 
6 A. Yeah. 
5 (Exhibit Nos. 3 through 10 
6 were marked ) 
7 Q, Write that right over the road: 7 MR. VERNOK: h4i. Funk, 1 just have a 
8 "Logging road " 1 8 few questions for you. 
9 Now, did I mark that correctly? 9 THE WITNESS: Okay. 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q. And where I wrote "logging road" in 
12 blue ink along this road on the east side ofthe 
13 mountain -- 
14 A. Yeah. 
15 Q. -- that was the road that you refemd 
16 to previously? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q. Okay, 
19 A. I looked at this mountain here, and I 
20 had thought maybe on opening this up and using 
21 it. I t  was, like I say, overgown a little 
22 and -- but X thought maybe I would take a 
23 bulldozer and go in and open that up again and 
24 come in that way, bur ... 
10 
11 ExfllwUNATION 
12 QUESTIONS BY MR. VEEUSiON: 
13 Q. I'm showing you what's been marked as 
14 Exhibits 3 and 4 to your deposition. And I think 
15 we have already talked about Exbibit 3. That 
16 describes the property that you putchased in 
17 1969; is that correct? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q, Okay. And just to make it clear for 
20 the record, Exhibit 4 that we have highlighted -- 
21 do you see tl?e portions in highlight here in 
22 Exhibit 4? 
23 A, This? 
24 Q, Yes. 
25 Q. But you never did? I 25 A. Now, wait a minute. Tk;s ' 2 1. Oh, 
(208) 345-96 1 1 M & M COURT REPORTlNG SERVICE, INC. d 4 7  3 3 (208) 245-8800 (fax) 
1 Q, -- the top of lhe mount~n? 
.? A, Yes. Best o f  my recollection, yes, 9 
3 believe rhat is it. 
4 Q, Okay. Mere  on EMbit  5 would the 
5 gate be that we've talked about prior? 
6 A. Rrght there (indicating). 1 believe it 
7 actually was at an angle, as I recollect. It was 
8 at an angle. 
9 Q. Okay. I'm going to draw a circle -- 
lo A, Yes. 
11 Q. -- and I'm going to draw an m o w  with 
12 a11 X ,  h d  what I've circled, is rhat the gate 
13 that we have been discussing in this deposition? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Okay, 
16 A. X believe it was actually set in just a 
17 few feet, and it was at that angle, as I recall 
18 (marking), 
19 Q- Okay. So let's do this. I'm going to 
20 draw an arrow to the line you just drew, and E'II 
21 put M. Funk, Is that what you just drew in 
22 tight there? 
23 A Yes 
24 Q. Okay. h d  then after that gate, do you 
25- thi q -- 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. --rotid? 
3 A. Absolutely, yes. Very well maintained 
4 road. 
5 Q. I guess what I'm getting at is -- Ids 
6 go back to Exhibit 2,  Do you recall Exhibit 2? 
7 A. Urn-hmnt. 
8 Q. Yes? 
9 A. Yes.  
10 Q. Okay. And I guess what I'm getting at 
11 is: You say this is a very we11 maintained road; 
12 is that correct? 
13 A. Well, I'm nor -- it was, yes. This 
14 continued, as X remember, but not very -- I don't 
15 know. This was pretty bad, I h a w  that I just 
16 never used it much. I always went in here 
17 (pointing). 
18 MR. WLm: Let rhe record reflect 
19 that the wtness was pointing to the portion o f  
20 the road in Section 28 that goes around the 
21 mountain. 
22 Q. (BY Mli. VERNON) Let's talk about this 
23 section o f  road right here. You indicated that 
24 you did drive on that section from time to time; 
25 is that correct? 
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1 4. Yes. 
2 O. Okay, h d  where w s  it &at it started 
3 being real rough. if you recall? 
4 A. Xt was -- X know rkts was rough here; I 
5 h o w  it was rough (indlc&ing), They didn't 
6 clean it ap. 
7 Q. Well, let me ask you ths: From -- and 
8 I'll draw this in later, but you can see where 
9 I'm pobtinl;. From right in this area as the 
lo road~comes back into Section 21, was it well 
11 maintained as it came back into Section 2 l ?  
12 A. Wow, let's see. I wish 1 co~Ad 
13 remember exactly. 
14 Q. Ibis is what I want to get to, 
15 Na. Funk. If we: look at: Exhibit 2 -- do you see 
16 Exhibit 2? 
17 A. Urn--. 
18 Q. Okay. On Exhibit 2, didn't you say 
19 where the st= was, was where the gate was? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q, Now, on Exhibit 6, do you see where you 
22 drew in the gate? 
23 A. Urn-hmm. 
24 Q. Okay. You drew in the gate over here. 
-st'? 
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A. IS this the section line? 
Q. Yes, I believe that is the section 
line. 
A. What's this other line? 
Q. I am not sure. Do you feel comfortable 
on Ehibit 6 that you drew the gate in at the 
correct place? 
A. It was on the edge of that land, I know 
that, !that 669. When it was there or there, I 
don't! know which represents the border, but it 
looks like that ww. 
Q, Let's go back to Exhibit 2. This road 
that you drew in here, do you agree with me that 
Exhibit 2, it doesn't show on the exhibit itself 
a road drawn bn; that you just drew that road in 
with a pen? 
A, Yes. Now, you have to understand that 
the telephone company built that road. 
Q Okay. 
A. So if it was crooked here, they might 
have ,straightened it. See what I mean? 
Q. Right, 
A. Because h t  was a built road. I mean, 
they had a road grader up there and graded it. 
Q, And when you're talking "that was a 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRSTJUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
VS" 
, DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO. CV-03-0462 1 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND 
BRENDA LAWRENCE TO 
RENEWED MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF 
PLAl NTl FF 
DATE: November 28, 2007 
TIME: 3:00 p.m. 
JUDGE: John T. Mitchell 
Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. Lawrence, by and through 
their attorney of record, John P. Whelan, submit the following opposition to 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment: 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tower Assets Sub, Inc.'s unveriiriedillomplaint alleges that it "has a vested 
leasehold interest in certain real property leased from Robert and Brenda Hall."' 
As the alleged holder of a leasehold interest, Plaintiff seeks to establish that it 
has a right to cross the land of Defendants under theories of easement by 
necessity, by implication or by prescriptive use.* Plaintiff has previously alleged 
that it had an express easement, but that theory was rejested on appeal. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously ruled in this case that Tower 
would not have standing to seek to quiet t i t le to the land owned by Lawrence or 
~a11 ,~  Ye.t Tower persists in its efforts to esrablish an easement for the Ha// 
Page 1, paragraph I, of Plaintiff's Complaint. No evidence has been offered in support 
of this allegation, The statute of frauds requires leaseholds in duration of one year or more to 
be in writing. [Idaho Code 9-503). 
Second, third and fourth Causes of Action of Plaintiffs Complaint, No admissible 
evidence has been offered that Plaintiffhas been granted any interest whatsoever in the land at 
issue in Plaintiff's Complaint. Ar best, Plaintiff has established that it may have a leasehold 
interest in land owned by Hall. The deed to Hall (marked as Exhibit U ta the Affidavit of Weeks) 
makes no mention of the Lawrence parcel. If Hall has no right to use the Lawrence parcel, Hall's 
leaseholders would have no rights either. Hall is not a party to  this action. 
The Supreme Coun ruled as follows: "Tower will have standing to  seek iniunstive 
relief if It can establish it has an alleged legal right to  benefit from the Blossom Mountain road 
-
easement. As lessee of the alleged dominant estate, Tower derives Its right to use the alleged 
easemenr from i t s  lessor, Hall*. (Emphasis Added). Tower Asser Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 
ldaho 71 0 (2007). 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 2 5.11 
parcelunder theories of casement: by necessity or implication. That is, Tower 
attempts to quiet t i t le  to the Hall and Lawrence parcels, as opposed to merely 
seeking an injunction to enjoin an inte~erence with a demonstrated access. Hall 
has no established easement by necessity or by implication. Therefore, he 
cannor lease or assign those rights to others, and Tower has no standing to 
create such rights. 
Accordingly, the only theory of easement that can be advanced by Tower 
would be a theory based on prescriptive use. 
The opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence is based on this 
memorandum, the court records and the affidavits that have been filed on behalf 
of Defendants in this action. 
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMED "UNDISPUTED FACTS" 
Many of the facts alleged by Plaintiff as being "undisputed" are not 
supported by the record in this action. However, rather than addressing each 
erroneous fact here, Defendants would invite the Court's attention to the 
admissih/e partions of the  affidavits and the competent and admissible evidence 
In this action. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA WWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 3 
PEFEFSDANTHARTIAL STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS;_ 
1. Since 1966, General Telephone has had a deeded right to use an 
access road that crosses the Lawrence parcel rn section 21. (See Affidavit of 
Weeks-Exhibits V, W and X). 
2 .  General Telephone has a legal right to cross sections 21 and 28 (see 
Exhibit "X"-Affidavit of Weeks); whereas Funk has never had the right to cross 
section 28, (See Affidavit of John P. Whelan and Funk deposition pgs. 54-56, 59 
and 66). 
3. There is  no evidence that Section 28 was ever owned by Funk, 
therefore there i s  no unity of title in this case. 
4. The owner of Section 28 i s  not a party to this action. 
5 .  Contrary to the allegations made, Funk has always had access to his 
lands from Mellick Road. 
6. Funk is not a party to this action. 
7. No clear and convincing evidence has been offered to establish a 
prescriptive easement. 
8. Plaintiff seeks to quiet title to the Lawrences land and obtain a 
judgment that it has the right to cross section 28 and the Lawrence parcel via 
the road used by CTE. 
9. In 1975, Funk moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, 
Idaho, where he has resided since. (Funk Deposition, hereinafter "FD" 28:20 to 
29:24); 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA W R E N C E  TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 4 
4 7 
10. After moving to American Fails, Funk visited his land an Glossom 
Mountain only two or three t imes (FD 38:25 to 31 :4); 
1 1, Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land since 1981 (FC) 
31 - 1  7) 
1 2. Funk acknowledged that the access road was gared (FD 1 8: 1 4 ro 
194). 
1 3 .  Funk obtained a key from GTC to use the access road (FD 26:3 to 
28:12). 
14. Mead gave Funk permission as well (FD 44:17 to 44:2 1). 
15 .  Funk identified the portion of the access road used (FD 51 : 1 1 to 
5 1  :25) .  
16. Funk never talked to Ullrich about the use of Section 28; Funk did 
not own land in Section 28; and Funk did not cross section 28  for his access (FD 
54:1 1 to 54:21; S S : 4  to 55:s; S9:Q to 56:23). 
17, Funk did not use the portion of the access road crossing the 
Lawrence parcel (FD 66:15 to 66:Zl). 
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY lUDCMENT 
Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable people could 
reach different conclusions or draw conflicting inference from the evidence, as 
summary judgment is proper where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 5 
material fact. Farm Credit ofSpokane v, Sl;tvenron, 1 2 5 Idaha 2 70, 869 P.2d 
1365; Rule SbS(c), ldaho R. Civ. P. 
Summav judgment is only proper if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admission on the f i le together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter sf law, 1.R.C.P 56(c). 
If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, the trial court 
should grant rhe motion 'for summary judgment. Farm Cfedif Bank v, Stevenson, 
1 25 ldaho 270, 272, 896 P.2d 1 365, 1 367 (1 994). 
STANDINe(l 
The issue of standing is jurisdictional. Van Walkenburgh v. Citizens for 
Term Limits, 135 ldaho 121, 124, 1 5  P.3d 1 1  29,  1 1  3 2  (2000).  T h e  issue of 
standing may be raised ar any time. Hoppe v, McDonald, 103 ldaho 33, 35,  644 
P.2d 3 5 5 ,  357 (1 982). Only the owner of the dominant estate has standing to 
quiet rille to aur easement appurtenant to thar estate. Beach Larefa/ Waref Users 
Ass'n v. Harrison, 142 ldaho 600, I 30 P.3d 1 1 38 (2006). 
There are but two types of easements: 
(1) Easements in gross; and 
(2) Appurtenant easements. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGUS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PlAINTlFF - 6 
An easemenr in gross, is persanal Po the  easement holder.  King v* Laogt 125 
Idaho 905, 42 P.3d 695 (2002).  There is no evidence that the Lawrences ar 
anyone else created such an easement in favor of Tower. 
"An easement appurtenant i s  a right to use a certain parcel, the servient 
estate, for the benefit of another parcel the dorninanr estate, Essentially, an 
easement appurtenant serves the owner of the dominant estate in a way that 
cannot: be separated from his rights in the land." Hodgins v, Sales, 1 39 ldaho 
225,  230, 76 P.3d 969 (2003). 
Accordingly, in light of Tower's allegation that: it i s  a lessee of Hall, Tower 
lacks standing to assert claims of easement by necessity or by implication. 
As alluded to by the ldaho Supreme Court in i t s  opinion pertaining to the 
matter at hand, Tower has standing to seek injunctive relief i f  it can demonstrate 
that it has an existing right to use the subject easement. Since Hall has 
established no easement by implication or necessity, Tower lacks standing to 
pursue those theories. 
If Tower can esrablish a prescriptive easement, it would have sranding ro 
enjoin the interference with such a right. 
OPPOSlTlON OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENRNED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 7 
STATUTE Of: LIMIITAT30m 
Idaho Code 5-203' recites t h e  fallowing: 
No action for the recovery of real praperty, or far the 
recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained, 
unless it appears that the plaintiff, his ancestor, 
predecessor or grantor, was seized or possessed of the 
property in question within five (5) years before the 
commencement of the action; and this section includes 
possessory rights to lands and mining claims. 
Idaho Code 5 - 2 0 4 ~  recites the following: 
No cause of action, or defense to an action, arising out 
of  the. title to real property, or to rents or profits out of  
the same, can be effectual unless il: appears rhat the 
person prosecuting the action, or making the defense, 
or under whose tltle was se~zed or possessed of the 
premises in question within twenty (20 )  years before 
the commencement of the act in respect to which such 
action is  prosecuted or defense made. 
Plaintif's complaint makes no reference to i ts  predecessors interest. Yet  
Plaintiff seemingly alleges that i t s  predecessors in interest acquired rights to use 
the Lawrence parcel and that those rights somehow inure to the beneflt of 
Plaintiff. Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to be 
perfecred. Plaintiff has offered no evidence on the subject. 
4 This statute was amended In 2006, after the instanr acrion was filed. 
* See prior footnote. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUG lAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PIAINTIFF - 8 
Plainriff's present claims are barred by the applicable statute of timitation. 
If Plainriff's predecessors had any  rights to use the L;rvvrenh;e parcel, those 
claims are now stale and barred by the statute of limitations. 
MCHES 
Whether or not a party i s  guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of  fact. 
Osrerloh v. State of  /d&ho, 1 00 Idaho 702, 604 P.2d 7 1 6. It i s  beyond question 
that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged stale claims which 
Plaintiff now sieeks to enforce. If Plaintiff: and i t s  predecessors truly enjoyed 
easements by implication, necessity and/or by prescriptive use, those claims 
should have been perfected through litigation. The failure to pursue the claims 
by Plaintiff's predecessors has clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and 
theirpredecessors to defend against the claims. 
TOWER HAS NOT ESTABLISHED ITSELF AS A LESSEE OR ASSIGNEE O F  T H E  HALL 
,LEAS-C 
The only factual allegations in the record regarding Tower's status are 
conralned In the unverifiedcomplaint of Tower  and in the Affidavit of Robert 
Hall (filed Sept. 13. 2004) offered by Plaintiff in support of irs first morion for 
summary judgment. 
OPPOSITION OF DOUCIAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 9 
Hall does nal state that Tower is his lessee, he merefy states that the land 
was leased to Mextel West Carp. and that "we received notice that rtris lease was 
assigned ta Tower Parent Corp.  and Tower Asset Sub, ~ n c . " ~  
Hall goes on to state 'Tower Asset Sub, Inc, continues to lease the site 
from us.' A copy af the Nextell lease is atrached to Hal!'s affidavir as Exhibit "A". 
The lease prohibits the assignment of the lease by Nextel without Hall's prior 
written ~ o n s e n t . ~  Mall's affidavit does not: recite that he provided the written 
consent or that he otherwise agreed to the assignment. 
Accordingly, T o w e r  has failed to establish that it i s  even a lessee.' 
Tower's status is certainly a genuine issue of fact. 
TOWER'S OWN AFFIDAVIT IREBOR) ESTABLIStjES THAT TOWER'S USE HAS BEEN 
PERMISSIVE 
As stated by the affidavit of Daniel Rebor offered by Plaintiff in support of 
its motion for summary judgment, Nextel obtained an access license from the 
See Hall Affidavit, pg. 2, paragraph 4. 
See Hall affidavit, Exhibit "A", paragraph 14. 
9 This issue has been raised previously and Tower has offered no additional proof on 
the issue- The inference therefore, is that Tower has no proof, 
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iawrences.'"~ower took an assignment of that access agreement and "[Slince 
May of 1399 Plaintiff has c o n t i n u o u s l y  paid the monthly licensing fee by check 
which identifies Specrra Site as payee." 
For t h e  lasr eight (8) years, t h r o u g h  i ts own aiffidavit, Tower's use of the 
Lavvrence easement has been permissive. Permissive use negates any c l a m  far 
an easement by prescriptian. Mefendez V. Hi/7tzI 1 1  1 Idaho 401, 724 P.2d 137 
( I  986). 
ELEMENTS OF EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION NOT SATISFIED 
Funk severed the Lawrence parcel from his remaining land in 197'5 when 
he entered into the Sale Agreement with Human Synerqistics.'' In 1972, Funk 
acquired the right to crass the Mead property in Section 21 but Funk had no 
righr to cross Section 28 to access his lands in Sections 2 1  and 22.  
The parcel at issue in this litigation was not created (or severed) from 
Funk's other lands until 1977 when Funk conveyed to ~asmussen/ChamberIain.'~ 
I V e e  affidavir of Rebor, filed Seprember 1 3, 2004, paragraphs 3-5. 
11 Id, paragraph 6. 
5ee affidavir of weeks filed Seprember 13 ,  2004, pg. 2 ,  paragraph "e" and Exhibit "E" 
thereto. 
la Id, page 4, paragraph 3(a)-(el. 
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Clearly, then, until the 1977 conveyance to Rasrnussen/ChamberSaioa, the 
land allegedly leased by Tower was but  an undivided pur-tion of the  act-eaye held 
by Funk in Section 22, Funk had access to that, section via Mellick Road. 
There is absolutely no evidence in the record rhar  suggests that there was 
an existing access road to the land that would eventually become rhe 
Rasmussen/Chamberlain parcel in 1975when Funk severed what would become 
the Lawrence parcel (the servient estate) from Funk's other holdings (the 
dorninant estate), 
Therefore, the easement claimed by Tower did not exist in 1975 when the 
servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, i.e, there was no prior use. 
Furthermore, Funk never had the legal right to cross Section 28 from 
Section 21 to access his land in Section 22. Funk cannot create by implication 
that which did not exist in fact in 1975. There was no access road to the land at 
issue in this action in 1975. Thus, the key element to establish an easement by 
implication is  lacking in the  instant action. 
The Idaho Supreme Caurt stated In the case of Bearfsland WaterAssoc., 
Id. ,  that: 
To establish an easement by implication from prior use, 
the party seeking to establish the easement must 
demonstrare three essent~al elements: ( 1 )  unlry of t~ t l e  or 
ownership and subsequent separation by grant of the 
dominant estate; ( 2 )  apparent continuous use long 
enough before conveyance ~ f .  the dominant estate to 
show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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the easement must be reasonably necessary to the 
proper enjayment of rhe  dominant estate. Cfose v. 
&ensinkt 995 Idaho 72, 76, 501 P.Zd 1383, 7 387; Davis v. 
Gswn, 83 Idaho 204, 210, 369 P.2d 403, 406-07 
(1 96 1 >. (Emphasis added). 
The third element recited above requires proof that a disputed access is 
reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate. As stated 
in the affidavits af Douglas Lawrence and Bruce Anderson, Funk has always had 
access to his Section 22 property via Mellick Road. Funk or his successors can, 
and should, provide access to Tower. 
EASEMENT BY NECESSIlY 
An easement by necessity is  founded on the following legal theory: 
"A way of necessity is an easement arising from an 
implied grant or implied reservation; it is of common law 
origin and i s  supported by the rule of sound public 
policy that lands should not be rendered unfit for 
occupancy or successful cultivation ... It is  a universallv 
established pr inc i~ le that where a tract of land is  
conveved which is se~arated from the hishwav bv other 
lands of the qranror or surrounded bv his lands or by his 
and those of third oersons, there arises, by implication, 
in favor of the grantee, a way of necessity across the 
premises of the rJrantor to the highway." (Emphasis 
added). 
BurfeyBrick andSand CQ, v. Cofer, 102 ldaho 333, 335,  629 P.2d 11 6, 1 7 68 
(1 98l)(quoting 17A Am. Jur. Easements 3 58 (1 957)); see 25  Am. Jur. 2d 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGlAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
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Easements and Licenses 5 5  30-03 1 (2005). One who claims an easement by 
necessity across another's land must prove "(1) unity sf title and subsequenr 
separation of the dominant and servient estates; ( 2 )  necessity of the easement at: 
the rime of severance; and (3) great present necessity for the easement." e a r  
Island W;3rerA~s%?, fnc. V, Brown, I 2 5  Idaho 71 7,  7 2 5 ,  874 P.Zd 528, 536  (1 994). 
In the matter at hand, Tower cannot demonstrate that there was a 
necessity for the access across the Lawrence parcel far the benefit o f  rhe parce/ 
allegedly leased by T o w r  when the Lawrence parcel was severed from the other 
land retained by Funk. Funk obviously had access to his other lands when he 
severed the parcel sold ro Wurnan Synergistics in 197'5, otherwise Funk would 
have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human 
Synergistics in 1 975. 
It should be noted that the parcels of  land at issue sit on top of a 
mountain. The lands are not suited for farming or residential development. The 
land is suitable only for the maintenance of radia and phone towers. Nothing in 
the record establishes that anything but infrequent access to these sites is 
commonplace. 
5 
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must establish by clear 
and convincing evidence all of the elements necessary for a prescrlptlve 
easement Hodgins v. Sa/es, 139 Idaho 225, 229;  Abbot v. NampaSchoolDist. 
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DATED this 1 3 day of November, 2007- 
Respecrfu!ly submitted, 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
n 
for Defendants 
OPPOSITION OF DOUGLAS AND BRENDA LAWRENCE TO RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF - 16 
CERTIFICATE OF SEWVlCE 
w 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15 day of November. 2007, I caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by rhe method indicated below, 
and addressed to  the fallowing. 
Susan P, Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Via: 7 Facsimile: (LOB) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
SUSAN P WEEKS 
JAMES. VERNON & WEEKS, PA.. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur &illme. fD 83 8 14 
Telephone: (208) 667-0683 
Fax: (205) 664-1 654 
TSB #A255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IX THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, X N  AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAT 
T O W R  ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware 
corporation, Case No. CV d-% 
i 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA .T. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife. 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KAYMOND W. 
GOOBWN IN SUPPORT OF 
SUBSTTnJTION OF REAL 
PARTY IN INEREST 
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA ) 
1 ss. 
County of Wake f 
1, Raymond W. Goodwin, first being duly sworn upon oath depose and 
say: 
1. The information contained herein is  based upon my own information 
and is true and correct to the best of my knowledge, I am over the age of 18, and 
I am competent to testify thereto. 
2 .  I was the attorney-in-fact for the above listed Plaintiff in the above 
matter. I am cumntly the attorney-in-fact for Spectra Site Communications, 
LLC . 
AFFIDAVJT OF &%YMONa W. COODWTN IN SUPPORT OF SUBSTTTUTION OF 
PARTY IN INTEREST: 1 
iiii3/ZBM! 13:?3 ,J ,,) 1,') 
r"HiJt kb; 3"; 
3,  On or about March 2006, Tawer: Asset Sub, Tnc., pursumt to 
Delaware law, converted its legal form from a Delaware corporation to a Delaware 
limited 1iabSit.y compmy. 
4. 8n or about F e b m q  23, 2007, 'lbwca Asset Sub, LLC merged into 1 
SpectraSite Communications, inc. On or about March 31, 2007, pursuant to 
Delaware law, Spectrasite Communications, Inc. converted its legal form from a 
i Ddawme corlporabon to a Delaware limited 1iabilitr-J company. 
4. The above entities were all issued certificates of authority by the 
Idaho Secretary of State to do business in Idaho during the relevant time periods I 
I 
of their existence. True and correct copies of the relevant filings with the I 
secretary of state are attached hereto as Exhibit "An. 
is 13& day of Novemb 
/ 
$& SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this /a day of November, 
AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND W. GOODWIN IN SUPPORT OF SUBSXTUXON OF REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST: 2 
I hereby certify that on the /3?day o f  Nu'ovembcr, 2007, I caused to bc served a truc and 
correct copy ofthe foregoing document by the m~thod indicated below, and addressed to the 
followiq: 
0 U.S. Mail Overni&t Mail 
61 Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
John P, Whclan 
2 1 3 4Lh Street 
Coeur d'hlene, TD 538 2 6 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
AFFIDAVIT OF RAYMOND W. GOODWI'N M SUPPORT OF SUBSTITUTION OF REAL 
PARTY IN INTEREST: 3 

' 0 2 / 1 4 / 2 0 0 3  ld:12 FAX '318 861 0786 
. 202 
THORITY (Fur Proflt) : ) . !  r.2 I L  jlfi 2: 2 9  
(tnstructlons on €lack of Applfcatlon) 
1 The name of the a~rporeucm Is: 
Tawcr Aeeet Sub, Inc. 
2. The name whtch i t  ahall use In Idaho Is: , 
3. 11 Is incorporated under tho lewa of: DciawE* 
4. Its dsite af Incorporation Is: 0SPZ111998 
5. The address of Its prlnclpal olllce Is. 
100 Regency Fotwt Dnvc. Suitc I60, Cary. NC 275 1 1 
6. The ~ d d r e e ~  ta which carnmpandbnce should be sddm3aed, If dlPlb+ant from ltsm 5,  Is: 
OY 
and izs reglstercd agent h Idaho r# that addteee is: C T morat l lm 8-
8. The names and respeclive business addresses af Its dlrectars and nfflcers are: 
Oflice Address 
SEE A Z7ACHiWEM 
-u . . 
T N G n  e- Sp i v a ~  
Ta-EBERLE BERL l N PWC' oaz I 
Dirbsctars and 63S;ficem Repa& 
Tovvssa Asset Sub, Inc. 
SIephen CfWk Dimetar 
EEeEtjm: Tuesday, Aprjl20, 1999 
Primary Addnn6: 100 Regency Fame!: Drtve 
Suite 160 
Gary, NC 2751 I 
Camrnenc 
OFFICERS 
Dstt A. Carny Prealdent-Lasing Dlvlslorr 
EfEmlve: Wednesday, Janu~ry 0 1.2063 
Primary Address: f 80 Fkggency F~rm Driee 
Suite! 160 
Gary, NC 275 1 1 
Comment: Unlimited OPfrccr 
Robert Clamaa Senior Vise P r d e n t - S I I I ~  end Msrkrthg 
Effective: Wednesday, January 01,2003 
Prlmary Address: 100 Regency Fofrsri Drive 
Suits t 60 
Cary, NC 275 I t 
Cantncnt: Ljmircd Officer 
Gsbrbh Gaazllez Senior 'blica Praeida~t and Contralhr 
Effective: Wednesday. January CJI ,2O1)3 
P n m w  Address: 100 Regency Forcrt brivc 
Sulrs I60 
Cay, NC 175 1 t 
Comment: Llmlted CEtlcet 
Dsnlel A v a  Vice Prealrien t - Sa Ies 
Eflerctive: Wednesday. January 0 1.2OU3 
-w. ,. . Primary Address: 100 Regency F u m  Drive 
Suite 160 
Cary, NC 275 1 1 
Camrncnr: Limited Ofl~ccr 
Brian Dietrich Vice Prullidtnl; - Property Management 
Effeccivt: Wed~resduy, Janumy 01,2003 
Primary Addrcsr;: 100 Regency Farcsc Drive 
Suite t 60 
Cary, NC 275 11 
Comment: Limited Officcr 
Dutlnc C. MacEntee Vice Prerldent-Qusiity, Admlnktmtion end Reld Smicizi 
Effactive: Wtdnmdey, January 01,2005 
Primary Addman: 1 OD Regency Fnrexr. Drive 
Suite 160 
C~ry,NG27511 
I Cammtnt: Limited Offirser 
Rwe l ved 02-1 4-2003 12 : 14 Frm419 851 0795 To-EBERLE BERL l N P ~ p e  1103 
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T m ~ o r  A~tiel  Sub, k c .  
CIan P. Spiwak Vice Prrcldent-Bujiness Q~nrclbpmenr 
Effirtive: Wednesday, lmuary 01,2303 
Primary Addmris: 2 80  Ragcncy Fnw-9c Drive 
Suite 160 
Cnry, NC 275 1 1 
Cornmcnr: Ltmlted O ~ I C C :  
*'' . ' Gerard Ains8t.eia Vice President-Qllacetlon Operrrtions 
EEectivc: Wednesday, Janum O I ,  2003 
Primary Address: 160 Regency Form Drive 
Suite 160 
Cary, NC 275 I 1 
Comment: Umlted ORicer 
Ted &4brsras VIce Reidant-TcchnuIa~ 
ERkctiuc: Wadnefidq, J m r y  01,2003 
Primary Addraaa: 100 Regonty Fenst Drive 
S ~ x k  1160 
Cary, NC 275 11 
Comment: Limind Offtc;cr 
Robmt Anderaan V i a  President-National Acrouatt Rcprasent~t3ve 
EFFsctiw: Wadntsday, January 01,2003 
Pi-intary Addraes: 100 Regancy Fares? Drive 
Suite 160 
Cary, NC 2751 1 
Comcnan?: Limited Oficcr  
Brian Porter Vice PresidanbNstionel Account Repiuentetive 
EfFectivc: Wrdnesdny. January 0 1.2603 
Primary Address: 1 BO Rcgcncy Forest Drive 
Suin, 160 
Cary, 1UC 275 1 1 
rae.. . .. Comment: Limit4 OfPice: 
.Ica v. Ricks Vice Fratidant-National Account Repr~cntatlve 
Effcctin: Wednesday, J a n r r q  01.2003 
Prfmery Address: N ~ n e  given 
Camm enr: Limited OfFicer 
John W, Lynch Secretftry 
Effcczivo: Wednesday, Janujry 0 1,2003 
Primary Address* 100 Regcney Forest Drive 
Suiac 160 
Cary, FJC 275 11 
Cornrnant: Limited Officcr 
Jamra Blnghram Director-Collacstiao 
Eective: Wednesday, January 01,2003 
Prifna~y Addrest?: 100 Regency Foren Drive 
Suite 160 
Csry, NC 275 i I 
Commenr: Autllorized Individud 
Chkp Carew Natti~nal Director alOptimiEPtim 
Effective; Wednwday, Jsnuay 01,2005 
Primary Address: ] 00 Regency Forest Drivc 
Suite 160 
C q .  NC 275 1 1 
Comment: Aurhorizcd IndhrEdual 
I.rr*p;- . , 
0 2 / 1 4 / 2 ~ 0 3  14:13 FAX 818 851 0'7116 S P E G ~ S I T E :  cam.  -SBC @ o a s  
U. . 
. Tower Aasct Sub, Ins. 
Rick Foster IlirsLttos-ProJed Management 
EEoww;: Wtdnmdry, Jarnary 01,2003 
Primary Address. 1 DO R ~ g t n q  Fcrcsr bivc  
Suite 16a 
Cary, NC 275 1 I 
Commcn~: Aurharized Individual 
CLevid Piarect Dfreetor-Ceilucetioa 
EfTemive: Wednesday, January O P ,2003 
Primary Address: 1 00 Regency Foroat briwo 
Suirr: 16Q 
Gary. NC 775 1 ). 
Commcni: A udrorimd 1 ndivirtuat 
Xhralei E. Rebear Dirertor-Real Estate O m t i a n s  
Effeetlva: Wadncsday. January 0 t, 2003 
Primary Address: 100 Regency Forest Dl-ivc 
Suite 160 
Cary, NC 2751 1 
Comment: Authorized Individual 
Michael Whitley Dircctar-Deployment rnltfalltvas 
Bffnctivc: Wcdncsday, January 01,2003 
-4..X7.' I, Primary Addnssr 100 Regency Fomt Drive 
Suite 1-50 
C ~ r y ,  NC 275 1 1 
Camrnont: Authoriztd lnd ividual 
fernes S. Pclmeh Assiscest Traaauter 
ERacrive: Wednesday, fanumy 0 1.2003 
Primary Addross: I Oft  Regency Farex Drive 
Suite 280 
Gary; NC 2751 1 
Commant: Limited OFicec 
Steven 1, Reinhard AaBistent SectetPry 
EftWive: Wednesday, f~rtuary 01,2003 
Priinary Addrrrs~: 100 Regency Fores? Dr~vc  
Suite 160 
Cary. NC 2751 1 
Carnmcnr: Limited OfTicu 
Dennis Jay Sargewt, Jr. AsJiSta nt S~erela ry 
ERECT~VE: Wednesday. fanuarv 0 1.2003 
Primary Address: 100 Regency Forest Drive 
Suite 160 
Car);. NC 275 1 L 
Commenr: Limited Officer 
Recalved 02-14-2003 12:14 Frwn-919 851 0795 To-EBERLE BERL l N Page 005 
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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
I 
OF 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. 
File Number C 747677 
I ,  BEN YSURSA, Secretary of State of the State of Idaho, hereby cerhfy that an 
Application for Certificate af Authority, duly executed pursuant to the provisions of the 
Idaho Business Corporation Act, has been received In this ofice end is found to 
conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY a+ by virtue of the authority vested in me by law, I issue this 
* .' Certificate of Authclrrty to tqnsact buslness in this State and attach hereto a duplicate of 
. the appllcatfon for such certificate. 
Dated: I 4 February 2003 
Lw 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
- .  BY %?fi;i~d 
I I I 565 
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I 
APPLICATION FOR CERTlFICATE 
OF WITHDRAWAL 
(Insiructlons on badc of applldlan) 
To the Secretary of Stale of ldEIho 
Pmuent ta Sectloo 30-1 -1520, Maho Code. the undersigned Copratton hersby epplleslor a 
certificate dwlthdrawal horn the Stale of Idaho, and fofttcatpurpose submlts thefallwvlng statefnent: 
1. T b  name of the corporation Is: 
Tower Aaact Sub, be. 
The name whWI H used In ldaho Is: 
Tower Assot Sub. Inc. 
2. It is lnmrporated uderttPe taws of Delaware - 
3. It is not transading buslneae h the Slab of Idaho. 
4. It hereby surrenders ~ts authortty to trar~sed business h said sMe. 
5. It revokes the suthor#y af its reglstared agent tn the, State of Id& to aeceptservlce of pccass and 
uxrssnts that s w b  of process tn any adlon, sult orpmedlng based upon any cause dadlon 
arising in the State of Idaho duringthe h e  It was authorized lo transact bu6lr1ass therein may 
themafter be made on It by regislered or cerbf'ed mall to the corpmtkm at the address llsted In item 
8.. below. 
6. The postofljca addreestowhich process agalnstth6 carporatIan m a y  bs malled is: 
clo Ctnrtral Camsel, A m d m  Tower Cotporatlon, 1 16 Hmtbgm Ave., 1 1 th Fbor. Bobtan, MA 021 16 
7. It agrees to Mtiv me S6- oFSbte dthe  Steb of Idaho of any changefothe addmas In Item 6. 
a Signatue C u a a c r A c a f '  m = ( r p w a . c o a R 1 )  S ~ o f S @ I t 0 u e p a t c y  
TYWd Micbsel B. h4ilsorn 
Capedty VP k A s a i m  S e e  
4 
l a R l . I l W C T l y w -  
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CERTiFlCATE OF WITHDRAWAt 
OF 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. 
. \ s / ~  . . 
I I 
flle Num bet C 147677 I I 
rJ 
I, BEN YSURSA, Secretary d State of the State of idaho, hereby certify that 
Application for Certificate of Wimdravval fmm this State, has been received In this ofFice 
and is found to conform to law- 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Law, I issue,th$ 
CerMicate of Withdrawal and attach hereto a duplicate of the Applimtion for such 
Certincate. 
State of Idaho I 1 
Dated: March 6,2006 
*-'; - . 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
r,- 
I\ 1, The name of ihe limited liability company is: 11 I - '  Tower b e t  Sub, UC 2. If me name of the limited liability company lo not permissible or is not available in Idaho, the name the breign limited liability company will use in ldaha is: 
, -. -- 
3. The juriodidon under whose l a w ~  the limjted liabilib company is organized is: 
and the date of its fannation was; 8.iZU19-98 
4. me name and address of the registered agent in Idaho is: 
C T cmpmrion Syskm. d o  t T Cmpmtlun S p m ,  3WNonh 6th Snmt. R d s c  K. 83702 - 
5 ,  me address of the limited liability mmpam's ofliar in (ha jurisdiction under whose laws 
it Is organized Is: 
d o  The Cotpandon Tnai CQ.. Cmmmtlon T~nCrmcr, 1209 Ormm St. Wilmrngton DE 19801 
6, The address of the limited liabilily mmpanqs principal ofice. If other than the address 
in #5 above, is: 
116 Wlmtingrm Avenw. 1 lrh Floor. Boston. MA 02116 
7, The address to which correspondence should be a d d m e d  Is: 
8. Signature of a manager. if any, of a member 
if there are no managers. 
d 
- 
Signature 
Typed Name M~ehncl B MibJPb W Of bhUgcf  . 
Manegar a Mmmber Cj,  I !%cmtaryolStara~arly 
B 
3 IDRHD s€cR€TARY OF Slm $ 83/Cirb/efi386 85aBB 
eK: 8436 CTI ll#1 941413 
1 1  11.80 c 1ea.m 4 4 
1 e ee.m a 2a.r m ~ n  c B s 
r m 3 3 . I W S M C T ~ M ~  
PAGE 27,'39 
* 
2001 WAFt 13 PH 2: 17 
(InstNctions on back of application) 
, . A  , .  
1. The name of the foreign Ernited IiaMlity company is: 
Toosar Aarrec Sub, LEX: 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
J 
, 
> 
2. The JwIsdlELlon under whose laws the limited llabillty mmpeny is organized Is: 
DeZawat.6 
3. The forelgn Ilmlted liability company is not transacting buslness h Idaho, and it 
hereby surrenders its regismtion tD transact business In idaho. 
4. The toreign limited liability company revoker'the suMorfty of L reeistered agent forser- 
vice of process, and corrsents that sem1c.e of process In any actlon which arclee during the 
time it was registered In Idaho my hereafbt be made by r6glsteW ar cwtlfied mail 
addressed to: 
116 Xuntlnqton Avenue, Zlth' Floor 
a %mtnry d8bb lee ow 8 
w w I . 5 - 3  , 
C W c f b  i3eni.o~ Vice pnw5Adsnl: 
. 
mBECmwffmfE 
' 83/i3/28917 eSsQf8 
ma 1w1@6E CTr 71104 BHz k- 
L @  8 , 0 8 6  a98 wtFUWI2 
1 P e8.m g8.m mxn c I a 
I 
aoetan, MA -6 
. A t t n :  X ,  Anthonsr Lehv, Senior Vies Precridsnt 
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State of Idaho 
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY 
OF 
SPECTRASITE COMMUNICATIONS, INC, 
File Number C 131 950 
1 I I PETE T CENARRUSA. Secretary of Stete of the State of idaha, hereby cerii 1 1 
that an Application for Certificate of Authority, duly executed pursuant to the provisions 
of the Idaho Business Corporation Act, has been received in this office and is found to 
conform to law. 
ACCORDINGLY and by virtue of the authorrty vested in me by law, 1 Issue this 
Certificate of Authority to transact business in this State and attach hereto a duplicate 
of the ~pl icat lon tor such Certificate. 
Dated: January 7,2000 
SECRETARY OF STATE 
5. ~ f / b p d ~ ~ & a f f l c ~  100 Reuency Forest  Drive, S u i t e  400 
Cary, NC 27511 
8. The agdtress ta whlch mmrspondtln5Pl ahoukf be addmasea. If ditterent trom h n  S, i s  /I 
7. The sraet a d d m s ~ l  faghnbred flea In IdzBairr ,1603. Shoreline Driva. ~oine, ~Cbh:, 83702 
8. Tha namas end respective bmlws sddresslcaa M Its direuun and o f i i ~en  are: it 
, .  .,. . s .  
. . 
, , , .  . 
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T e r q  L. Armant Vice President 
Primary Acidrcss: I00 Rtg~ney Forest Driva 
Suite 400 
Cary, N C  275 1 1 
Timothy G. 8i1a Cnief Operating OEccr 
Primary Address: 100 Regency Forest Drive 
Suite 400 
Cary, NC 2751 1 
James Bingbarn Vice President 
Primary Address; 1 Oa Regency Forect Drive 
Suite 40@ 
Cary, PC 275 1 1 
Stephen U. Clark Presfdent . 
Primary Address: 101) Regency Fares? Drive 
Suite 400 
C q ,  NC 275 I I 
Cttiei Executive Officer 
Primary Addrcss: 100 Regency Foren Drivc 
Suite 400 
Cary. NC 275 1 1  
R rian Dietrich Vice President - Property Management 
Primary Addreas: 100 Regency Forea Drive 
Suite 400 
Cary. NC 275 1 1 
iCtlagaus F. Fribcrg Vlce Rrmldenr -Sales end Marketing 
Pdmw Address: 100 Regency Farest Dcive 
Suite 400 
Cary, NC 275 1 1 
Keliy Getrard As.siatant Secretary 
Primary Addrm: 309 1 Governors Lakes Drive 
Norcross, GA 3007 1 
Dove P. Culllcn 'Jiee President 
Prlmofv Address 3OSt 1 Goternoa Lakes Drive 
Vorcross, CX 3007i 
W. Scntl Lbyd V Ice Prraldenr- Collocarlon 
cs,+ . P r t m w  Address' 100 Regency Fontsr Crr~ve 
Suitc dOCl 
Cary, i"JC 275 i ! 
John H, Lynch k c  President, Gencrsl Counscl 
Primary Address, 100 Regency Forest Drive 
Suitc 400 
Cary, NC 275 1 i 
Fmnk Mnrco Vice Presldcnt 
Primary Address: 873 5 West Higgins Road 
Chisago, Il, 6D63 I 
Calvin J. Peyne Exccutivc Vicc Prcsidntt - Design and Cvnsrruction 
Primary Address: (7886 4 5.5 th A v e ~ u t  
Surrey. B.C. V3A 6CQ Canda 
Leonard Pirklc Assistant Secretary 
Primary Address: 2000 Crow Canyon Pfnce 
,Can Ramon, CA 94 553 
John F. Ricct Vice President 
Primary Address: 2000 Crow Canyon Place 
San Ramon. CA 96583 
- , Richard Seiff hsistant Secrcra~y 
Primary Addrcnt: 3091 Govemars takes Drive 
Norcross. G A  30071 
taah Sell Shaw v i c e  President - Hliman Re?t(r~rrccs 
Primary Address: 800 Regency Parkway . f. P  
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Cnry, NC 275 1 I 
Glen F. Spivak Vice President - Corpomte Stralegy 
Primary Address: LOO Regency Fores Drive 
Suite A00 
Cory, NC 27s 1 1 
David P. Tornick Secretary 
Primary Address: 100 Regency Foresr Drive 
Suite 400 
Casy.NC27511 
Chief Pinanrial Qtflnr 
Primary Address: LOO ~cgrncy  Forcst Drivc 
Suitc 600 
Cary, NC 275 1 1 
Tirdd Vlrstk Asststant Secretrrp 
Pnmtrzy Address, R'SS Wcst Ftiggin3 Xoad 
Chicago. iL 5063 ! 
Jansc D. W a l k n  Assbtana Secrctai-y 
Primary Address 100 Regency Forest Drive 
Suite 600 
C w .  NC 275 1 1 
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j (1 1. The name of the llm4Csd Ratl iQ mmpny is: 
1 2m 
I 
S ~ i a 3 C o n m m ~ , ~  
2, W the name of the tirnfted liability mmpany Is not pm~lasiMe w Is not amliable In Idaho, 
the name the hWgn llrnfted liability cwnpahy dl1 ~ s e  in Idaho Is: 
NtA 
Sic-. 
REGlSTRATlON OF FOREIGN O-J ~2 I pn 3- 34 
LlMlEl) LlkBiMPV COMPANY 
(hsbuctione a, bsdr of application) !3.imflAR'f Of' SAE EXATE OF lW 
, 4, The n a m  and a d d m  oftite registered agertt In Idaho Is: 
I 
5. The eddmss of h e  R m W  llabilfty company's dfb In the JutisdidJon under wtrose taws 
I ~t ~ r r  organized IS: 
3. Tha]urlsdlctfan undervvhase lam the limited llabtllty company OB 0rganl2Bd k: wwm 
and the date of its tsmaUonwas; 1111311996 
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SLIS,kY P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERVON & WEEKS, P.R. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Goeur d'Alene. ID 835 14 
Tetepl~one: (208) 657-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
TSB #4255 
Attorneys for Pf ainti ff 
IN THE DISTRTCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THJZ COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
MOTION TO CONTTNUE TRJAL 
COMES NOW Plaintiff in the above-entitled action and hereby moves d7.e Court for 
continuation of the trid scheduled for December 10,2007. This motion is made upon the 
grounds that Defendants have hled two separate motions for disqualification, which have 
delayed the Court's consideration of the pending summary judgment motion. Plaintiff i s  entitled 
to a ruling on the summary judgment proceeding before commencement of trial. Givcn the trial 
date, the Court will not have adequate time in which to consider and issue a dccision.an the 
pending summary judgment motion. 
FURTHER, Defendants have alleged that the lack of a scheduling order has prejudiced 
them. Any prejudice is equal to both parties. Therefore, the appropdate remedy is a 
MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL: 1 c 3'79 1 
continuation of trial with a pretrial scheduling order being issued to provide guidance to both 
parties. 
DATED Qis 13" hay of November, 2007. 
JAMES, VEhlOK & WEEKS, P.A. 
c, - 
BY 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
CERTIFKATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby cedi& that on the 1 3 ' ~  day of November, 2007, I caused to be served a m e  and 
conect copy of the Foregoing document by the method ~ndicated below, and addresscd to the 
fc~llowing: 
El U.S. Mail C l  Overnight Mail 
IJ Hand Delivered !Ia" Telecopy (FAX) 
MOTION TO CONTlNUE TRZAL: 2 
SUSAN I". WEEKS 
JAMES. WRvC)N & WEEKS, P.A. 
1 626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Atene, ED 838 1 4 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664- 1684 
TSB #4255 
ITIJ THE DISTRICT COTJRT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL, DISTRJCT OF Tm 
STATE OF IDAHO, I%' AND FOR THE COUT\?TU OF KOOTENAT 
TOWER ASSET SUB We., a Delaware 
corporation, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J, 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Case No. CV 03-462 1 
h4OTION FOR SUBSTITUTION 
OF REAL PARTY IN R\ITEREST 
Defendants. 1 
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, and pursuant to T.R.C.P. 17(a) moves the Court 
for an order substituting Spectra Site Communications, LLC, a Delaware limited 1iabiliQ 
company, as the real party in interest in the above matter. This motion is made upon the grounds 
set forth in the affidavit of Raymond Goodwin, filed concurrently herewith. 
DATED this 13& day of Navernber, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
h4OTTON FOR SUBSTITUTXON OF REAL PARTY Xld INTEREST: 1 587 
i hereby ccrrti@ that on the 2 3'"day of November. 2007. T caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method, indicated below, and addressed to the 
folloliving: 
u 
61 
Overnight Majl 
Telecopy (FAX) 
U.5. &fail 
Hand Def iveted 
John P. Whelm 
2 13 4th Street 
Coeur dxlene. ID 8381 6 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
MOTION FOR SUBSTITUTION OF REAL PARTY IN INTEREST: 2 
SGSAB I?, %1;EEKS 
IAMES, VERNON iZ: WEEKS, P.A. 
I 626 Lincoln ?Yay 
C a a r  dTAlene, ID 83 8 1 4 
TeIephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 654 
ISB ff4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST SEJDTCTAL DTSTRICT OF THE 
TOWER ASSET SUB TNC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J 
L A W N G E ,  husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
RESPONSE TO SECOND NOTION 
TO DISQUALIFY 
STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DTSQU'ALXFV 
Idaho Rules of CiviI Procedure Rule 40(d)f2)(A}(4) "Disqtlalification for cause" provides 
that: "(A) Grounds. Any party to an action may disqualify a judge or magistrate for cause from 
presiding in any action upon any of the following grounds: . . . [tlhat il~e judge or magistrate is 
biased or prejudiced for or against any party or the case in t h ~  action." Orders on motions to 
disqualify are evaluated according to abuse-of-di screti on rules. Samuel v. Hepworth, fiagester 
& Laarniz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 88, 996 P.2d 303, 307 (2000). 
ARGUMENT 
K\ $:) -q 
d d " -  
RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 1 
Defcndmts' counsel claims that the arid jjudgc is prejudiced against Defendants' case 
because thew altorney perceives that tthc judge treats him disgarzlt;ely The new facts t11a"couasel 
provides in support of the renewed motion are: ( I )  Defendmts counsel has filed a judicial 
complaint against thc trial judge based upon actions in the present case; (2) no scheduling order 
was issued in either Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence. Kootenni County Case No. CV- 
02-7671 or Tower Asset Sgb v,  Law~vence, Qotenai Coul-tty Case No. CV-03-4621; (3) the judge 
allegedly called counsel a liar in fi'ont of his soz-x; and (4) the Court applies a different standard to 
plaintiff's counsel based upon an order entered by the Court. 
.Although the Court has previously noted that it has made rulings both in favor and 
against Defendant's counsel, Defendant's counsel continues to claim that his perception that thc 
trial judge has animosity toward him wliich prejudices his client. Plaintiffis not in a position to 
look into the subjective mind of the court and answer suc11 allegation. However, from an 
objective point of view, plaintiffhas not obsmred those things of which Defendant's couiisel 
compla~ns. There was a scheduling order issued in Case No. CV-02-767 1 on Decernber 12, 
2003. There was not one issued in Case No. CV-03-4621. Plaintiffs counsel ltas observed this 
ovasight in othcr cascs by other judges. Tt has been h a  practice to notify the wurt clerk when 
there i s  wch an oversight. If Defendants felt this oversight in Case No. CV-03-4621 prejudiced 
them, they certainly were aware of this fact and had every nppoctunity to bring it to the court's 
attention. Objectively, an oversight (which may well have occurred long before hlr. Whelm was 
the attorney o f  record) does not establish prejudice 011 the part of the court. 
Defendants are correct that thc order presented by Plaintiff for the Sixth Access 
referenced an affidavit when no such affidavit was prcsented and the Court signed it. The order 
was modeled after a previous order and should have been modified. The failure to modify it was 
the ,Fault of plaintips counsel, not the coui-t. However, this fact alone is not indicative that the 
RESPONSE TO SECOND MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 2 584 
tour"; is prejudicecl against Defaldmt or treats thc pl&ntiFs counsel better than defendant. In 
fact, thc same siuation occurred when Dcfcndants presented their ordm on judicial notice. The 
order presented by Defendants and entered by the court on September 1 1 , 2007 was not 
consistent with the ruling made in court. Plaintiff brought a motion to correct the judment as 
allowed by the rules. Defendant is afforded the same opportunity. The mere fact that an order 
was presented and subsequmtly entered that was inconsistent with the ruling is not indicative of 
prejudice by the Court toward the presenting counsel. If it was, tbe logical conclusion in this 
matter is that the tnal court is presudiced against both parties because it has entered orders for 
both that were incorrect, which leads to the nonsensical conclusion that this court: will rule in 
neither parties favor and both parties favor. 
As to the claim that the court called Mr. Whelan a liar, both plaintiff's counsel and the 
court disagreed with Mr. Whelan's sl2aracterizatiion of the Supreme Court's opinion. However, 
plain.tiF'l's counsel does not recollect the ~ o u r t  calling Mr. W~elan  a liar. Plaintiff's counsel's 
recollect was that the court indicated that Mr. Whelm was not being truthful when he 
represented that the Supreme Court reversed the preli~ninary injunction when it remanded the 
matter. However, the rccord is the better source for reference on this matter. 
RESPONSE TO SECOPUD MOTION TO DISQUALIFY: 3 
COKCLUSION 
Perhaps VJhelan's perceptions are shaped by his o w  internal views. Plaintiffs 
counsel does not perceive the trmsgressions pmccivtd by Mr. Whelan. 
DATED this 2 0 ~  day of November, 2007. 
JAMES, \TRP;ON Rt. WEEKS, P.A. 
BY - 
SUSAN P. WEEKS 
CERTIFICATE 0% SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 20"' day of November, 2007, I caused to be served a true and 
conect copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
.Following: 
U.S. Mail Overnight Mail 
Wand Delivetctd w" Tclecopy (FAX) 
JoZm P, WeIan 
21 3 4Ih Street 
Coeur d' Alcnc, ID 838 16 
Facsimile: (208') 664-2240 
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SUSAN P. WEEKS 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P-A. 
1626 Linwln Way 
C o r n  d' Alme, ID 83 8 3 4 
Telephone: (208 j 667-0685 
Facsisnilc: (208) 664-1683 
ISB M255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FTRST ,TURICXAL DJSTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUE3 lNC., a Delaware 
corporation, / Case No. CV 03-462 1 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Lawrence argues that Towm on remand continues to seek to establish an easement in 
itself across the Lawrence paxcel. To the contrary, Plaintiff seeks to obtain injunctive relief as 
allowed by the Supreme Court in T O W ~ F  Asset Sub Jnc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710, 152 P.3d 
AXthaugh Tower's initial brief set forth theories under which Hall had easement rights, 
the recitation was not ncccssary. The Idaho Supreme Court on appeal noted that Tower Asset 
Sub, hc. on appeal had already established that Hall had the right to use. the easement. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that "Tower presented uneontroverted 
P"r 
PLATNTIFF'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY MEMORANDUM R'I SUPPORT OF MUTTON ' 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: 1 
ev~dence that the Hall parcel was intended ta have the bcnefit o f  the access road across the 
La~vrencc parcel. However. that does not establish an express casement, which must be crcatcd 
by a written instmment." Id, at 584. 
Lawmce also claims that Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant. This 
same argument was argued to the Idaho Supreme Court and disposed of by the appellate court. 
The Suprcrne Court in Tower Asset Sub, lnc. v. Lawrence, sldpra, specifically noted that: ''We 
hold that Tower, as lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief 
preventing the Lawrences fiorn intefiering with its alleged right to use the casemenl." The court 
concluded that: "Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if it can establish it has an 
alleged legal right to benefit Erorn the Blossom Mountain R o d  casement." Nothing presented by 
Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset Sub has standing. 
Thus, the law of the case as cstablished on appeaI is that Tower Asset Sub has standin.g to 
to seek indjunctive relief it it can establish it has an alleged legal right to benefit from the 
Thus, the on1 y issue ran and& by the appellate court: was whetller Tower, ns a tenant, has 
the lcgal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement of its landlord, I-InZls. 
While a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the owner of the 
way, his family, ~.enai?ts, ervants, and guests, as we11 as by persons transacting business with 
him, in the absencc of a special agreement to the contrary. 28A C.J.S. Easements 5 164 (1996). 
This concept wa$s clearly enunciated by the New Hampsilire appellate wurts in Rrcidi v. 
Town ofRyo, 150 N.H. 694,700-701,846 A.2d 535 (N.H.2004), wherein the murt held: 
We next look at the dominant estate holder's ri&t to usc an appurtenant easement. 
A dominant cstatc: holder is entitled to the reasonable use of an appurtenant 
easement. See White v. Hotel Co,, 68 N.H. 38,43, 34 A. 672 (1 894) (stating that 
easement holders have whatever rights are remonably nmssary to enable them to 
enjoy the easement beneficially), in addition, ths dominant estate holder "may 5 3 
PLAXNTEF'S SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY mMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF klOTTON 
FOR SUMrvWRY JUDGMENT: 2 
license or atrt'no~zr: t h i d  pmsoras to use its right of way" so long as the use i s  
reasonable. Henley v, C0ratineni~zl.l CahlevLisio~a, 692 S .W.2d 825, 828 (Mo,Ct*App. 
1985)' Reasonable use may ibiclude use by tenm"l, jpestts and invjtees of the 
dominant estate balder. Gnwe)z v Cote, 875 S.W.2d 637, 641 (Ma-Ct.App.. 
1 994); Bmce. sldpra 5 8:4, at 8-1 5; see also 28A C. J.S. Eiasemetfls 6 1 64 ((a 996) 
(stagng that an appurtmant caament may be used '%by all persons lawfully going 
to or from [the dominant estate]"l. 
A copy of the lease bet~veen Tower m d  I-Tall was included with the affidavit of Robert 
Hall. Nothing contained therein dmons&ates a special a g e m m t  between WaZl and Tower that 
Tower may not use any easmmts for which Halls has the benefit. Therefore, Tower is entitled 
to injunctive relief. 
La~wences argument that Tower Asset i s  not FTalls' tenant use the easement because 
Halls and Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement is 
speciaus. Essentially, Lamences argue that Hall may not waive a contract clause. As long as 
Hall and TOWM Asset Sub are in agreement that they share a tenant/landlord relationship 
pursuant to the lease, L a m c c s  may not challenge that relationship. Na law requires strict 
compliance to the terns of the lease ageernent if the parties agree to the waivcr of the tmn. 
Lawraces are not in privity and have no standing to enforce strict compliance with the terms, 
Thus, Tower Asset has a right to use the wrment.  
DATED this 2lSt day of November, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
PJ,ATNTIFF'S SUTPLEMENTAL REPLY M E M O W D M  IN SUPPORT OF MOTTON 
FOR SUMNARY JUDGMENT: 3 
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I hereby certify tJ7at on the 21 '' day sf Novanher, 2007, J caused ta bc served a true and 
cored copy of the foregoing documeart by the method indicated below, and addmssed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail O v m i  ght Mail 
a Hand Delivered Telecopy (FAX) 
John P . MeIan  
2 1 3 4& Street 
Coeur d'hlene, ID 83 8 16 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
PLGINTIFF'S SLTPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMR/IARY JUDGMENT: 4 
SUSAN P. Q'EEKS 
JAMES, "L'EWOY & 'gEEKS. PA.. 
1 626 Lincoln Way 
Coeilr drALene, ID 5351 4 
Tclephne: (208) 667-06&5 
Facsimile: f2t)gj 664-1 684 
ISB #4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
THE DTSTRICT COURT OF TEIE FIRST .TUDICIrJII, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF TDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB 1CNC., a Delatvare 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
I Case No. CV 03-4521 
WTTNESS LIST 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, hiasband and wife, 
Defendants. I 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through its amrneys of record, James, Vernon & Weeks, 
P.A. and hereby submits its list o f  witllesses to be called at the trial of this action to commence 
December 10, 2007, as foflows: 
1. Comad Agte 
2. JohnRook 
3. Kelvin Brownsbcrger 
4. Wynn Wcrker 
5. John Bedini 
6.  Aman Fam~anian 
WI'rNESS LIST: 1 
7. Lisa Holmes 
8. Kosta Panidis 
9. Kent Abcnclsoth 
1 0. Robert Hall 
I I .  Doug Lawrence 
1 2. Brenda Lawrence 
13. tali lbur Mead 2 1. Bert Rol~rbach 
14. dim Van Sky 22. Jim Can 
15. J o b  Someland 23. John McHugh 
1 5. Wes H a i l t o n  24, Barry Pry 
17, John Kinney 25. C.P. Mer~man 
IS. John CasoriaiTrinity Broadcasting 26. Dwight Ogp 
19. Kim Benefield 27. Wynn Wenker 
20. Richard Kohles 28. Thomas Loudi n 
In addition to the witnesses listed. Plaintic may usc m y  witness contained on 
Defendants? Witness List. 
DATED this 2fith day o f  Kovernher, 2007. 
JAMES, VERNON I& WEEKS. P.A. 
WRJESS LIST: 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2hth day of Novcmbcr. 2007. I caused to be servcd a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing docmlent by the method indicated below, and addressed to the 
following: 
U.S. Mail 
Wand Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
T~lecopy ( F a )  
John P. \%elan 
21 3 4'h Stred 
Coeur d7Alene, ID 838 1 6 
Facsimile: (208) 664-2240 
SUSAN E". WEEKS 
JAMES. VEmO'N 6;: WEEKS. P.A. 
1626 Lincoln Way 
COEW d'hlene. ID 538 1.4 
Telephone: (208) 667-0685 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
XSB iii4255 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, li\J AND 'FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAX 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
corporation. 
Plaintiff? 
VS. 
DOUGLAS LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. 
LAWRENCE, ht~sband and wife, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 03-4621 
EXHIBIT LIST 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by 3nd througlt its attorneys of record. James, Vernon & Weeks, 
P.A. and hereby submit its Exhibit List a s  required by the Court's scl~eduling order in the form 
attached hereto. In addition to the exhibits listed, Plai,ntiff may use any exhibit contained on 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTEAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC, 1 Case No. CV 2003 4621 
t 
Plaintiff, j SCHEDULING ORDER, NOTICE 
vs. 1 OF TRIAL SETTING AND INITIAL 
1 PRETRIAL ORDER 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE, ET AL, ) 
I 
Defendant. 
Pursuant to IRCP 16 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. A JURY trial for 5 day(s) will commence at the KOOTEAI County Courthouse at 
900 a.m. on MAY 12, 2008. If possible, cases set for the same day wil l  be tried on a 
to  fol low basis. 
2. The Court, at its discretion, will set the priority for each of the civil matters set 
for trial on the above date. Any party may request a priority setting by filing a request 
for Priority Setting, copy to the Court in chambers. The Court will attempt to give 
priority to cases where such Request for Priority Setting is filed in the order in which 
they are filed. Prior participation in mediation is a factor in granting pr~orrty.Notice is 
hereby given that all civi l  trial settings are subject to being preempted by the 
court's criminal calendar. 
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In order to assist with the pretrial conference and trial of thls matter IT IS HEREBY 
FURTHER ORDERED that: 
1. a. PRETRIAL EVENTS: Before notlclng a deposltlon, hearlng or other pretrlal 
event, a lawyer should consult and work with opposlng counsel to accommodate the 
needs and reasonable requests of all witnesses and partlclpat~ng lawyers 
b. MOTION PRACTICE: Before setting a motlon for a hearlng. a lawyer should 
make a reasonable effort to resolve the issue without involving the Court A lawyer who 
has no valid objection to an opponent's proposed motion should promptly make this 
position known to opposing counsel. After a hearing, a lawyer charged with preparing the 
proposed order should draft it promptly, striving to fairly and accurately articulate the 
Court's ruling. Before submitting the proposed order to the Court, the lawyer should 
provide a copy to opposing counsel who should promptly voice any objections. If the 
lawyers cannot resolve all objections, the drafting lawyer should promptly submit the 
proposed order to the Court, stating any unresolved objections. 
c. PRETRIAL MOTIONS: Motions for summary judgment shall be trmely filed 
so as to be heard not later than ninety (90) days before trial. The last day for fillng all 
other pretrial motions shall be twenty-one (21) days before trial, except for motions in 
limine concerning witnesses and exhibits designated pursuant to paragraph Nos. 6 and 7 
respectively of this Pretrial Order. Motions in limine concerning designated witnesses and 
exhibits shall be submitted in writing at least seven (7) days before trial. Motions in 
/;mine concerning any designated exhibit shall attach copies of the exhibit in issue. 
Motions in limine regarding designated witnesses shall attach copies of the discovery 
requests claimed to require the earlier disclosure and a representation by counsel 
regarding the absence of a prior response from the party to whom the discovery was 
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directed. The fact that a party which has submitted discovery to another party has not 
filed motions to compel in advance of trlal does not, In and of rtself warve an objectron by 
that party as to the timeliness of disclosure of witnesses and exhrblts by the other party as 
required by this order. 
2. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT: There shall be served and flled wlth 
each motion for summary judgment a separate concise statement, together wlth a 
reference to the record, of each of the material facts as to whlch the movrng party 
contends there are no genuine issues of dispute. Any party opposing the motion shall, 
not later than fourteen (14) days prior to the date of  the hearing, serve and file a 
separate concise statement, together with a reference to the record, setting forth all 
material facts as to which it is contended there exist genuine Issues necessary to be 
litigated. In determining any motion for summary judgment, the Court may assume that 
the facts as claimed by the moving party are admitted to exist without controversy, except 
and to the extent that such facts are asserted to be actually in good faith controverted by 
a statement filed in opposition to the motion. 
3. BRIEFS AND MEMORANDA: In addition to any original brief or memorandum 
filed with the Clerk of the Court, a chambers' copy shall be provided to the Court. To the 
extent counsel rely on legal authorities not contained in the Idaho Reports, a copy of 
each case or authority cited shall be attached to the Court's copy of the brief or 
memorandum. 
4. DISCOVERY DISPUTES: Unless otherwise ordered, the Court will not entertarn 
any discovery motion, except those brought pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c) by a person who IS 
not a party, unless counsel for the moving party files with the Court, at the time of filing 
the motion, a certification that the lawyer making the motion has in good falth conferred or 
< "  
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attempted to confer with the opposlng lawyer to reach agreement wlthout court actlon, 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 37(a)(2). The motlon shall not refer the Court to other documents In 
the file. For example, if the sufficiency of an answer to an Interrogatory IS In Issue, the 
motion shall contain, verbatim, both the Interrogatory and the allegedly lnsufflclent 
answer, followed by each party's contentions, separately stated In the absence of a 
showing of good cause as to why the discovery was not lnltlated so that tlmely responses 
were due at least thirty (30) days before trial, the Court will not hear motlons to compel 
discovery after twenty-one (21) days before trial. 
5. EXPERT WITNESSES: Not later than one hundred eighty (1 80) days before 
trial, plaintiff(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trial. Not later than one hundred 
fifty (150) days before trial, defendant(s) shall disclose all experts to be called at trlal 
Such disclosure shall consist of at least the subject matter upon which the expert IS 
expected to testify and the substance of any oplnlons to whlch the expert IS expected to 
testify. The disclosure shall be contemporaneously filed with the Court 
Each party shall, at least twenty-eight (28) days before trial. frle wrth the Court 
and serve all parties with a supplemental disclosure for each expert wltness whrch shall 
identify the underlying facts and data upon whlch the oplnlons of each expert are based 
to the extent such information is required to be disclosed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
26(b)(4)(A)(i). Absent good cause, an expert may not testlfy to matters not Included In 
the disclosure. A party may comply with the disclosure by referencing expert wltness 
depositions, without restating the deposition testimony in the disclosure report. 
6. DISCLOSURE OF WITNESSES: Each party shall prepare and exchange 
between the parties and file with the Clerk at least fourteen (14) days before trial a list 
of witnesses with current addresses and telephone numbers, settlng forth a brlef 604- 
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statement identifying the general subject matter about which the w~tness may be asked to 
testify (exclusive of impeachment witnesses). Each party shall prov~de opposrng padres 
with a list of the party's witnesses and shall provide the Court with two copres of each l~st 
s f  witnesses. 
7. EXHIBITS AND EXHIBIT LISTS: Using the attached form, each party shall 
prepare a list of exhibits it expects to offer. Exhibits should be listed in the order that the 
party anticipates they will be offered. Each party shall affix labels to their exhibits before 
trial. After the labels are marked and attached to the original exhibit, copies should be 
made. Plaintiff's exhibits shall be marked in numerical sequence. Defendant's exhibits 
shall be marked in alphabetical sequence. The civil action number of the case and the 
date of the trial shall also be placed on each of the exhibit labels. Exhibrt lrsts and copres 
of exhibits shall be exchanged between parties and the exhibit list filed with the Clerk at 
least fourteen (14) days before trial. The original exhibits and a Judge's copy of the 
exhibits should be filed with the Clerk at the time of trial. Two copies of the exhibit list are 
to be filed with the Clerk. It is expected that each party will have a copy of all exhibits to 
be used at trial. 
8. JURY INSTRUCTIONS: Jury instructions shall be prepared and exchanged 
between the parties and filed with the Clerk (with copies delivered to chambers) at least 
seven (7) days before trial. The Court has prepared stock instructions covering the 
following Idaho Jury Instructions: 1.00, 1.01, 1.03, 1.03.1, 1.04, 1.05, 1.09, 1 .1  1 , 1.13, 
1.13.1, 1 .I 5.2, 1.20.1, 1.22, 1.24.1 and 9.00. Copies of the Court's stock instructions 
may be obtained from the Court, and are available on the Kootenai County website 
(www.co.kootenai.id.usldpeartment~districtcouforms.asp). The parties shall meet in 
good faith to agree on a statement of claims instruction which shall be submitted to the6 C T, 
- 1 
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Court with the other proposed instructions, Absent agreement, each party shall submit 
their own statement of claims instruction. All instructions shall be prepared in 
accordance with I.R.C.P. 51(a). A party objecting to any requested jury instruction shall 
file at the time of trial written objections to jury instructions, 
9. TRIAL BRIEFS: Trial briefs shall be prepared and exchanged between the 
parties and filed with the Clerk (with copies to chambers) at least seven (7) days before 
trial. 
10. PROPOSED FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: If the trial is to the Court, each 
party shall at least seven (7) days prior to trial file with the opposing parties and the 
Court (with copies to chambers) proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
supporting their position. 
11. TRIAL PRACTICE: At least a week before trial the lawyers shall meet and 
confer to discuss any stipulations that can be made at the beginning of trial and what 
exhibits can be admitted by stipulation. Following this meeting, the parties shall 
immediately alert the Court to any matters that need to be taken up before the t~me 
scheduled for trial to begin. 
12. TRIAL DAY: After the first day of trial, all subsequent trial days will likely be on 
an 8:30 a.m. to  1:30 p.m. schedule. 
13. MODIFICATION: This Pretrial Order may be modified by stipulation of the 
parties upon entry of an order by the Court approving such stipulation. Any party may, 
upon motion and for good cause shown, seek leave of the Court modifying the terms of 
this order, upon such terms and conditions as the Court deems fit. Any party may 
request a pretrial conference pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16 or mediation pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
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14. REQUEST TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING: Any party movlng or stlpulatlng to 
vacate a trial settlng shall set forth the reasons for the request and rncluile ,-i 
representation by counsel that these reasons have been discussed wtth the cllent and 
that the client has no objectton to vacatlng the trlal date. For a continuance to be granted, 
the parties shall have already engaged in mediation, or should expect to engage In 
mediation at the time originally set for the trtal or shortly thereafter. 
Any vacation or continuance of the trial day shall not change or alter the ttme frames 
for the deadlines set forth herein, but the dates for such deadlines wlll change to the new 
dates as are established by the date of the new trlal settlng Any party may, upon motlon 
and for good cause shown, request different discovery and disclosure dates upon 
vacation or continuance of the trtal date 
15. MEDIATION: Lawyers should educate thetr cllents early tn the legal process 
about the various methods of resolving disputes without trtal, lncludlng medlatlon, 
arbitration and neutral case evaluation. The parties are encouraged and expected to 
mediate as soon as possible. The Court will facilitate medtatlon tf requested The partles 
are ordered to report jointly to the Court in writing at least sixty (60) days prior to trial, 
setting forth when mediation occurred and the results of mediation. If no mediation has 
taken place, the joint report must state the reason the parties are not using mediation. 
16. SANCTIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE: Failure to ttmely comply In all 
respects with the provisions of this order shall subject noncomplying partles to sanctions 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 76(i), which may include: 
(A) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose 
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting such party from introducing designated 
matters in evidence; 
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(B) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further 
proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part 
thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; 
(C) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order treating 
as contempt of court the failure to comply; 
(D) In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the 
party or the attorney representing such party or both to pay the reasonable expenses 
incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless 
the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other 
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no party may rely upon any deadline set forth in 
this pretrial order as a reason for failing to timely respond to discovery or to timely 
supplement discovery responses pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(c). 
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l  )(G), that 
an alternate judge may be assigned to preside in this case. The follow~ng IS a ltst of 
potential alternate judges: Hon. James R. Michaud, Hon. John P. Luster, Hon. Fred 
Gibler, Hon. Charles W. Hosack, Hon. Steve Verby or Hon. George R. Reinhardt, Ill or 
Hon. Lansing L. Haynes. 
Unless a party has previously exercised their right to disqualification without cause 
under Rule 40(d)(l), each party shall have the right to file one (1) motion for 
disqualification without cause as to any alternate judge not later than ten (10) days after 
service of this notice. 
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17 IS FURTHER ORDERED that any party who br~ngs In an addttlonal party shall 
serve a copy of this "Scheduling Order, N o t l c e  of Tr~al Setting ' upon th,-it ac!c!etl gar?) cjl 
the time the pleading adding the party is served on the added party, and proof of such 
service shall then be given to the Court by the party adding an additional party 
41 DATED this 7 day of November, 2007. 
BY ORDER OFJOHN T. MITCHELL, District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that true copies of the foregoing have been mailed, postage prepaid or sent by interoffice marl 
this 37 day of November, 2007, to: If applicable, KOOTEAlCounty Jury Commissioner, Judge Grbler Judge 
Hosack, Trial Court Administrator . 
Susan Weeks 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
John P. Whelan 
213 N. 4th St 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
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~eanne~clausen, Deputy ClerkiSecretary 
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County of K00TENA1 )" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
) 
TOWER ASSET, INC., a Delaware ) 
Corporation, ) case NO. CV 2003 4621 
) 
VS. 
Plain tifts, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR 
) 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
) INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12 LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 
a Delaware Corporation, ) Case NO. CV 2002 7671 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' VS. RENEWED MOTION FOR 
J 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, ) INTERLOCUTORY ORDER, I.A.R. 12 
) 
Defendants. 1 
I. BACKGROUND. 
On November 13,2007, Defendants Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Lawrences) 
filed a "Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an Interlocutory Order" in each of 
the above cases. The interlocutory order sought to be appealed was an interlocutory 
order that did not exist as of November 13, 2007. In their motion, Lawrences "request an 
" : '\ 
Order granting them permission to appeal ifDefendantsl Renewed Motion for &.-r .J ' 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER Page I 
D~squaltficatton for Cause IS denied " Motion for Permission to Appeal From an 
lnterlocutory Order, pp 1-2 (emphasts added). On November 7, 2007, Lawrences filed 
a "Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause" in each of the above cases. That 
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause was not heard until November 27, 2007. 
After oral argument by counsel for all parties on November 27,2007, the Lawrences' 
Renewed Motton for Disqualification for Cause was denied on the record, and the 
reasons for that denial were stated on the record. After the denial of the Lawrences' 
Renewed Motion for Disqualification for Cause, this Court heard oral argument on 
Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. That 
matter was taken under advisement. Thus, though prematurely filed on November 13, 
2007, Lawrences' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order 
is now at issue. 
The reason this is Lawrences "Renewed" Motion for Permission to Appeal From an 
lnterlocutory Order, is back on July 9, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Permission 
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, in which they requested "an Order granting them 
permission to appeal the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Motion for 
Disqualification for Cause, I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2) filed June 25, 2007." Motion for Permission 
to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, pp. 1-2. That motion was denied on the record at 
oral argument on August 6, 2007. 
Since the Lawrences furnished no briefing in support of their Renewed Motion for 
Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order, the Court took the Lawrences' 
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order under advisement 
on November 27, 2007, so that it could review the briefing regarding the Lawrences' initial 
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. A review of the Court file /j 7 
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shows there was no briefing filed at the earlier motion either. The Court has reviewed the 
reasons set forth on the record for the denial of the Lawrences' tnitial Motion for 
Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. Those same reasons apply to the 
Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. Those reasons 
are as follows. 
I!. ANALYSIS. 
ldaho Appellate Rule 12 is a discretionary rule, allowing that permission to appeal 
an interlocutory order "may" be granted, but only when certain things exist. ldaho 
Appellate Rule 12 requires two things, at least the first of which must exist in order for a 
trial court to grant a motion for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. The order 
must first involve "a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion" and second, "an immediate appeal from the order. ..may materially 
advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." I.A.R. 12(a). (italics added). This Court 
interprets the second criteria as not a requirement, but a factor to be considered by the 
trial court in its discretion. 
At the August 6, 2007 hearing, this Court commented that there was no issues of 
controlling case law that were articulated by the Lawrences in their motion to disqualify. 
That is again the case following the November 27,2007 hearing on Lawrences' Renewed 
Motion for Permission to Appeal From an lnterlocutory Order. The Lawrences furnished 
no case law on the issue of disqualification, nor on the issue of permissive appeal. On 
the issue of disqualification, the Court cited on the record several cases it had reviewed 
as to why it was denying the renewed motion for disqualification. While these cases cited 
support both granting and denying a motion for disqualification, the reason is they are 
naturally fact driven. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' RENEWED MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL FROM AN 
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER Page 3 
Even if thts Court could get beyond the lack of an issue of controlling case law as 
to whtch there IS substanttal grounds for dtfference of opinion, from a practical standpotnt, 
an tmmedtate appeal from this Court's dectsions on renewed motions for disqualification 
would not "materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation." If this Court later 
rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment (both cases now have pending 
mottons for summary judgment brought by defendants in each case) in each case, and 
the cases proceed to trial, and Lawrences prevail at trial, the Lawrences would be unlikely 
to have any incentive to appeal this Court's decisions regarding their motions to 
disqualify. If this Court later rules in favor of Lawrences on summary judgment in both 
cases, but against Lawrences at trial in Capstar and a jury rules against Lawrences at trial 
in TowerAsset, then the Lawrences could appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify 
as well as any other issue they would like, including issues that may arise during the trials 
now scheduled about six months from the date of this decision. If this Court later rules 
against Lawrences on summary judgment in these cases, then the Lawrences can appeal 
that decision and appeal the rulings on the motions to disqualify as well as the rulings on 
summary judgment. 
Ill. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that in the exercise of this Court's discretion, for the 
reasons set forth above, defendants' Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal From an 
Interlocutory Order in Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and identical motion filed in 
TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are DENIED. 
Entered this .?O%ay of November, 2007. 
- / D - -  I *- 
T. hitchell, District Judge t ; i  n 
I 
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,- Certificate of Service h 
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FILED 2 -1;-15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
1 
TOWER ASSET SUB, INC., a Delaware ) 
Corporation, ) case NO. CV 2003 4621 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
) ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S VS. MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
t JUDGMENT, AND ORDER 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) 
1 GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION LAWRENCE, husband and wife, TO SUBSTITUTE REAL PARTY IN 
) 
Defendants. 1 INTEREST 
) 
CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING COMPANY,) 
a Delaware Corporation, 1 case NO. CV 2002 7671 
1 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
1 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S VS. 
) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA J. ) JUDGMENT 
LAWRENCE, husband and wife, 1 
) 
Defendants. ) 
I. BACKGROUND. 
Although one decision is being filed in each of these two cases, these two cases 
are not consolidated. At the November 27, 2007, hearing on various motions in both 
cases, counsel for defendants in each of these two cases indicated on the record that he 
would be pursuing a motion to consolidate on behalf of his clients. No such motion has 
been filed. Although one decision is filed in each of these two cases, this decision will 
discuss each case separately. 
At the conclusion of the November 27, 2007, hearing, this Court stated that the 
ruling on the upcoming summary judgment motion (heard November 28, 2007) would be 
taken under advisement and that the decision on summary judgment would not be issued 
until after this Court filed its decision on "Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to 
Appeal from an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12". This Court entered its "Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Renewed Motion for Permission to Appeal from 
an Interlocutory Order, I.A.R. 12" on November 30, 2007. On December 17,2007, 
defendants in both cases filed a "Motion for Permissive Appeal" with the ldaho Supreme 
Court. On January 25, 2008, this Court received notice that on January 17, 2008, the 
ldaho Supreme Court denied defendants' Motion for Permissive Appeal in each of these 
two cases. Accordingly, summary judgment in each of these two cases is at issue. 
Oral argument on the summary judgment motion brought by plaintiffs in both cases 
was heard November 28, 2007. 
Capstar Radio Operating Company and Tower Sub Asset (collectively the 
"Plaintiffs") filed suit to declare the existence of an easement over property owned by 
Douglas and Brenda Lawrence, the defendants in each of the two cases. Due to a 
discovery dispute, summary judgment was limited to only the issue of express 
easement. Oral argument on the express easement theory was heard in these two 
cases at two different times. This Court granted summary judgment in favor of Tower 
Asset Sub against Lawrences on May 27,2005, and this Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Capstar against Lawrences on June 7, 2005. Lawrences appealed 
this Court's finding of an express easement in both cases to the ldaho Supreme Court. 
On January 26, 2007, the ldaho Supreme Court vacated the summary judgment in both {; j 7 
J 
cases and remanded to this Court "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." 
M F M n p A W n l  n c r p l c l n h l  r h l n  nonrzo ~ o ~ r r r r r ~ ~  n!  i r r r r c c l e  - . r r s * n a l  rrr- n* I.... . --, .. .------- 
Capstar v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7; TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 
2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7 .  The Supreme Court noted that although the plaintiffs did not 
have an express easement, it appeared that the case might have been concluded on 
summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs' other theories. The ldaho Supreme Court 
wrote in Capstar: "It is unfortunate that the district court confined the summary 
judgment proceeding to the express easement issue, as it appears the case might have 
been brought to a conclusion based on evidence that was submitted with respect to 
Capstar's other theories but not considered on summary judgment." Capstar v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 13, p. 7 .  A similar statement was made by the ldaho 
Supreme Court in TowerAsset Sub, Inc.: 
Final resolution of this case would have been expedited, had the district 
court not confined its inquiry to the express easement issue. Based on 
evidence submitted to the court, certain of the other theories showed 
greater promise from Tower's standpoint and it is unfortunate that those 
theories were not fully developed and decided upon. 
TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 7 .  On May 14, 2007, the 
plaintiffs in each case filed a "Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment", which again 
raised for this Court's consideration the other theories of easement advanced in 
plaintiffs' previous motions for summary judgment, but not decided upon by this Court in 
its initial decisions on summary judgment in 2005. 
I I .  ANALYSIS REGARDING CAPSTAR RADIO OPERATING CO. v. LAWRENCE. 
A. Facts Pertaining to Capstar Radio Operating Co., v. Lawrence. 
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and 
Capstar own parcels of property on Blossom Mountain. Both the Capstar parcel and 
the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were once part of a larger tract held under 
common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. The Lawrence parcel was broken o t 6 i  n 
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in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Susan Weeks 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 1 I .e., Exhibit E), and the Capstar 
parcel was broken out in 1989 when Funks sold that parcel to Kootenai Broadcasting, 
Inc. (Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5, 13.3, 
Exhibit Q). The Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and 
the Capstar parcel is located to the east of the Lawrences' parcel in the southwest 
quarter of Section 22. Section 21 lies directly west of Section 22. Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7, 1 8, Exhibit Z. There is a 
public road in the area known as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally to 
the west of the Lawrence parcel, which in turn is west of Capstar's parcel. Capstar 
seeks an easement to access its property from Signal Point Road over an unimproved 
private road commonly known as Blossom Mountain Road. Blossom Mountain Road 
crosses through the Lawrence parcel before passing near the Capstar parcel. In 
litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken September 30, 
2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone Corporation (GTC) 
obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 over the private road 
that crossed the southwest quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel). Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7,11 5-7, Exhibit W, 
X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the 
road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast through the southwest portion of 
Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the north half of Section 28 were it then 
turned northeast and entered the southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and 
Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y. 
Capstar and Tower Asset have proven the following chain of title for the parcels 6 1 9 
involved in Sections 21 and 22: 
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1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits A 
and D. 
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed 
August 17, 2004), Exhibits B and C. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits B and C. 
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this 
case. 
Capstar and Tower Asset have established the title chain with respect to what 
became the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as: 
1. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992): 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed November 2, 2004), E and I; Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit A and F. 
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16, 
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H; 
5 7 (1 
ARidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H. 
3 Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July 
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0; 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0. 
4 N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibits J and K. 
5. Farmanian to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 1996, 
Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, M, 
N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P. 
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
I .  Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case 
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits Q and R. 
2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S. 
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed 
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T. 
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit U. 
Capstar asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' 
parcel from the parent parcel in 1975, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had 
been used by the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 
and 22. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (filed March 9, 
2004), pp. 4-5, 77 7-9. Capstar asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the 
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel. 
Id., pp. 5-6,77 10-12. Capstar argues the road was also later used by Kootenai 
Broadcasting, Inc. for access to its segregated parcel in Section 22. This claim is 
proven by the Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 9, 2004. John Rook was the President of Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. Rook's 
testimony is uncontroverted. 
The chain of title as to both the Lawrence parcel and the Capstar parcel is set 
forth in the Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed 
March 9, 2004, and attached exhibits thereto. In 1975, the Funks agreed to sell the 
Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc. In 1992, the Funks gave Human 527 
Synergistics a warranty deed that stated it was "given in fulfillment of those certain 
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contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the 
conveyance of the above described property ..." This property passed through several 
other hands before the Lawrences purchased it in 1996. 
When the Lawrences questioned Capstar's right to access its property over the 
portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed their property, Capstar filed suit on 
November 7, 2002, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Tower Asset filed a similar 
suit on June 27,2003. Capstar and Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared 
based on four theories: express easement, easement by implication, easement by 
necessity, and prescriptive easement. On plaintiffs' previous motion for summary 
judgment, this court found that plaintiffs held an express easement over the Lawrence 
property based on the sale agreement, as well as the deed. The Court did not address 
Capstar's other theories. The Lawrences appealed from that decision and the Supreme 
Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an express 
easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, the plaintiffs renew their motion for 
summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously advanced by 
Capstar. 
B. Easement by Implication from Prior Use. 
An easement can be formed by implication from prior use. Creation of 
easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the rule that written instruments 
speak for themselves, and because implied easements are contrary to that rule, the 
courts disfavor them. Sutton v. Brown, 91 ldaho 396, 400, 422 P.2d 63, 67 (1966); 
Cordwell v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 (Ct. App. 1983). An 
easement is implied because it is presumed that if an access was in use at the time of 5 2 7 
severance it was meant to continue. Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 105 ldaho 535, 
542, 681 P.2d 101 0, 101 7 (Ct. App. 1984). Easements by implication rest on the view 
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that land should not be rendered unfit for use due to a lack of access. Id. 
In order to establish an easement by implication from prior use, the party 
attempting to establish such easement must prove: 1) unity of title or ownership and 
subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; 2) apparent continuous use; 
and 3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the 
dominant estate. Bear Island Water Association v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 
P.2d 528, 536 (1994); CordweN v. Smith, 105 ldaho 71, 77, 665 P.2d 1081, 1087 
(Ct.App. 1983); Close v. Rensick, 95 ldaho 72, 76, 501 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1972); Davis 
v. Gowen, 83 ldaho 204, 21 0, 360 P.2d. 403, 406-07. See also Phillips Industries, Inc. 
v. Firkins, 121 ldaho 693, 698, 827 P.2d 706, 71 1 (Ct. App. 1992); and Davis v. 
Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 (1999). Apparent continuous use 
refers to the use before the separation of the parcels that would indicate the roadway 
was intended to provide permanent access to the parcels. Cordwell, 105 ldaho at 78, 
665 P.2d at 1088. The party seeking to establish the easement has the burden of 
providing the facts to establish the easement. Id., 105 ldaho at 77, 665 P.2d at 1087. 
In Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 641-42, 991 P.2d 362, 366-67 (1999), the ldaho 
Supreme Court held that successors in interest to the original grantors of property could 
assert easement rights by implied or prior use. 
Strict necessity is not required for the creation of an implied easement by prior 
use. All that is required is reasonable necessity. Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 991 
P.2d 362 (1 999); Thomas v. Madsen, 142 ldaho 635, 132 P.3d 392 (2006). 
Reasonable necessity is something less than the great present necessity required for 
an easement implied by necessity. Davis, 133 ldaho at 642. Furthermore, the 
f t l  
easement by implication is not extinguished if the easement no longer exists or is no J i '1 
longer reasonably necessary. Id. at 643. The ldaho Supreme Court further noted in 
Davis: 
This long standing rule is based on the theory that when someone 
conveys property, they also intend to convey whatever is required for the 
beneficial use and enjoyment of that property, and intends to retain all that 
is required for the use and enjoyment of the land retained. Consequently, 
an easement implied by prior use is a true easement of a permanent 
duration, rather than a temporary easement which exists only as long as 
the necessity continues. See, e.g., Norken v. McGahan, 823 P.2d 622, 
631 (Alaska 1991); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201, 593 P.2d 1 138, 
1 145 (1 979); Story v. Hefner, 540 P.2d 562, 566 (Okla. 1975). Additionally, 
an implied easement by prior use is appurtenant to the land and therefore 
passes with all subsequent conveyances of the dominant and servient 
estates. See Hughes v. State, 80 ldaho 286, 328 P.2d 397 (1958); I.C. § 
55-603 (stating that a transfer of real property also includes all easements 
attached to the property). 
Id. 
There can be no dispute that the first element has been proven. As to use and 
reasonable necessity, Harold Funk testified in his affidavit that when he and his wife 
Marlene purchased parts of Section 21 and 22 in 1969, there was "an existing private 
easement road used for access that crossed the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and 
entered into the Southwest Quarter of Section 22 and provided access to these two 
parcels and access to the General Telephone Company parcel [GTC owned about one 
acre in Section 221." Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 2, gg 2-3. This is the same easement road referenced in the Real Estate 
Contract between Funks and their predecessor in interest, the Radens, over which 
General Telephone Company had a recorded easement for access. Id. p. 2 ,13 ,  
Exhibit A. This was the Funks only access into Section 21. Id. p. 3, 7 4. When Funks 
sold their portion of Section 21 to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor) in 
1975, Funks still owned their land in Section 22, and the sales agreement to Human 5 2 5 
Synergistics included "Item 5" in the Sales Agreement that "...indicated that the Section 
21 parcel was being sold subject to an ingresslegress easement over the existing road 
on the property that was being sold to Human Synergistics." Id. p. 3, 7 6. Without 
those terms Funks' Section 21 property would have been landlocked, and that was not 
t-larold Funk's intent. Id. Harold Funk testified that following the sale [to Human 
Synergistics], we continuously utilized the existing road in Section 21 to access Funks' 
property in Section 22. Id. p. 4, 1. 6. That Sales Agreement was recorded as well. Id. 
In 1989 Funks sold part of their Section 22 property to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., 
and Funks knew Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. was going to use that parcel for 
construction of a broadcasting tower. Id. p. 4, 1 8 .  Rook testified that he used this road 
several times to access the Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. Affidavit of John Rook 
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 1 4. 
Apparent continuous use from no later than 1975 is also shown by the Affidavit 
of Wynn Wenker. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed March 9, 2004, Exhibit FF at 11 0. The Farmanian - Mack Agreement 
and Quit Claim Deed attached also infers that there is a road across the Section 21 
property, the Farmanian property at that time. Id. Exhibit EE. Harold Funk's Affidavit 
indicates that the road subject to this action is the only road onto the property. Affidavit 
of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 11 3, 4. Harold 
Funk further indicates that it was their intent to include an easement in the transfer to 
Human Synergistics so the property in Section 22 would not be landlocked. Id. 1 6. 
Similarly, John Rook's Affidavit states that when Kootenai Broadcasing purchased from 
the Funks (at a later time in 1989), this road that is subject of this dispute was the only 
access to the property now held by Capstar. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, 1 6. 
Capstar noticed their Motion far Summary Judgment to be heard on April 14, 
2004 Just prior to that hearing, Lawrences pro se made discovery motions related to 
~nformation Rook and Funk had. Because such discovery was not relevant to the 
express easement theory, discovery was allowed and Capstar's motion for summary 
judgment proceeded on the express easement theory alone. The ldaho Supreme Court 
has ruled on that issue. On March 23, 2004, Lawrences pro se filed Defendants 
Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. In that 
pleading Lawrences claim, with a reference to a Metzker Map, that Capstar has access 
to its parcel via Mellick Road. Defendants Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to Plaitiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. On April 6, 2004, Capstar filed an Affidavit of 
Kelvin Brownsberger, the Road Supervisor for Post Falls Highway District. He testified 
in his affidavit that Post Falls Highway District has not constructed and maintained 
Mellick Road beyond its entry into Section 15, well short of Section 21 or Section 22. 
Even if Lawrences had created an issue of fact as to an alternate route (they have not), 
the ldaho Supreme Court in Davis v. Peacock, 133 ldaho 637, 642, 991 P.2d 362, 367 
(1999) held only "reasonable necessity" is needed for an easement by implication, not 
strict necessity which is needed in an implied easement by necessity. 
Lawrences made one other argument in Lawrences' Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 16-1 7. Lawrences claim Wilber Mead 
testified he kept his gate locked from1 966 until 1998, that the only party that had a key 
to the gate was General Telephone Company, that Mead granted Funks an easement 
in 1972 and that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975; thus, Funks could have only 
used the property for three years instead of the requisite five. Id. Lawrences cite to the 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Defendants Lawrences' Reply in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit H, but no such 
document exists. Only the cover page of Douglas Lawrence's Affidavit is filed. 
Capstar argues that Mead only stated "to his knowledge" Mr. Funk was not using 
the road, that Mead indicates he gave a key to GTE, but Mead has no knowledge as to 
whether GTE gave a copy of the key to Funk or any knowledge that Funk did not go 
around the gate. Capstar also argues there is no evidence to support Lawrences's 
allegation that Funks moved to American Falls in 1975. Plaintiffs Reply Brief in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. 
In Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment filed May 14, 2007, Capstar reiterates the same facts, law and arguments it 
made in 2004. Lawrences, through their attorney, filed their "Opposition of Douglas and 
Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff' on July 24, 2007. In 
that brief, Lawrences essentially argue that since Funks had no right to cross Section 
28 (Section 28 lies immediately to the south of Section 22 in which Lawrences' parcel is 
contained and Blossom Mountain Road dips from Section 22, down to Section 28, 
before reaching Section 21), they have no right to cross Blossom Mountain Road as it 
crosses Lawrences' land. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 4-5. Capstar correctly notes that in this lawsuit the 
owner of Section 28 is not a party. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 7. Capstar's access, or lack thereof, over the portion of 
Blossom Mountain Road as it travels through Section 28 is simply not an issue before 
this Court. Finally, Lawrences again argue Capstar and their predecessor Funk had the 
ability to access their land via Mellick Road. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 6. On August 2, 2007, 
Capstar filed "Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment". Capstar correctly points out that nothing in Bruce Anderson's Affidavit 
(Attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence filed July 24, 2007), nothing 
in the Viewer's Report and nothlng in Loudin v. Stokes (a 1987 District Court decision 
by Distr~ct Judge Gary M. Haman which shows it was related to Section 15 and Mellick 
Road, Exhibit C to Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary 
Judgment filed July 24, 2007), demonstrate that Funks could access their Section 22 
property from Mellick Road because the Funks never owned the Northeast Quarter of 
Section 21. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p, 3. 
After Capstar filed its reply brief on summary judgment, on September 10, 2007, 
Lawrences filed yet another brief on summary judgment (in contravention of I.R.C.P, 
56(c)), this one entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff'. In that brief, Lawrences repeat, word for word the brief 
Lawrences filed on July 24, 2007, as it pertains to implied easements from prior use. 
No request for a jury trial has ever been made in Capstar v. Lawrence. 
Accordingly, "When an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the trial court 
as the trier of fact is entitled to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the 
undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary judgment despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, L.L.C., 140 Idaho 
354, 360-61, 93 P.3d 685, 691-92 (2004). 
In the Capstar case, there is unity of title at the time of the severance of the 
dominant and servient estate. The road was in use by the Funks at the time of the 
severance and served as their sole access to the Section 21 and Section 22 properties 
they retained. Thus, it was reasonably necessary for the beneficial use of the dominant 
estate, Funk's Section 22 property at the time of severance. Capstar has met its "q q t-1 L fl 
burden of proving there is an implied easement by prior use which is appurtenant to the 
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property. 
C .  Easement by Necessity. 
Capstar correctly notes that an easement by necessity has some similar 
elements to an easement by prior use. Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 13. The elements are: (1) that the dominant parcel and the 
servient parcel were once part of a larger tract under common ownership; (2) that the 
necessity for the easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the 
severance; and (3) the present necessity for the claimed easement is great. Id., citing 
B&J Development & Inv. Inc. v. Parsons, 126 ldaho 504, 507, 887 P.2d 49, 52 (Ct.App. 
1994), MacCaskill v. Ebbert, 11 2 ldaho 11 15, 11 18,739 P.2d 414,417 (Ct.App. 1987); 
Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 ldaho 535, 543, 681 P.2d 1010, 1018 (Ct.App 
1984). See also, Bear Island Water Ass'n, Inc. v. Brown, 125 ldaho 71 7, 725, 874 P.2d 
528, 536 (1994). Capstar added little in its Memorandum in Support of Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13. 
There is no dispute that the first element exists. 
As to the second and third elements, Lawrences pro se made an argument 
unsupported by the law, that because "Funks and [Capstar] don't have a legal 
easement to get to the Lawrence property to cross it", necessity does not exist. 
Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 18. This argument was noted by the Court in its analysis of an implied easement 
from prior use. Since the owner of Section 28 is not a party to this lawsuit, Lawrences' 
argument is without merit. 
Capstar claims that Kelvin Brownsberger's affidavit contradicts Lawrences' claim 
that there is access via Mellick Road based upon a Metsker's map. Plaintiffs Reply 6 7) r) 
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Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 5. Because Brownsberger does 
not tell us in his affidavit when he became familiar with Mellick Road, nor does he tell us 
when he began working for the Post Falls Highway District, Brownsberger cannot 
discuss what existed back in 1969 when Funk's purchased or what existed back in 
1975 when Funks sold to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor). What is 
pertinent is what existed at severance in 1975. The Metsker's map (at the August 7, 
2007 hearing on motions to strike, this Court took judicial notice that Metsker maps 
have been relied upon for decades, but not as to their accuracy) is not sufficient to 
contradict Howard Funk's testimony. The only competent evidence of what existed in 
1975 is from Howard Funk. Funk stated: "The private easement road was the only 
existing road providing access to the Southeast Quarter of Section 21 and the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 22" and when they severed the property in 1975 the sales 
agreement referenced that private road and that the Section 21 property being sold to 
Human Synergistics, Inc., was being sold subject to an ingress egress easement over 
the existing road, and that it was not their intent to landlock the Section 22 property. 
Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3, 77 4, 6. 
John Rook corroborates Harold Funk, but does so at a later time in 1989 when 
Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its land. Rook testified in his affidavit that in 
1989 the private access road was the only road that provided access to the Funks' 
parcels in the Southwest Quarter of Section 22. Affidavit of John Rook in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3 ,77 4, 6. Finally, John Mack's affidavit makes it 
clear that Mellick Road did not provide access to the Funks' parcels in 1992 when Mack 
purchased. Affidavit of John Mack in Support of Defendants Lawrences Reply in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. C,jl 
Lawrences then make the argument that: "Funk obviously had access to his 
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other lands when he severed the parcel sold to Hyman Synergistics in 1975, otherwise 
Funk would have taken great care to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to 
Human Synergistics in 1975." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion 
for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. The identical argument is made in Opposition 
of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 10- 
11. This argument by Lawrences actually cuts against Lawrences quite clearly when 
one considers the uncontradicted fact that Funks in their Sale Agreement to Human 
Synergistics, Inc., stated that "the Section 21 parcel being sold was subject to an 
ingress egress easement over the existing road on the property that was being sold to 
Human Synergistics (Affidavit of Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 3, 7 6). Just as the Lawrences argue, Funks actually did take great care 
to reserve an easement across the parcel he sold to Human Synergistics in 1975; 
however, they errantly put that language in the Sale Agreement. That is why there is no 
express easement. But the reason there is no express easement is perhaps the most 
convincing evidence as to the implied easement theories. .. Funks needed to, intended 
to, and thought they did reserve an easement across the Human Synergistics land (now 
Lawrences land) when they sold to Human Synergistics in 1975. At all times thereafter 
Funks used this road as if they had every right in the world to use it. This Court finds 
that the second element of easement by necessity exists ... the necessity for the 
easement claimed over the servient estate existed at the time of the severance in 1975. 
Capstar argues that the third element, present great necessity for the easement, 
is supported by the Affidavit of Thomas Mack. Mack's affidavit does indicate Mellick 
Road does not pass over Funks' property, and Mack's affidavit indicates that even 
Mack had no access to Mellick Road until he made an agreement with Fred Zuber, 4 ,. .I * 
owned to the North of Mack, "whereby I agreed to reconstruct the road leading down 
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the north face of Blossom Mountain." Mack also testified "Over the years, the road had 
been completely abandoned" and "It did not appear that anyone had used the road for 
nearly 20 years." Capstar also argues "As demonstrated on the assessor's map 
included as Exhibit 'A' to Weeks' Affidavit in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence 
Affidavit filed 7/24/07, Mellick Road as constructed today lies in the Northeast Quarter 
and the Southeast Quarter of Section 22", and "Funks never owned either of these 
parcels." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 
p. 13; Affidavit of Weeks in Support of Motion to Strike Lawrence Testimony, filed 
August 4, 2007, Exhibit A. 
This Court finds there is no question of fact as to whether the present necessity 
for the claimed easement is great. There is no evidence that Capstar has any other 
access other than the Blossom Mountain Road access which is the subject of this 
litigation. 
D. Easement by Prescription. 
An easement by prescription was not raised in Capstar's initial Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed March 9,2004, nor did Lawrences 
discuss the theory in their pro se Defendants Lawrences Reply in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 23, 2004. Capstar did not raise 
the theory in its Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
April 6, 2004. The first time the issue of a prescriptive easement was raised was in 
Capstar's Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11- 
Capstar argues the road was established as early as 1966, and that it is 
fC -2 -? 
5 13 r". 
undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and 
Section 22 parcels. Id. p. 12. Capstar argues that when Funks sold the Section 21 
m n r a s n n .  s lnl  n r r l n l n s r  . sin r\nnrn ~ n .  .ITI IC  n s  A I . I T I F F I C  S I ~ ~ T I A . ~  -fin C I  IIISIIFJV 11 I P ~ C I I C . I T  nlll ~o 
parcel to Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales 
contract language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for 
ingress and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. Id. Capstar argues this 
language provided notice to others that they were claiming a right to use the road in the 
future far ingress and egress to the lands the Funks retained, and that it is undisputed 
that Funks and their predecessors (successors) then proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for the statutory period. Id. 
Capstar notes the ldaho Supreme Court in Akers v. D. L. White Construction, 
Inc., 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (2005) held: 
A party seeking to establish the existence of an easement by 
prescription "must prove by clear and convincing evidence use of the 
subject property, which is characterized as: 1) open and notorious; (2) 
continuous and uninterrupted; (3) adverse and under a claim of right; (4) 
with the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient 
tenement (5) for the statutory period." (citation omitted). The statutory 
period in question is five years. (citations omitted). A claimant may rely 
on his own use, or he "may rely on the adverse use by the claimant's 
predecessor for the prescriptive period, or the claimant may combine such 
predecessor's use with the claimant's own use to establish the requisite 
five continuous years of use." (citation omitted). Once the claimant 
presents proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the 
claimed right for the prescriptive period, even without evidence of how the 
use began, he raises the presumption that the use was adverse and 
under a claim of right. (citations omitted). The burden then shifts to the 
owner of the servient tenement to show that the claimant's use was 
permissive, or by virtue of a license, contract, or agreement. (citations 
omitted). 
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 11-12. 
A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by 
permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of 
the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 ldaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006). 
Lawrences argue that Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive. c;5n 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
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Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5, Footnote five of Lawrences7 brief cites the Court to the "affidavits of 
Daniel Rebor [sic, actually Rebeor] and Douglas Lawrence" to support this claim. There 
are several Douglas Lawrence affidavits filed in this matter. The Affidavit of Douglas 
Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment filed July 24, 2007, indicates 
just the opposite, that Capstar's use of the land at least when Lawrences came into 
possession of the land, was anything but permissive: 
25. Since taking title to the land, I have worked hard to protect my 
private property rights from illegal trespass. I have maintained one or 
more locks on my gate, placed no trespass signs at various points on the 
property, stopped and turned back people who cannot demonstrate a 
legal right to use the road, and have actively attempted to engage the 
local Sheriffs office on many occasions to get their support. Between 
May 2000, and October 2003, 1 have filed over 10 separate crime reports 
with the Kootenai County Sheriffs office for vandalism, trespass, 
destruction of personal property, and for leaving my gate open and 
unlocked. These Crime Reports are attached and included herein as 
Exhibit "I". 
Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed 
July 24, 2007, p. 9 (unnumbered pages), 7 25. Douglas Lawrence's affidavit 
contradicts the claim his attorney makes on his behalf. Lawrences' claim that use of 
the land has always been permissive flies in the face of the fact that the genesis of this 
lawsuit was Lawrences "periodically locked the gate which they placed across the 
Blossom Mountain Road in an effort to deny Capstar its right of access over and across 
the Blossom Mountain Road." Complaint for Quiet Title and Permanent Injunction, p. 6, 
Douglas Lawrence's affidavit claims that prior to 2001, "Capstar's use of the road 
as it crosses my land was permissive." Affidavit of Douglas Lawrence in Support of 
Opposition to Summary Judgment, filed July 24, 2007, p. 14 (unnumbered pages), 7 
49, Exhibit M. Douglas Lawrence cites to Capstar's response to Lawrences' Request 5 3 5 
for Admission No. 85 which reads: "Please admit that, prior to 2001, Defendants 
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Lawrence did not use any gate to restrict Plaintiff Capstar's Vehicular access", to which 
Capstar responded: "Admit that the gate has always been on the road since Capstar's 
predecessors in title acquired the Capstar parcel was not locked and did not obstruct 
either Capstar or its predecessors in title's access until it was locked by Lawrence." Id. 
The fact that the gate is not locked may be evidence of Lawrences' acquiescence of 
others, including Capstar, to travel this road, it may be evidence of Lawrences' 
indifference of others, including Capstar, travelling this road, and it may be evidence of 
Lawrences' ignorance of anyone, including Capstar travelling this road, but it is not 
evidence that Lawrences or their predecessors gave Capstar or its predecessors 
permission to use this road. "Mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient 
basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of 
the servient tenement." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 51 1 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). 
Lawrences claim that "Capstar's use of the land has always been permissive" 
ignores the fact that Lawrences did not purchase their property until 1996. Thus, in the 
years from 1966 to 1996, they are not competent to testify as to anything that occurred 
in that period. 
Lawrences cite the affidavit of Daniel Rebor [Rebeor] for their claim that 
Capstar's use of the road was permissive. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 9, n. 5. There is an Affidavit 
of Daniel E. Rebeor in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order filed July 22, 
2003. A review of Rebeor's affidavit shows he managed the tower site for Capstar, and 
that "On November 3, 1997, Nextel West Corp. entered into an "Access License 
Agreement" with Douglas and Brenda Lawrence in an effort to avoid litigation regarding 
access to a leased parcel upon which it was locating a communications tower ..." 1; 3 F; -J
Affidavit of Daniel E. Rebeor, p. 2, 77 2, 3. On January 13, 2003, Nextel assigned the 
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Access License Agreement to Capstar. Id. v. The uncontroverted evidence is the 
license was entered into in 1997 "in an effort to avoid litigation". That certainly is not 
evidence that there was permissive use of the road at that time. It is evidence of just 
the opposite, that Lawrences were claiming Capstar had no right to use the road. 
Certainly the assignment of a license would stop the adverse period from running per 
the quoted portion of Akers, but the evidence has not been contradicted by Lawrences 
that from 1966 to 2003 Capstar and their predecessors used this road under a claim of 
right. 
Capstar's uncontradicted evidence is as follows: Harold Funk testified in his 
affidavit that: "Following the sale [in 19751, we continuously utilized the existing road in 
Section 21 to access our property in Section 22 without interference." Affidavit of 
Harold Funk in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 2004, p. 4, 7 
6. John Rook testified in his affidavit that when Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased 
its parcel in 1989: 
There were other nearby parcels used for towers further east from 
the parcel purchased by Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc., including a parcel of 
property owned and used by General Telephone Company. At the time 
that Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc. purchased its parcels, these property 
owners and their tenants were using the road to access their parcels, and 
continued to do so after Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc, purchased its parcel. 
Affidavit of John Rook in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 9, 
The existing private access road was visible and in use by Funks at 
the time Kootenai Broadcasting purchased its parcel. I have personally 
driven this road and used it on several occasions to access the Kootenai 
Broadcasting, Inc. parcel. The private road was the only road that 
provided access to Kootenai Broadcasting, Inc.'s parcel of property. 
Id. p. 3, 7 4. 
#/; -, f-2 
Lawrences make several arguments regarding Capstar's predecessor's (the . i 
Funks) ability to obtain a prescriptive easement. First, Lawrences claim "In 1975, Funk 
moved to Aberdeen and then to American Falls, Idaho, where he has resided since. 
(Funk Deposition, hereinafter 'FD' 28:20 to 28:24.). Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 4. Lawrences then argue: 
"After moving to American Falls, Funk visited his land on Blossom Mountain only two or 
three times (FD 30:25 to 31:4)11 and "Funk has not visited the Blossom Mountain land 
since 1981 (FD 31 :I  7)." Id., p. 5. What Lawrences omit from that same deposition is 
the following: 
Q. BY MR. WHELAN: Now between the time you bought the property 
and the time you sold it to Human Synergistics, how many times did you 
go up to the property? 
A. Well, we'd always go up andpick huckleberries and stuff, and target 
practice and - I don't know. I would have to guess maybe, I don't know, 
20, 30 times. 
Q. In the two year period, well three years since 1969. I'm sorry. Six- 
year period, from 1969 until 1975, about 30 times you were on top of the 
mountain? 
A. I would suppose, yeah. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Exhibit A (August 17, 2007 Deposition of Harold Funk), p. 25, LI. 11-23. 
Lawrences fail to realize that Funk's use of his property and the use he made of the 
Lawrence property in getting to his property from 1975 to the present is not relevant. 
The uncontradicted evidence is that Funk used the property consistently for the six- 
year period from the day he sold to Human Synergistics to the day he moved from the 
area. This is one year more than the five years required for the prescriptive use. 
This isn't the type of property of which one would expect daily use. The property is on 
top of a mountain. Capstar seeks this easement to maintain its radio equipment on top 
of this mountain. The use Capstar seeks is no different than the prescriptive use Funks 
made of Lawrences' land for that six-year period from 1969 to 1975. 
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It is the long established rule in this jurisdiction [Idaho] that any right gained 
by prescription is confined to the right as exercised during the prescriptive 
period, "It is limited by the purpose for which it is acquired and the use to 
which it is put." 
ldaho Forest Indus., v. Hayden Lake Watershed Impon/ement Dist., 1 12 ldaho 51 2, 51 5, 
733 P.2d 733, 736 (1 987); citing Azteck Limited, Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100 ldaho 
566, 568, 602 P.2d 64, 66 (1979). "[Plresciption acts as a penalty against a landowner 
and thus the rights obtained by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by 
the courts. Id., citing Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 ldaho 633, 570 P.2d 870 (1 977). The 
character and extent of a prescriptive easement generally is fixed and determined by the 
use under which it was acquired. No different or materially greater use can be made of 
such an easement, except by further adverse use for the prescriptive period. 25 
Am.Jur.2d Easements and Licenses § 81. 
The uncontroverted evidence is the road was established as early as 1966, and 
it is undisputed that Funks were using the road for access to both their Section 21 and 
Section 22 parcels. It is uncontradicted that when Funks sold the Section 21 parcel to 
Human Synergistics (Lawrences' predecessor), Funks included in the sales contract 
language that gave notice that Funks intended to continue to use the road for ingress 
and egress to the Section 22 parcel Funks retained. It is uncontradicted that Funks in 
fact made use of that road. This language in the recorded sales contract provided 
notice to others that Funks were claiming a right to use the road in the future for ingress 
and egress to the lands the Funks retained. The uncontroverted evidence is that Funks 
and their successors relied on that language in the recorded sales contract as it is 
undisputed that Funks and their successors then proceeded to use the road openly, 
continuously, without interruption, under a claim of right for much longer than the 6- 3 
Lan 
statutory period requires. 
E. Lawrences' New Defenses of Laches and Statute of Limitations. 
On September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed their Motion for Leave to File Amended 
Answer, requesting to add the additional defense of laches. This motion to amend was 
granted and an order to that effect was filed on September 26, 2007. Also on 
September 10, 2007, Lawrences filed another brief on summary judgment, this one 
entitled "Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment 
of PlaintifT1. In that brief, Lawrences repeat their arguments made in their brief filed July 
24, 2007, regarding implied easement by prior use, easement by necessity and 
easement by prescription. Lawrences claim additional facts not in dispute. Finally, 
Lawrences also added a brief argument on Statute of Limitations and a one paragraph 
argument regarding laches. Lawrences also filed on September 10, 2007, an "Affidavit 
of Douglas Lawrence in Support of Opposition to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment" and an "Affidavit of John P. Whelan in Support of Defendants' Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Leave to Amend." On September 17, 2007, Capstar filed "Plaintiff's 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment". 
1) Statute of Limitations. 
Lawrences argue ldaho Code § 5-203 and 5-204 apply to bar Capstar's claims. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, p. 6. Lawrences provide no legal analysis to support that argument. ldaho 
Code § 5-203 is not a statue of limitation. It simply sets forth the number of years a 
plaintiff in an action must be in possession of the property in question before filing a 
lawsuit to adverse possess that property. ldaho Code § 5-204 is also not a statute of 
limitation, but, simply a statute setting forth the number of years a party must be seize & !, i: 
or be in possession of property following an act of adverse use. It applies to all parties, 
not just the plaintiff as in I.C. 3 5-203, and it applies to defenses and to prescriptive 
easements, where I.C. 5 5-203 only concerns prescriptive possession of property. 
Lawrences argue: "Plaintiffs complaint makes no reference to its predecessors 
interest". Id. First, Lawrences completely fail to explain the legal significance of that 
claim. There can be no legal basis for this argument, as both I.C. 5 5-203 and § 5-204 
specifically mention a party's predecessor. ldaho case law has long since recognized 
this fact that a party's predecessor's use of property or time in possession can be 
tacked on to the party's use or time in possession to achieve the requisite number of 
years. Akers v. D. L. White Construction, Inc., 142 ldaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 
(2005); Hodgins v, Sales, 139 ldaho 225, 230, 76 P.3d 969, 975 (2003); State ex rel. 
Haman v. Fox, 100 ldaho 140, 146, 594 P.2d 1093, 1099 (1 979); Marshall v. Blair, 130 
ldaho 675, 680, 946 P.2d 975, 980 (1997). Second, from a factual standpoint, 
Lawrences' claim is false. Capstar's Complaint, p. 6, 7 XVll alleges: "Capstar and its 
predecessors in title have used the Blossom Mountain Road as it crosses the 
Defendants' real property for access to Capstar's real property openly, notoriously, 
continuously, adversely and under claim of right for a period exceeding five (5) years." 
Lawrences next argue: "Any such rights would necessarily had to have been litigated to 
be perfected." Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary 
Judgment of Plaintiff, p. 7. Again, there is no explanation as to the legal basis of this 
claim. Such argument is squarely contradicted by ldaho Code § 5-203, § 5-204, and 
the analysis of Hodgins, Haman, Marshall and Akers. 
2) Laches. 
Lawrences entire argument on laches is as follows: 
Whether or not a party is guilty of laches is ordinarily a question of C: fact. Osterlich v.State ofldaho, 100 Idaho 702, 604 P.2d 716. It is 4 
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beyond question that the Lawrences have been prejudiced by the alleged 
stale claims which Plaintiff now seeks to enforce. If Plaintiff and its 
predecessors truly enjoyed easements by implication, necessity andlor by 
prescriptive use, those claims should have been perfected through 
litigation. The failure to pursue the claims by Plaintiff's predecessors has 
clearly prejudiced the ability of the Lawrences and their predecessors to 
defend against the claims. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, p. 7. (italics in original). While Lawrences claim it is "beyond question" that 
Lawrences have been prejudiced, there is not one fact alleged, not one bit of argument 
stating why this is so. Similarly, there is no factual or legal argument made why 
Capstar's claims or Capstar's predecessor's "claims should have been perfected 
through litigation." The obvious flaw to Lawrences' unsupported argument is prior to 
Lawrences purchasing their property and subsequently denying Capstar access, there 
was no need to litigate! Every indication is that as soon as Lawrences prohibited 
Capstar's access, Capstar took action. Capstar simply is not "guilty of laches." 
There is absolutely no merit to either of Lawrences' defenses of statute of 
limitations or laches. 
II. ANALYSIS REGARDING TOWER ASSET SUB, INC. v. LAWRENCE. 
A. Facts Pertaining to Tower Asset Sub, Inc., v. Lawrence. 
As a preliminary matter, on November 13, 2007, Tower Asset filed a "Motion for 
Substitution of Real Party in Interest." The basis for this motion is Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. became Tower Asset Sub, L.L.C., and on February 23, 2007, Tower Asset Sub, 
L.L.C. merged into Spectra Site, L.L.C., a different Deleware Corporation. Affidavit of 
Raymond W. Goodwin in Support of Substitution of Real Party in Interest. This motion 
was heard on November 28, 2007, just prior to oral argument on Capstar's summary 
judgment motion. At the end of oral argument on the Motion for Substitution of Real 
g, 4 3 
s% 1 '  
Party in interest, the Court granted the motion and directed counsel for Tower Asset to 
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prepare an order No order has been prepared to date Slnce no order has been 
entered until thls decision and order, the Court will continue to refer to the plaintiff in this 
action as Tower Asset Sub, Inc., (Tower Asset) even though the Court has granted the 
motion to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest. 
Tower Asset has made it clear that it is only seeking injunctive relief in this case, 
and that Tower Asset is not making any claim to title over Lawrences' land. PlaintifTs 
Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 1. 
Blossom Mountain is located south of Post Falls, Idaho. The Lawrences and the 
Halls (through whom Tower Asset claims its right) own parcels of property on Blossom 
Mountain. Both the Halls' parcel and the Lawrences' parcel (Lawrence parcel) were 
once part of a larger tract held under common ownership by Harold and Marlene Funk. 
The Lawrence parcel was broken out in 1975 when Funks sold that parcel to Human 
Synergistics. Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset Case filed August 17, 2004), p. 2, 7 2.e., Exhibit E. The Halls' parcel was 
broken out in 1996 when Funks sold a parcel to Rasmussen. Id., Exhibit Q. The 
Lawrence parcel is located in the southeast quarter of Section 21, and the Halls' parcel 
is located to the east in the southwest quarter of Section 22. Id. Section 21 lies directly 
west of Section 22. Id., p. 6, 7 8, Exhibit Z. There is a public road in the area known 
as Signal Point Road. Signal Point Road lies generally West of the Lawrence parcel, 
which in turn is west of Hall's parcel. Tower Asset, as a tenant of Halls, seeks an 
easement to access its equipment located on Halls' property which Tower Asset leases 
from the Halls. The easement is located on an unimproved private road commonly 
known as Blossom Mountain Road as Blossom Mountain Road crosses through the 
Lawrence parcel. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition J 4? 7 " 
taken September 30, 2003, recognized the right-of-way easement General Telephone 
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Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' 
parcel) Id., pp. 6-7, 77 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road 
prepared by GTC's engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then 
travels southeast through the southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then 
enters the North Half of Section 28 where it then turned northeast and entered the 
southeast quarter of Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y. 
Tower Asset asserts that prior to the separation by the Funks of the Lawrences' parcel 
from the parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by 
the Funks as the exclusive means to access their property in Sections 21 and 22. 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (field August 17, 2004), pp. 
4-5, 77 7-9. Tower Asset asserts that even after the separation of Section 21, the 
Funks continued to use the private easement road to access their Section 22 parcel. 
Id., pp. 5-6, 77 10-1 I .  
Capstar and Tower Asset prove the following chain of title for the parcels 
involved in Sections 21 and 22: 
1. Reynolds to the Radens and the Marcos (Contract in 1968, Deed in 1974): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and D. 
2. Radens and Marcos to Funk (Contract in 1969, Deed in 1974): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed 
August 17, 2004), Exhibits B and C. 
To this point there was unity of title in the portions of Sections 21 and 22 at issue in this 
case. cj 4 4 
Capstar and Tower Asset establish the title chain with respect to what became 
- . ..- ----- - --.. -...- -. ... .-.--.- ..-- .-..--- - .,.....-., .,.--.. -..- . .... 
the Lawrence property located in the southeast quarter of Section 21 as: 
I. Funk to Human Synergistics (Sale Agreement in 1975, Deed in 1992): 
Supplemental Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case .filed November 2, 2004), E and I; Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits A and F; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit A and F. 
2. Human Synergistics to Johnston & McHugh (Contract and Deed May 16, 
1977): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits F and H; 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits F and H. 
3. Johnston & McHugh to N.A.P. (Sale Agreement October 6, 1987, Deed July 
16, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits G and 0 ;  
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits G and 0, 
4. N.A.P. to Farmanian (Deeds June 28, 1996 and July 8, 1996)): Afidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset 
case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits J and K; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibits J and K. 
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5 Farman~an to Douglas and Brenda Lawrence (Sale Agreement July 12, 
1996, Deed July 5, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibits L, 
M, N and P; Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 2004), Exhibits L, M, N and P. 
Capstar establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Capstar property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
1. Funk to Kootenai Broadcasting (Deed September 22, 1989): Affidavit of 
Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case 
filed March 9, 2004), Exhibit Exhibits Q and R. 
2. Kootenai Broadcasting to Rook Broadcasting (Deed October 25, 1993): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Capstar case filed March 9, 2004) Exhibit S. 
3. Rook Broadcasting to AGM (Deed November 20, 1998): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed 
March 9, 2004), Exhibit T. 
4. AGM to Capstar (Deed October 25, 2000): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Capstar case filed March 9, 
2004), Exhibit U. 
Tower Asset establishes the title chain with respect to what became the Hall property in 
the southwest corner of Section 22 as: 
I .  Funk to Rasmussen (Deed August 26, 1996): Affidavit of Susan Weeks in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case filed August 
{:) 5 
17, 2004), Exhibit Q. 
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2. Rasmussen to VanSky (Deed September 29, 1978): Affidavit of Susan 
Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (Tower Asset case 
filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit R. 
3. VanSky to Switzer Communications, Inc. (Deed December 1 1, 1981): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit S. 
4. Switzer Communications, Inc. to Term Corp. (Deed December 8, 1982): 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit T. 
5. Term Corp. to Mark E. Hall and Robert A. Hall (Deed April 16, 1997); 
Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
(Tower Asset case filed August 17, 2004), Exhibit U. 
6. Spectra Site was assigned a leasehold interest with Mark Hall and Robert 
Hall in a Parcel of property situated in the Southwest quarter of Section 
22, Township 50 North, Range 5 West, Boise Mer4idian, Kootenai 
County, Idaho. Affidavit of Dan Rebeor (Tower Asset case filed July 22, 
2003). 
When the Lawrences questioned Tower Asset's right to access the property it 
leases from the Halls over the portion of Blossom Mountain Road that traversed 
Lawrences', Tower Asset filed suit on June 27, 2003, seeking declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Tower Asset sought to have an easement declared based on four theories: 
express easement, easement by implication, easement by necessity, and prescriptive 
easement. On Tower Asset's previous motion for summary judgment, this court found 
that Tower Asset held an express easement over the Lawrence property based on the 647 
sale agreement, as well as the deed. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment 
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and Enter~ng Decree of Qu~et Title, filed May 27, 2005 The Court did not address 
Tower Asset's other theories raised in its Complaint due to a discovery issue at the 
time. Accordingly, Tower Asset and Lawrences in that initial motion for summary 
judgment did not address theories of easement by implication, easement by necessity 
and prescriptive easement. The Lawrences appealed from that decision, and the 
Supreme Court reversed summary judgment holding the deed did not create an 
express easement over the Lawrence property. On remand, Tower Asset renews its 
motion for summary judgment based on the other theories of easement previously 
raised in their complaint. 
The Lawrence parcel and the Hall parcel were once part of a single tract of land 
under the common ownership of Harold and Marlene Funk. In 1975, the Funks divided 
their land and sold what is now the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics, Inc., while 
retaining the southwest quarter of Section 22. Tower Asset asserts that although its 
origins are unknown, it is apparent that an easement over the road existed as early as 
1966. In litigation in yet another case, Douglas Lawrence, in his deposition taken 
September 30, 2003, recognized the right of way easement General Telephone 
Corporation (GTC) obtained in July 1966 for access to GTC's property in Section 22 
over the private road that crossed the Southwest Quarter of Section 21 (Lawrences' 
parcel). Affidavit of Susan Weeks in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6- 
7, 77 5-7, Exhibit W, X and Y. The detail of the access road prepared by GTC's 
engineer in 1967 shows the road leaves Signal Point Road, then travels southeast 
through the Southwest portion of Section 21 (Lawrences' parcel), then enters the North 
Half of Section 28 were it then turned northeast and entered the Southeast quarter of 
Section 21. Id. Exhibit Y, and Exhibit 15 attached to Exhibit Y 
Tower Asset claims that prior to the separation of the Lawrence parcel from the 
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parent parcel, the private road across the Section 21 parcel had been used by the 
Funks as an exclusive means to access their property. That same road was later used 
by t-iall for access to their segregated parcel in Section 22. Affidavit of Robert Hall in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3, 77 7, 8. In 1992, the Funks executed 
and delivered a warranty deed conveying the Lawrence parcel to Human Synergistics. 
The warranty deed stated that the deed was given "in fulfillment of those certain 
contracts between the parties hereto dated July 1, 1975 and conditioned for the 
conveyance of the above described property." In 1996, after a number of other 
intermediate conveyances, the Lawrences acquired ownership of their parcel. 
The ldaho Supreme Court noted on appeal that Tower Asset had already 
established that the Halls (and thus, Tower Asset) were intended to have the right to 
use the easement. The ldaho Supreme Court noted in footnote 1 that: "Tower 
presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the 
benefit of the access road across the Lawrence parcel." TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. 
Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. 
Lawrences also claim Tower Asset has not established that it is Hall's tenant and 
that Tower Asset has no standing to seek to quiet title across Lawrences' land. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Plaintiff, pp. 1, 2, 9, 10. A copy of the lease between Nextel Communications and Hall 
is included with the Affidavit of Robert Hall. Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 77 3, 4, Exhibit A. Hall received notice that this lease was 
assigned to Tower Parent Corp., and Tower Asset Sub, Inc., and that Tower Asset Sub, 
Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Id. p. 2, 77 4, 5. Additionally, the Supreme 
Court in TowerAsset, Inc., v. Lawrence, supra, noted that: "We hold that Tower, as 1349 
lessee of the alleged dominant estate, has standing to seek injunctive relief preventing 
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the Lawrence's from ~nterfer~ng with ~ t s  right to sue the easement " TowerAsset Sub. 
Inc v Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No 14, p. 4. The ldaho Supreme Court also held: 
"Tower will have standing to seek injunctive relief if ~t can establish it has an alleged 
legal r~ght to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road easement." Id. Lawrences' 
argument that Tower Asset lacks standlng to pursue easement theories of implication 
or necessity (Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for 
Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 6-7) is without merit. Lawrences admit Tower Asset 
has standing to prove an easement by prescription. Id., p. 7. 
Lawrences next argue that Hall has no easement by necessity or implication and 
thus has nothing to assign to Tower Asset, and that the only theory available to Tower 
Asset is easement by prescription. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to 
Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 1-3, 8. Tower Asset now argues that 
nothing presented by the Lawrences alters the Supreme Court holding that Tower Asset 
has standing as a lessee of the dominant estate. Tower Asset correctly argues "the 
only issue remanded by the appellate court in this case was whether Tower 
Asset, as a tenant, has a legal right to benefit from the Blossom Mountain Road 
easement of its landlord, Halls." Plaintiff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 2. (emphasis added). This is because the ldaho Supreme 
Court noted in Footnote 1 that: "Tower presented uncontroverted evidence that the Hall 
parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road across the Lawrence 
parcel." Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 14, p. 4. 
In accordance with 28A C.J.S. Easements 5 164 (1996), Tower Asset argues 
that while a private way may not be used by the general public, it may be used by the 
owner of the way, his family, tenants, servants, and guests, as well as by persons 
6: 5 
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transact~ng business with him, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary. 
Plaint~ff's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2. 
Additionally, Tower Asset asserts that there is nothing contained in the copy of the 
lease between Tower Asset and Hall that demonstrates a special agreement between 
Hall and Tower Asset that Tower Asset may not use an easement for which the Halls 
have the benefit. Id. at p. 3. Hence, Tower Asset argues they are entitled to injunctive 
relief. Id. 
Lawrences argue that Tower Asset is not the Halls' tenant since the Halls and 
Tower Asset did not follow the assignment provision of the lease agreement. 
Opposition of Douglas and Brenda Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment, p. 10. The lease between Nextel and the Halls has a provision that reads: 
"Lessee may not assign, or otherwise transfer all or any part of its interest in this 
Agreement or in the Premises without the prior written consent of Lessors ...I1 Affidavit 
of Robert Hall in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit A, f/ 14. Tower 
Asset re-characterizes Lawrences argument as follows: "Essentially, Lawrences argue 
that Hall may not waive a contract clause." Plaintiffs' Supplemental Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 3. Tower Asset correctly 
states that as long as the Halls and Tower Asset are in agreement that they share a 
tenantllandlord relationship pursuant to the lease, Lawrences may not challenge that 
relationship. Id. The uncontroverted evidence by Robert Hall is ". . .that Tower Asset 
Sub, Inc. continues to lease the site from us." Affidavit of Robert Hall in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 2, 77 4, 5, Exhibit A. This Court finds the 
uncontroverted evidence shows that Hall and Tower Asset are in agreement that they 
share a landlord and tenant relationship. As noted by Tower Asset, "No law requires 
6 I. 1 
strict compliance to the terms of the lease agreement if the parties agree to the waiver" 
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of the term " Plainti'ffs Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support: of Motion for 
Summary Judgment, p. 3. Obviously, Hall and Nextel either agreed to waive the 
assignment term, or they simply are not concerned with that provision. There is no 
assignment issue at issue here. Quite simply, the Lawrences are not in privity to the 
leasing agreement between Nextel and the Halls, or the agreement between Nextel's 
assignee, Tower Asset, and the Halls. Therefore, Tower Asset is correct in asserting its 
right to use the Halls' easement over Lawrences' land. Tower Asset is entitled to 
injunctive relief, 
As noted by the Idaho Supreme Court, "Tower presented uncontroverted 
evidence that the Hall parcel was intended to have the benefit of the access road 
across the Lawrence parcel." TowerAsset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, 2007 Opinion No. 
14, p. 4. Additionally, the analysis above as to Capstar's easement by implication from 
prior use, easement by necessity and easement by prescription, applies to the Halls. 
The only additional argument made by Lawrences as to an easement by prescription is 
.that Lawrences argue that Tower Asset itself makes no claim that it has used the 
Lawrence parcel openly, notoriously, continuously, and in a hostile manner for the 
statutory period. Lawrences' argument continues that since no prescriptive claim has 
been established by Tower.Asset and since Tower Asset's use of the road has always 
been permissive, a prescriptive easement cannot exist. The Court's analysis above 
explains why these arguments have no merit. The only additional argument made by 
Lawrences as to an implied easement by prior use is Lawrences assert that the parcel 
at issue in the Tower Asset case was not created or severed from the Funks' other 
lands until 1977 (as opposed to 1975 in the Capstar case) when Funk conveyed the 
property to RasmussenlChamberlain. Lawrences argue that because there was no 
" r- 0 1 6J -J 
easement in 1975 when the servient estate was severed from the dominant estate, and 
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therefore no prior use, Tower Asset has failed to meet the second element of an 
implied easement. This Court has already explained why there was an easement by 
~mplication, from prior use and by prescription in 1975. 
As lessee from Halls, Tower Asset is entitled to injunctive relief against 
Lawrences as to use of this easement across Lawrences' land for use of this road 
known as Signal Point Road. 
Just as in the Capstar case, Lawrences in this Tower Asset case also make the 
arguments of statute of limitations and laches. Opposition of Douglas and Brenda 
Lawrence to Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment of Plaintiff, pp. 8-9. The analysis 
above as to those arguments applies in the Tower Asset case. Lawrences cannot avail 
themselves of those defenses for the reasons stated above. 
Ill. ORDER. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment filed 
by Capstar v. Lawrence, CV 2002 7671 and Renewed Motion for Summary Judmgnet 
filed in Tower Asset Sub, Inc. v. Lawrence, CV 2003 4621, are GRANTED. In the 
Capstar case, Capstar has proven they have an implied easement by prior use, an 
easement by necessity, and an easement by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to 
establish a material fact as to any other these theories. In the Capstar case, 
Lawrences have failed to establish a material fact in dispute as to any of these theories. 
The defenses of laches and statute of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in 
the Capstar case. 
In the Tower Asset case, Tower Asset has proven they are entitled to injunctive 
relief, as their landlord, the Halls, have an easement over Lawrences land established 
by prior use, by necessity and by prescription, and Lawrences have failed to establish a ,: 1; -, 
,. J - 
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material fact in dispute as to any of these theories. The defenses of laches and statute 
of limitations are not available to the Lawrences in the TowerAsset case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED in the Tower Asset case, that Tower Asset's motion 
to substitute Spectra Site, L.L.C., as the real party in interest is GRANTED. 
Entered this 6th day of February, 2008. 
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ISB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. 
TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Tower Asset Sub Inc., and its attorney, 
Susan P. Weeks, and to the Clerk of the above-entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. 
Lawrence, appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the above- 
entitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and 
the Orders described in paragraph one (1) above are appealable Orders under 
and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a) of the ldaho Appellate Rules. 
3. Several primary orders are appealed in this appeal, including the 
February 6, 2008 order granting Plaintiff's renewed motion for summary 
judgment, together with the trial court order denying Defendants renewed 
motion for disqualification for cause. 
4. The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
(a) Was the alleged landlord of Tower Asset Sub, Inc. a necessary 
and/or indispensable party to the litigation? 
(b) Did Tower have standing to seek to establish easements by 
prescription, necessity and/or by implication? 
(c) Was it an abuse of discretion to permit Tower to substitute 
Spectracite as the real party in interest? 
(d) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself 
for cause? 
(e) In granting Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, are the 
findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent 
evidence? 
(f) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff 
prejudgment access to Defendants land without first requiring a 
bond or undertaking? 
(g) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only 
two weeks to complete their discovery? 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 &" ".; 
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(h) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting  plaintiff"^ 
affidavits in their entirety over Defendants' objections? 
(i) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendants' 
affidavits? 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript has been requested and the required 
fees will be paid on determination of an estimated cost. 
(b) The Defendants request the preparation of  any untranscri bed 
transcripts of the hearings before the Court. 
6. The Defendants request that the Clerk's record include the 
documents specified in subsection (b)( l)  of Rule 28  of the Idaho Appellate Rules 
as well as the following documents: 
(a) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for 
summary judgment together with all affidavits submitted in support of the 
motion. 
(b) Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary 
judgment and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of the opposition. 
(c) Defendants' renewed motion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(d) Defendants' original motion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(e) Defendants' motion for enlargement of  time and the briefs and 
affidavits in support. 
(f) Plaintiffs motion to substitute real party in interest, together with 
all briefs and affidavits in support. 
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(g) Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party 
in interest together with all briefs and affidavits in support. 
7.  I hereby certify: 
(a) That a copy of  this Notice o f  Appeal has been served on the 
Clerk of  the District Court. 
(b) That a request has been made with the Clerk o f  the District 
Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost. 
(c) Said fee will be paid upon determination of the appropriate 
amount. 
(d) Service has been made on all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this day of March, 2008. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the if day of March, 2008 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
2 1 3 N. 4th Street 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 4 
Tele.: (208) 664-5891 
Fax: (208) 664-2240 
lSB# 6083 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
TOWER ASSET SUB INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
DOUGLAS P. LAWRENCE and BRENDA 
J. LAWRENCE, Husband and Wife, 
Defendants. I 
CASE NO. CV-03-04621 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: The above-named Plaintiff, Tower Asset Sub lnc., and its attorney, 
Susan P. Weeks, and to the Clerk of  the above-entitled Court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Defendants, Douglas P. Lawrence and Brenda J. 
Lawrence, appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court from orders entered in the above- 
entitled action by The Honorable John T. Mitchell presiding. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and 
the Orders described in paragraph one (1) above are appealable Orders under 
and pursuant to Rule 1 1 (a) of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3 .  Several primary orders are appealed in this appeal, including the 
February 6, 2008 order granting Plaintiffs renewed motion for summary 
judgment, together with the trial court order denying Defendants renewed 
motion for disqualification for cause. 
4. The primary issues presented by this appeal include, but are not 
limited to, the following: 
(a) Was the alleged landlord of Tower Asset Sub, lnc. a necessary 
and/or indispensable party to the litigation? 
(b) Did Tower have standing to seek to establish easements by 
prescription, necessity and/or by implication? 
(c) Was it  an abuse of discretion to permit Tower to substitute 
Spectracite as the real party in interest? 
(d) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by refusing to disqualify itself 
for cause? 
(e) In granting Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, are the 
findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent 
evidence? 
(f) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff 
prejudgment access to Defendants land without first requiring a 
bond or undertaking? 
(g) Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Defendants only 
two weeks to complete their discovery? 
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(h) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting Plaintiff's 
affidavits in their entirety over Defendants' objections? 
(i) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by excluding Defendants' 
affidavits? 
5. (a) A reporter's transcript has been requested and the required 
fees will be paid on determination of an estimated cost. 
(b) The Defendants request the preparation of  the following 
transcripts of hearings before the Court from Court Reporter, Julie Foland: 
- June 13,  2007: Hearing re: Renewed Motion 
for Summary Judgment; Motion 
for Enlargement of  Time; 
A p p l i c a t i o n  f o r  O r d e r  
Shortening Time; Motion for 
Disqualification for Cause; 
Motion to Strike Portions of 
Affidavit Douglas Lawrence; 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of 
John Mack 
- August 6, 2007: 
- August 7, 2007: 
Hear ing re:  Mo t ion  f o r  
Reconsideration; Motion for 
Permission to Appeal from an 
Interlocutory Order 
Hear ing  re:  Mot ion  f o r  
Summary Judgment; Motion for 
Enlargement of  Time; Motion 
to strike; Request for Judicial 
Notice; Motion to Strike All 
Whelan's Motions 
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November 27, 2007: Hearing re: Renewed Not ion 
for Disqualification for Cause; 
Motion to Substitute Real Party 
in Interest; Renewed Motion to 
Appeal from an Interlocutory 
Order; Motion to Continue Trial 
November 2 8 ,  2007: H e a r i n g  r e :  M o t i o n  f o r  
Summary Judgment; Motion to 
Substitute Real Party in Interest 
6. The Defendants request that the Clerk's record include the 
documents specified in subsection (b)(l) of Rule 2 8  of the Idaho Appellate Rules 
as well as the following documents: 
(a) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and renewed motion for 
summary judgment together with all affidavits submitted in support of the 
motion. 
(b) Defendants' briefs in opposition to the various motions for summary 
judgment and all affidavits offered by Defendants in support of the opposition. 
(c) Defendants' renewed mdtion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(d) Defendants' original motion to disqualify for cause and all 
supporting briefs and affidavits. 
(e) Defendants' motion for enlargement of time and the briefs and 
affidavits in support. 
(f) Plaintiffs motion to substitute real party in interest, together with 
all briefs and affidavits in support. 
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( g )  Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's motion to substitute real party 
in interest together with all briefs and affidavits in support. 
7 .  Defendants further request that the District Court Clerk forward all 
exhibits that have been offered in the course of the various motions before the 
District Court that are, in whole or part, the subject of the instant appeal. 
Defendants further request that any exhibits forwarded to the Supreme Court be 
identified in a Clerk's certificate accompanying the Clerk's record. 
8. lherebycertify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of  Appeal has been served on the 
Clerk of the District Court. 
(b) That a request has been made with the Clerk o f  the District 
Court for a determination of the estimated fee for the transcript cost. 
(c) Said fee will be paid upon determination of the appropriate 
amount. 
(d) Service has been made on all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this 7% day of April, 2008. 
JOHN P. WHELAN, P.C. 
J $ ~ P .  Whelan 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theb!!.L day of  April, 2008 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, 
and addressed to the following: 
Susan P. Weeks 
James, Vernon & Weeks 
Attorneys at Law 
1 626 Lincoln Way 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 8381 4 
Via: d.S Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: (208) 664-1 684 
Personally served 
Julie Foland 
Court Reporter 
324 West Garden Ave. 
P.O. Box 9000 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 8381 6-9000 
Via: /US. Mail, postage prepaid 
Facsimile: 
Personally served 
~ f h n  q Whelan 
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I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
ill and for the Couilty of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the above 
entitled cause was compiled and bound uildcr my directioil as, and is a true, full and correct record of 
the pleadings and documeilts under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I certify that the Attorneys for the Appellant and Respondent were notified that the Clerk's 
Record and Reporter's Transcript were complete and ready to be picked up, or if the attorney is out of 
town, the copies were mailed by U.S. mail; postage prepaid, on the ____ day of 
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court 
at Kootenai, Idaho this day of ,2008. 
DANIEL J. ENGLISH 
Clerk of District Court 
By: Dep~lty Clerk 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and 
for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that I have personally served or mailed, by United States 
mail, one copy of the Clerk's Record to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows: 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Attorney at Law 
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Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 14 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at 
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